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ABSTRACT
In the year following the Fukushima nuclear disaster in March
2011, the renewable and clean energy industries faced significant turmoil—
from natural disasters, to political maelstroms, from the Great Recession,
to U.S. debt ceiling debates. The Department of Energy’s Loan Guarantee
Program (“DOE LGP”), often a target since before it ever received a dollar
of appropriations, has been both blamed and defended in the wake of the
bankruptcy filing of Solyndra, a California-based solar panel manufac-
turer, in September 2011, because of the $535 million loan guarantee made
to it by the Department of Energy (“DOE”) in 2009.1 Critics have suggested
political favoritism in loan guarantee awards and have questioned the
government’s proper role in supporting renewable energy companies and
the renewable energy industry generally.2
This Article looks beyond the Solyndra controversy to examine the
origin, structure and purpose of the DOE LGP. It asserts that loan guaran-
tees can serve as viable policy tools, but require careful crafting to have the
potential to be effective programs. It concludes that the DOE LGP did not
have consistent or achievable legislative directives nor did it have a rea-
sonable timetable to implement its Loan Guarantee Program. Overall,
projects supported by the DOE LGP are likely to remain a relatively low-
risk portfolio (notwithstanding Solyndra and several outliers).3 This risk
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1 Chu: Solyndra Demise Due to ‘Totally Unexpected’ Change in Market, NBCNEWS.COM
(Nov. 17, 2011, 10:16 AM), http://nbcpolitics.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/11/17/8857477-chu
-solyndra-demise-due-to-totally-unexpected-change-in-market?lite.
2 Amy Payne, Morning Bell: Wind Energy Subsidies Are as Useful as VHS Tape Subsidies,
HERITAGE BLOG (Aug. 16, 2012, 9:02 AM), http://blog.heritage.org/2012/08/16/morning-bell
-wind-energy-subsidies-are-as-useful-as-vhs-tape-subsidies/.
3 Alison Williams, BGOV Study: Solyndra Failure Obscures Low-Risk Energy Guarantees,
BLOOMBERG GOV’T BLOG (Dec. 1, 2011), http://about.bgov.com/2011/12/01/bgov-study
-solyndra-failure-obscures-low-risk-energy-guarantees/.
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profile, however, reflects the DOE’s failure to meet some of its statutory
goals, because the DOE had competing and contradictory Congressional
directives, dooming the Loan Guarantee Program’s ability to succeed.4
This Article has six sections. First, the Article examines the ambig-
uous language commonly used to describe renewable energy, green energy,
clean energy and industries associated with these terms. It then defines
two terms: the Renewable Energy Industry (“REI”) and the Renewable
Energy Electrical Generation Industry (“REEGI”). Second, the Article ex-
amines the state of the market for REEGI and various challenges that face
this industry. Third, the Article describes the origin and structure of the
DOE LGP and initial assessments of this program prior to the Solyndra
scandal. Fourth, the Article examines the details concerning Solyndra’s
loan guarantee and bankruptcy, and asserts that Solyndra’s failure was
based on market conditions and the company’s business model not on short-
comings in the DOE LGP. Few other DOE loan guarantee recipients will
follow in Solyndra’s wake. Fifth, the Article analyzes the DOE LGP and
asserts that the program’s contradictory legislative guidance limited the
effectiveness of the program, ensuring the program would face criticism
from all sides no matter which projects it supported. The Article also ex-
amines the common arguments made against the DOE LGP specifically,
and government loan guarantees generally. Finally, the Article concludes
that loan guarantees can be viable policy tools, but their effectiveness de-
pends on both the coherence of legislative authority and implementation.
In the case of the DOE LGP, competing legislative purposes and lack of
specificity hampered the program’s effectiveness.
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INTRODUCTION: FRAUD, FAVORITISM, AND FREE MONEY
The Solyndra scandal has garnered national attention ever since
it became evident Solyndra would file for bankruptcy during the first week
of September 2011.5 It was a shock when Solyndra filed for bankruptcy
protection, notwithstanding the fact that news of corporate bankruptcies
had become distressingly regular news since 2007.6 Solyndra was the much
5 Solyndra has become the poster child for critics of federal involvement in and support of
renewable energy, with frequent allegations of influence peddling, cronyism, and failures
of federal government programs. Solyndra filed for bankruptcy on September 6, 2011. See
discussion of Solyndra’s bankruptcy infra note 199 and accompanying text.
6 Corporate bankruptcies have been newsworthy for their size rather than the quantity
of filings in the past several years. Nevertheless, filings in 2011 were more than double the
filings in 2007. See Shira Ovide, MF Global: Likely Among the 10 Biggest Bankruptcies
Ever, WALL ST. J. BLOGS (Oct. 31, 2011, 10:38 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2011/10/31
/mf-global-likely-among-the-10-biggest-bankruptcies-ever/ (noting MF Global’s bankruptcy
filing, based on asset values at the time of filing, ranked number eight of the ten largest
filings; seven other filings on this list occurred in 2008 or later). The list does not include
other well-known bankruptcy filings from 2011, such as American Airlines, Borders,
Blockbuster, Circuit City and Dynegy (the energy company that almost merged with
Enron before the latter filed for bankruptcy in 2001). See generally Dynegy Scraps Enron
Deal, CNNMONEY (Nov. 28, 2001), http://money.cnn.com/2001/11/28/companies/enron/;
U.S. Federal Courts Bankruptcy Statistics, UNITED STATES COURTS, available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics.aspx (providing statistics on bankruptcy
filings commenced over trailing three or twelve month reporting periods. While the number
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touted recipient of the first loan guarantee commitment7 issued by the
DOE for $535 million by the DOE’s Loan Guarantee Program Office (“LGP
Office”). President Obama even personally visited the new factory around
the time of the loan guarantee commitment.8 The Solyndra matter has been
the subject of intense Congressional scrutiny9 including an investigation
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”).10 In light of the Solyndra
scandal, some critics asserted that the DOE LGP engages in crony capi-
talism, alleging that its recipients are political donors or otherwise well-
connected to the Obama Administration.11 Other critics simply believed
loan guarantees do not work, and pointed to the DOE LGP as an example
of a failed government policy.12 Still others have criticized the beneficia-
ries of the program (the renewable energy, green energy, or clean energy
of business Chapter 11 filings commenced on the twelve month period ending Sept. 30, 2011
(10,168 cases) was lower than the number of filings in the same periods in either 2010 or
2009, this figure was greater than the number of filings in 2008 and nearly double the
number of filings in 2007 (5317 cases)).
7 Solyndra Inc., LOAN PROGRAMS OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://lpo.energy.gov
/?projects=solyndra-inc (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
8 NBCNEWS.COM, supra note 1; George Gilder, California’s Destructive Green Jobs Lobby,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2010, at A21.
9 The House Energy and Commerce Committee (“HEC Committee”) and its Subcommittee
for Oversight and Investigations (“Oversight Subcommittee”) have held hearings and con-
ducted investigations into the circumstances surrounding all aspects of the Solyndra trans-
action and the DOE LGP generally. In addition, the House Oversight and Government
Reform Committee (“OGR Committee”) and its Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs,
Stimulus Oversight and Government Spending (“RASOG Subcommittee”) have also held
hearings and conducted investigations on Solyndra, other loan guarantee recipients, and
the DOE LGP. By contrast, the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee (“SENR
Committee”) expressly decided against holding hearings on Solyndra. See Amy Harder,
Senate Sitting Out Solyndra Saga, NATIONAL JOURNAL DAILY (Oct. 20, 2011), http://epw
.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Minority.Blogs&ContentRecord_id=21b4be4c
-802a-23ad-40ad-d272ba3d958a (last visited Jan. 30, 2013); The Obama Administration’s
Green Energy Gamble: What Have All the Taxpayer Subsidies Achieved?: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Regulatory Affairs, Stimulus Oversight, and Gov’t Spending, 112th Cong.
4–5 (2012) (statement of Jim Nelson, President and CEO, Solar3D, Inc.). This Article will
reference some of the publicly available information from the Congressional hearings.
10 The DOE participated in the FBI’s investigation of Solyndra. See Matthew Mosk &
Ronnie Greene, FBI Raids ‘Connected’ Energy Firm Solyndra, ABC NEWS: THE BLOTTER
(Sept. 8, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/fbi-raids-connected-energy-firm-solyndra
/story?id=14473051.
11 Id.; see also DARRELL ISSA, COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV’T REFORM, THE DEPARTMENT
OF ENERGY’S DISASTROUS MANAGEMENT OF LOAN GUARANTEE PROGRAMS 19–21, 23 (2012).
12 The American Energy Initiative: The Cost of Loan Guarantees, Testimony Before the H.
Comm. on Energy and Commerce SubCommittee on Energy and Power, 112th Cong. (2012)
(statement of David W. Kreutzer, Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation).
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industries), rather than loan guarantees as a form of government support
because they disagreed with providing incentives to these industries.13
This Article assesses whether loan guarantee programs can serve
their purpose as policy tools for lawmakers and policymakers and whether
the DOE LGP met its goals. It aims to look beyond the politically charged
Solyndra debate to consider the origins of the DOE LGP and analyze
whether the DOE LGP accomplished its legislative missions. This Article
does not consider individual allegations of illegal or unethical activity to
procure or modify loan guarantee commitments by Solyndra or any other
loan guarantee recipients. Instead, it evaluates the more systemic critiques
of the DOE LGP. In order to better understand the framework of the var-
ious arguments against the DOE LGP, it is necessary to untangle various
issues that complicate the debate over the value of the DOE LGP.
The Article consists of six Parts. Part I examines the ambiguity
of language in the area of renewable energy and proposes more accurate
terminology. While there are very different views on what federal and state
energy policy should be, on a more fundamental level different groups are
not even speaking the same language. Identifying this linguistic ambigu-
ity does not solve or even clarify this gap, but doing so may improve the
quality of debate over relative merits of different policy positions.
Part II highlights some of the challenges that face the REI14 as a
whole by focusing on a subset of the REI, the REEGI.15 The broader debate
over the appropriate role of government support for renewable energy,
clean energy or green energy, as these terms are defined below, is beyond
the scope of this Article.16 Arguments made by critics about any support
for these alternative energy sources will be addressed in future work.
Part III details the authorization and funding for the DOE LGP. It
describes the application process loan guarantee applicants faced, including
concerns over timing and inter-agency communication and coordination.
13 See ISSA, supra note 11, at 11.
14 I describe the term “Renewable Energy Industry” as the industries directly connected
with renewable energy electrical generation projects, including manufacturers of com-
ponents used in such projects. See infra Parts I.A and I.B.2.
15 I define the term “Renewable Energy Electrical Generation Industry” as the construction
and operation of electrical generation facilities which use renewable sources of energy to
generate electricity and the direct participants in this industry who build and operate these
facilities. See infra Part I.A.
16 I will review renewable energy incentives in a separate work that will examine the fed-
eral and state framework of incentives that are currently in place. I believe a better coor-
dinated framework of incentives is necessary to stimulate sufficient growth of REEGI to
reach a level of sustainable development.
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It also describes some of the government audits of the DOE LGP conducted
prior to the Solyndra scandal. Finally, it describes some industry perspec-
tives of the DOE LGP pre-Solyndra scandal.
Part IV details the Solyndra story, from formation to floundering,
and finally to bankruptcy. This Part details the reasons for Solyndra’s
bankruptcy and references some of the Congressional investigations con-
ducted post-Solyndra. This Part also describes some of the other DOE
loan guarantee projects that have failed or experienced difficulties since
Solyndra’s bankruptcy and differentiates them from the balance of the
DOE LGP portfolio.
Part V analyzes the DOE LGP and concludes that its fundamental
shortcoming was that its statutory goals were unduly broad and in some
cases contradictory. For example, the DOE LGP had incompatible missions,
such as supporting innovative technologies on the one hand and support-
ing commercial (excluding innovative) technologies on the other hand.17
Contradictory congressional directives18 with limited guidance meant the
LGP Office was doomed to disappoint no matter what types of projects the
LGP Office funded. This Part also examines some of the critics’ previous
arguments against loan guarantees and addresses their validity in the
current environment.
The Article concludes that loan guarantee programs, if properly
structured, can serve as effective policy tools. In the case of the DOE LGP,
it concludes that the initial legislative directives ensured that the DOE
LGP would not meet Congress’s expectations, because of the contradictory
nature of the programs.
I. THE RENEWABLE ENERGY TOWER OF BABEL
This Part highlights the lack of linguistic precision in discussions of
renewable energy. Much like mankind in the story of the Tower of Babel,19
the area of renewable energy suffers from lack of clarity in the language
used to describe it. This linguistic ambiguity hinders the growth and devel-
opment of this area, because the lack of a common understanding prevents
effective debate and results in imprecise decision-making by policymakers.
17 See infra Part III.B.3.
18 See infra notes 273–74 and accompanying text.
19 Mankind was working as one people to build a tower to the heavens. The Lord saw this,
and chose to confound mankind and make them speak different languages and scattered
them across the earth. Genesis 11:5–9 (King James) (“Therefore is the name of it called
Babel; because the LORD did there confound the language of all the earth: and from thence
did the LORD scatter them abroad upon the face of all the earth”).
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This Article does not propose to create common definitions or even to
change the many terms presently in use, but rather seeks to identify some
of the differences in language to raise awareness of the complexity and
confusion that exists in terminology.
Many of the terms used to describe renewable energy are amor-
phous, bending to fit the particular needs of the author or speaker at the
moment they are used. This Part attempts to point out some of these terms
and identify the general differences between these terms and the way each
is used. This Article defines the terms “Renewable Energy Industry” (“REI”)
and “Renewable Energy Electrical Generation Industry” (“REEGI”). It then
provides context for where these terms sit in the broader framework of
other commonly used identifiers, including green economy, green energy,
clean energy and clean tech. It defines renewable energy as a subset of both
green energy and clean energy.
A. Renewable Energy Industry and Renewable Energy Electrical
Generation Industry Defined
This Article focuses on the REI and a subset of this industry, the
REEGI. REI is a broad characterization of industries using renewable en-
ergy in connection with electrical generation projects, including not only
developers and operators of power from electrical generation projects, but
also contractors, manufacturers, and applied researchers contributing
directly to such projects. Technologies covered by the term REI shall in-
clude naturally occurring renewable resources, whether or not they are
regarded as depleting resources.20
REEGI is the industry that develops and operates electrical genera-
tion facilities reliant on renewable energy, with an emphasis on independ-
ent power producers, where a project or facility generates electricity for
resale to a utility. There are many participants and variations within the
industry, based on types of technology and the roles of participants (devel-
opers, contractors, operators, as well as power purchasers). This Article
focuses on facilities that are interconnected to the generation network grid,
20 Depleting resources are typically not considered renewable—by definition, depletion
implies that a resource cannot be renewed, but the Internal Revenue Code in some places
treats renewable resources as depleting ones. See 26 U.S.C. § 611(a) (2006) (treating geo-
thermal deposits as depleting resources for tax purposes and eligible for a deduction in
computing taxable income for a reasonable allowance for depletion and depreciation of
improvements); see also 26 U.S.C. § 613(e) (2006) (providing that geothermal deposits are
eligible for a 15% depletion deduction from gross income from the property, adjusted for
rent or royalties paid by the taxpayer).
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rather than purely “behind-the-meter” installations, such as homeowner
installations, distributed generation, or purely commercial operations con-
nected to the distribution network.21
B. What Is Renewable Energy?
There is no commonly agreed definition or scope for renewable
energy. In the evolving debate over the role of renewable energy and the
extent of government support for it, many imprecise and overlapping terms
are used. Some of the most commonly used terms are “green economy,”
“renewable energy,” “clean energy,” “clean tech,” and “energy efficiency.”22
Though these terms are commonly used nearly interchangeably, they do
not have the same meanings.
1. Green Economy vs. Green Energy
a. Green Economy
The term “green economy” is often used, but it is a broad and am-
biguous term used to convey very different meanings; the Oxford English
Dictionary (“OED”) defines green economy as “an economy based on or
guided by environmentalist principles; (also) the economic sector devoted
to products and services which are intended to minimize or remediate harm
to the environment.”23 “Green economy” can refer to something as broad
and difficult to define as guiding principles regarding products and services
21 “Behind-the-meter” typically refers to electricity generated on the customer’s side of its
electricity meter and connection to the electricity distribution network. See generally MARK
RAWSON, CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION, DISTRIBUTED GENERATION ISSUES AND BENEFITS
PAPER 5 (July 2004) (providing a definition of distributed generation). A better way to think
about the distinction, however, is whether a facility provides power into the bulk power gen-
eration grid or simply produces electricity for its own use. See generally Understanding the
Grid, NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORPORATION, http://www.nerc.com/page.php
?cid=1|15 (last visited Jan. 30, 2013) (illustrating the North American bulk power system,
consisting of the interconnection of generation, transmission, and distribution systems).
22 This set of terms is for illustration purposes and is by no means comprehensive. I picked
these terms because of their frequent use. Other terms used include “green energy,” “green
companies,” “sustainable energy,” and “green tech” to name a few. See, e.g., What Is the
Future of Natural Gas Use in the U.S.?, NPR RADIO BROADCAST (Oct. 17, 2011), available
at http://www.npr.org/2011/10/17/141434059/what-is-the-future-of-natural-gas-use (In this
interview, Mr. Daniel Yergin used the term “sustainable energy” to describe wind and
solar resources.).
23 Green Economy Definition, OED ONLINE, http://oed.com/view/Entry/81167?redirected
From=green%20economy (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
434 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 37:425
as well as the very specific fields of research, development, production, or
manufacturing in any of the following areas: renewable energy electrical
generation, alternative fuel development or production (such as hydrogen,
fuel cell or ethanol for blending), climate change technologies, reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions (“GHGs”), energy efficiency initiatives (such as
smart grid projects, improved insulation, improved energy efficient win-
dows, and “green” building technologies), greening of fossil fuels such as
carbon sequestration to create clean coal, or “clean tech” technologies.24
Even more confusing, the laundry list of fields in the preceding sentence
is by no means a comprehensive list of what people intend when they use
the term “green economy.”25 Some people use the term green economy to
refer to climate change initiatives focused on pricing of carbon emissions,
such as proposals for cap and trade legislation.26 Others use the “green
economy” to refer to a transformational shift in where and how resources
are allocated, including pricing of emissions, such as carbon emissions, but
also other areas such as implementing energy efficiency initiatives.27 Still
others intermingle the term “green economy” with other terms, suggesting
that the green economy includes clean energy and energy efficiency.28 The
term green economy could also conceivably include all recycling industries,
from metal salvage, to consumer recycling, or even production of lower im-
pact consumer products, such as paper and plastics produced with recycling
materials, production or distribution of low impact products, such as bam-
boo plates and silverware, or digital recording technologies. Finally, “green
economy” can be more broadly used to describe a fundamental cultural shift
in the way we produce and consume even the most ordinary consumer
goods to achieve sustainability.29 The definition of green economy is likely
broader than green energy.
24 See “clean” and related “clean tech” defined in Parts I.B.3 and I.B.4. These terms en-
compass industries and associated technologies in areas such as energy efficiency, energy
conservation, or GHG reductions. See also Timothy F. Slaper, The Green Economy: What
Does Green Mean?, IND. BUS. REV., Fall 2009, at 10, available at http://www.ibrc.indiana
.edu/ibr/2009/fall/article3.html.
25 Id.
26 See Paul Krugman, Green Economics: How We Can Afford to Tackle Climate Change,
N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Apr. 11, 2010, at 37.
27 See id.; Joseph A. Stanislaw, Climate Changes Everything: The Dawn of the Green
Economy, DELOITTE, Jan. 15, 2008, at 15–16, available at http://www.cleantechsandiego
.org/reports/us_er_Stanislaw_Climate%20Changes%20Everything_01-15-08%20FINAL.pdf.
28 See Lauren Williamson, The In-House Investment: Interview with Howard Learner,
INSIDE COUNSEL, Apr. 2009, at 62, available at http://media.insidecounsel.com/inside
counsel/historical/Issues/2009/April-2009/Documents/Cover%20story.pdf.
29 For two distinct views on this topic, see THOMAS FRIEDMAN, HOT, FLAT, AND CROWDED
(2008) and BILL MCKIBBEN, DEEP ECONOMY (2007).
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b. Green Energy
Green energy is a subset of the green economy which focuses on
industries related solely to energy. The OED Online defines “green energy”
as “renewable energy; energy produced or harnessed in an environmen-
tally responsible manner.”30 This suggests renewable energy is green
energy. The definition also suggests that the production or harnessing of
energy in an environmentally responsible manner can be considered green
energy.31 Would carbon sequestration32 or Integrated Gasification Com-
bined Cycle technologies33 for coal qualify? Likely yes. Would conventional
coal plants that are upgraded to meet new emissions standards for carbon
emissions through addition of scrubbers qualify? Perhaps, but this seems
like a less likely use of the term “green energy.” From a quick examination
of these terms, it is reasonable to conclude that green energy is a part of
the green economy. The exact scope of green energy, however, is difficult
to pin down, and appears to depend on the user’s threshold for what is or
is not “green.” That said, “green” appears to be broader than “renewable,”
as discussed below.
2. Renewable Energy
What does “renewable energy” mean? Interestingly, the OED de-
fines “renewable energy” as a synonym for “green energy.”34 Given that
green energy can be broad enough to include an increase in efficiency or
reduction of emissions at facilities that rely on fossil and conventional fuels,
and not just regular operations at facilities that use renewable resources
30 Green Energy Definition, OED ONLINE, http://oed.com/view/Entry/81167?redirectedFrom=
green%20energy (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
31 Id.
32 See generally Carbon Storage, Frequently Asked Questions, NATIONAL ENERGY TECH-
NOLOGY LABORATORY, http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/carbon_seq/faqs.html (last
visited Jan. 30, 2013). Carbon sequestration describes the process of carbon capture and
storage (“CCS”). This technology is currently in development and no commercial scale
projects have yet been built.
33 See generally How Coal Gasification Power Plants Work, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://
www.fossil.energy.gov/programs/powersystems/gasification/howgasificationworks.html
(last visited Jan. 30, 2013). IGCC technology is used to produce electricity from coal that
has been converted to synthetic gas. Neither CCS nor IGCC have been built at a commer-
cial scale and development costs for these technologies have been extremely high. In an
environment of unusually low natural gas prices, IGCC in particular faces obstacles as
synthetic gas is at a price disadvantage.
34 See Green Energy Definition, supra note 30.
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like solar and wind energy, it seems inconsistent to lump all renewable
energy in with these other concepts of energy. Using the terms described
above would suggest that renewable energy is green energy, but not all
green energy is renewable energy. For example, if we define green energy
as energy harnessed in an environmentally responsible manner, this does
not necessarily require tapping of renewable resources.
For REI as defined in this Article, “renewable energy” is defined as
the process of harnessing renewable resources and converting their energy
into electricity.35 The most commonly thought of renewable resources are
the sun, wind and water (the latter of which includes not only traditional
hydroelectric power generation but innovative forms like wave- and tide-
generated energy). Another natural resource is underground hot springs,
the steam from which is harnessed to produce geothermal energy.36
It is important to note that “renewable energy” is not always de-
fined in such a limited fashion. Often, the term “renewable energy” de-
scribes energy that comes from sources other than those considered pure
renewables. Other resources that may be considered in a similar category—
and require a human hand in their creation—are substances that are a
byproduct from other activity, which are then broken down to generate
electricity. Examples of this include biomass facilities, which use either
crops grown purely for energy or waste products such as wood byproducts
from forestry or paper, or even landfill waste.37
This Article defines “renewable energy” in the context of REI and
REEGI by limiting it to the process of converting energy from renewable
resources to electricity generation. This limitation is included because
energy represents a broad spectrum of activities and industries, more
than just “electricity.” It is important to highlight the difference between
energy and electricity. Energy takes a variety of forms, only one of which
is electricity.38 Electricity, is, therefore, a subset of energy.
35 Renewable energy projects are generally divided into several categories based upon the
amount of electricity to be generated, the end user of the energy, and how (or if) it is con-
nected to the grid.
36 See Geothermal Energy, Climate Techbook, CENTER FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS,
http://www.c2es.org/technology/factsheet/geothermal (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
37 See THE BIOMASS ECONOMY, NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY 1–3 (July 2002).
How these technologies are classified varies. Generally, they receive similar treatment for
public incentives, but are not technically renewable resources based on naturally occurring
sources of energy, but rather are recycling byproducts from some other process.
38 Energy Definition, OED ONLINE, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/62088?rskey=4TMY7S
&result=1#eid (last visited Jan. 30, 2013). Energy can exist in a variety of forms, such as
electrical, mechanical, chemical, thermal, or atomic, and can be transformed from one form
to another. Id.
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The term “renewable energy” is often used to describe the entire
supply chain associated with the generation of electricity, rather than sim-
ply the end facility that actually harnesses and converts energy to electrical
power.39 Thus, it looks beyond just the REEGI to the manufacturing com-
panies, suppliers, and various contractors along the entire supply chain.
An analogy to the petroleum industry would be the upstream extraction
element of oil and gas production40 and the downstream refining capacities,
the associated industries building equipment for up- and downstream
activities, and professionals working in these areas.41 At its broadest,
“renewable energy” is used to describe upstream and downstream activ-
ities within the sector, rather than simply one end product. It would be
akin to someone saying “petroleum industry” to refer to only independently
owned gas stations.42
The imprecision of language can be seen in the common usage of
the term “renewable energy.” Often the term is used vaguely, to capture
other areas that might not be considered renewable energy per se and cer-
tainly would not be considered part of the REEGI. For example, alternative
fuels43 are often described as “renewable energy” initiatives44 and even
alternative vehicle manufacturing.45 These technologies and industries
fit better under the terms described below.
3. Clean Energy
A clearer distinction is the difference between renewable energy
and clean energy. Renewable energy is a subset of clean energy; however,
clean energy spans much more than just renewables. “Clean energy” refers
39 JESS CHEN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL, RENEWABLE ENERGY
SUPPLY CHAINS 42 (2001).
40 L.F. Ivanhoe, World Oil Supply-Production, Reserves, and EOR, HUBBERT CENTER
NEWSLETTER (Colorado School of Mines Petroleum Engineering Dep’t), #2000/1-1, at 6.
41 Id.
42 If a town wished to tax gas stations more in their locality, that town would refer to gas
stations as opposed to the petroleum industry, lest it inadvertently tax unintended busi-
nesses, like a home heating oil company, an asphalt production company, a chemicals
company, or innumerable other ventures in which petroleum is a necessary component.
43 The term “renewable fuels” often refers to ethanol (whether corn-based or another feed-
stock, such as sugar cane, sorghum or newer innovations such as corn stover, switch-grass
and algae) and biodiesel. See Why Renewables: Biofuels, 25X’25 AMERICA’S ENERGY FUTURE,
http://www.25x25.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=16&Itemid=45.
44 See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2009) (Energy
Efficiency and Renewable Energy heading in appropriations language).
45 See Part III.B.3.c.
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to energy that is generated from sources that have limited or no carbon
footprint, i.e., they have limited or no emissions of GHGs, or at least a
reduced amount of GHGs compared to the unclean version of the same
energy.46 Many of the natural resources described under “Renewable
Energy” fall within the term “clean energy.”47 In addition to these resources,
clean energy often refers to energy derived from natural resources that
may not technically be considered renewable resources, such as geother-
mal energy.48 The most important form of electricity generation that is
included within clean energy, however, is nuclear power, which does not
generate any carbon and therefore no GHGs.49 Nuclear power accounts
for twenty percent of domestic electricity production.50 Clean energy often
includes advances in fossil fuel–based electric generation (“conventional
generation”),51 such as sequestration techniques for carbon to create clean
coal, including clean coal technologies (“CCT”), carbon capture and storage
(“CCS”) and integrated gasification combined cycle (“IGCC”) electrical
generating facilities.52
46 Clean coal technologies are often included in the category of clean energy in that the tech-
nologies offer a smaller carbon footprint for conventional generation. See Environmental
Responsibility, AMERICAN CLEAN COAL FUELS, http://www.cleancoalfuels.com/cleancoalfuels
_environmental.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2013).
47 This includes naturally occurring resources such as wind, sun, and water. Geothermal
energy is different. See infra note 48.
48 To extract geothermal energy, wells are drilled and hot steam is accessed deep under-
ground. When generating electricity from this steam, some of the steam is lost and must be
replenished with new water that is pumped back into the wells. This loss of the resource
technically prevents geothermal energy from being considered a pure renewable resource.
Rather geothermal energy is sometimes viewed as a depleting resource. See generally
C.E. Clark et al., Water Use in the Development and Operation of Geothermal Power Plants,
ARGONNE NATIONAL LABORATORY 5 (January 2011) available at web.anl.gov/renewables
/pdfs/ANL_EVS_R-10_5.pdf.
49 Clean-Air Benefits of Nuclear Energy, NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE, http://www.nei.org
/keyissues/protectingtheenvironment/cleanair (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
50 ENERGY INFO. ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2009
276, fig. 9.2 (Aug. 2010), available at ftp://ftp.eia.doe.gov/multifuel/038409.pdf. While
nuclear power leaves no carbon footprint, the country has yet to come up with a long term
solution to nuclear waste. Yucca Mountain had long been a proposed storage location, but
this program was cancelled and no alternative storage solution has been identified to date.
Yucca Mountain, BEYOND NUCLEAR, http://www.beyondnuclear.org/yucca-mountain
(last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
51 Fossil fuel–based electrical generation will be described as “conventional generation”
in this Article. It consists of electrical generation facilities fueled by coal, natural gas, and
petroleum products, such as diesel or other fuel oil. The nature or complexity of the gen-
eration facility does not matter for the purpose of this definition, just the fuel source.
52 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, CLEAN COAL TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS: PROGRAM UPDATE 2009 1–2
(2009), available at http://fossil.energy.gov/programs/powersystems/cleancoal/publications
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A prime example of the imprecision of language is the use of “clean
energy.” Consider President Obama’s 2011 State of the Union address.
President Obama used the term “clean energy” five times in his address
and called for eighty percent of the country’s electricity to come from clean
energy sources by the year 2035, but never specified how he planned to
reach this goal or what, precisely, he meant.53 Commentators surmised,
because of the terms he used, the lack of definition given to them, and the
significant reduction in GHGs he sought, that his focus was going to be on
nuclear energy and cleaning up conventional generation more than on inno-
vation in purely renewable energy sources.54 President Obama used the
term “clean energy” five times in the 2011 address, but the term “renewable
energy” just once.55 In 2012, he did the same, using “renewable energy” just
once but referring to “clean energy” seven times.56 Obama also used the
term “American-made Energy.”57
Perhaps President Obama’s use of the term “clean energy” is accu-
rate. Use of this term, rather than a more narrowly tailored term, offered
the President significant flexibility in how he could reach his carbon re-
duction goals.
4. Clean Tech
The term “clean tech,” short for “clean technology,” is another term
with no common definition.58 The term, however, is often used to describe
/CCT_Program_Update_2009.pdf (describing different types of clean coal technologies, as
well as technologies to harness energy from hydrogen and natural gas).
53 Pres. Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of Union Address (Jan. 25, 2011)
[hereinafter 2011 State of the Union Address], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the
-press-office/2011/01/25/remarks-president-state-union-address (“So tonight, I challenge
you to join me in setting a new goal: By 2035, 80 percent of America’s electricity will come
from clean energy sources.”).
54 Jonathan Fahey, Obama’s Clean Energy Standard: How Clean Is It?, HUFFINGTON
POST (Jan. 26, 2011, 5:13 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/26/obamas-clean
-energy-stand_n_814525.html.
55 2011 State of the Union Address, supra note 53.
56 Pres. Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address (Jan. 24,
2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/24/remarks-president
-state-union-address.
57 Id. (“And nowhere is the promise of innovation greater than in American-made energy.”).
58 For a more in-depth discussion of the idea of clean technology, see Neal Dikeman, What
Is Clean Tech?, CNET NEWS (Aug. 10, 2008), http://news.cnet.com/8301-11128_3-10012950
-54.html. The author describes the origin and use of the term “clean tech,” stating
“Cleantech, also referred to as clean technology, and often used interchangeably with the
term greentech, has emerged as an umbrella term encompassing the investment asset
class, technology, and business sectors which include clean energy, environmental, and
sustainable or green, products and services.” Id.
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companies, not only associated with various aspects of renewable energy,
but also a broader spectrum of ventures beyond energy.59 The term “clean
tech” does not focus on a specific technology, but appears to have a theme
of improved efficiency in using resources, whether natural or otherwise,
with an improvement to the environment, and associated investment in
these ventures and an overriding philosophy in the manner of doing busi-
ness or investing. Yet, as one can see, the definitions commonly found for
the term are not in agreement about what is included or excluded from
clean tech.
5. Energy Efficiency
The term “energy efficiency” is broad, though not quite as broad as
“clean tech.” Generally, it refers to doing more with less energy, and is often
used in connection with building construction and energy usage. Energy
efficiency covers much more than buildings—it can apply to improvements
in vehicles and aspects of industry, from manufacturing to service, in the
manner in which a company runs its business.60 It can include reductions
in usage of resources as well.61 Generally, it does not refer to the creation
of electricity, but rather a reduction in the amount of electricity or other
energy consumed. Examples of energy efficiency include improved insula-
tion in walls, buildings and doors, reduction in the use of plastics, reduc-
tion in water consumption, improved fuel economy for vehicles, improved
ability to recycle used components, and energy star ratings for consumer
appliances.62 McKinsey & Company concluded in a 2009 report on energy
efficiency that if various energy efficiency measures were implemented at
scale, they could reduce projected demand by approximately twenty-three
percent by 2020, which McKinsey estimated at 9.1 quadrillion BTUs, and
59 See, e.g., Clean Technology Definition, BUSINESSDICTIONARY.COM, http://www.business
dictionary.com/definition/clean-technology.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
60 See generally ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ENERGY EFFICIENCY: REDUCE
ENERGY BILLS, PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT, available at http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy
/documents/suca/consumer_fact_sheet.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
61 Id.
62 The DOE’s Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy has a broader mission—
it “invests in clean energy technologies that strengthen the economy, protect the envi-
ronment, and reduce dependence on foreign oil.” The resulting scope for this Office covers
a number of different areas within the broad context of energy efficiency, from programs
for homeowner weatherization assistance to vehicle technologies. See Energy Efficiency
and Renewable Energy, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www.eere.energy.gov (last visited
Jan. 30, 2013).
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abate up to 1.1 gigatons of greenhouse gases annually.63 There has been
significant focus on energy efficiency in recent legislation at the federal
level as well as at the state and local levels.64 Some scholars have pro-
vided recommendations for policymakers and practitioners to promote
energy efficiency.65
II. STATE OF THE RENEWABLE ENERGY ELECTRICAL
GENERATION INDUSTRY
As the description of competing terms and areas evidence, REEGI
is only a component of the broader REI and clean tech areas. To provide
a sense of scale and the issues surrounding why incentives exist, this
Part details the status of the REEGI and obstacles this industry faces. As
a subset of the broader REI and clean tech, challenges for REEGI natu-
rally reflect challenges for the broader industries as well. If a developer
cannot build a profitable generation project, other businesses in the supply
chain, such as solar panel manufacturers, are likely unable to operate
profitably either.
A. Market Penetration
While the REEGI has significantly increased its market penetration,
it remains a small component of our nation’s overall energy generation66
when compared to the overall electric generation industry.67 To offer the
reader a sense of how limited renewable energy generation penetration
63 Hannah Choi Granade et al., Unlocking Energy Efficiency in the US Economy, MCKINSEY
GLOBAL ENERGY AND MATERIALS (2009), at 1, http://www.mckinsey.com/client_service
/electric_power_and_natural_gas/latest_thinking/unlocking_energy_efficiency_in_the_us
_economy; see also, Energy Info Admin., Annual Energy Outlook 2011, ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, at 34 (Apr. 2011), http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/aeo/aeoref_tab.html
(EIA provides estimates on energy efficiency projected savings in residential and commercial
sectors related to changes in appliance standards and building code requirements).
64 ELIZABETH DORIS ET AL., NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY, ENERGY EFFI-
CIENCY POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: OVERVIEW OF TRENDS AT DIFFERENT LEVELS OF
GOVERNMENT iii, v (Dec. 2009), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/46532.pdf.
65 See, e.g., John Dernbach et al., Energy Efficiency and Conservation: New Legal Tools and
Opportunities, 25 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 7 (2011); Sarah Schindler, Encouraging Private
Investment in Energy Efficiency (Jan. 2011) (on file with University of Connecticut School
of Law, Center for Energy and Environmental Law).
66 LiveChat Thurs, 10/20, 2pm ET: Clean Tech Markets, ENERGY.GOV (Oct. 17, 2011), http://
energy.gov/articles/livechat-thurs-1020-2pm-et-clean-tech-markets.
67 The industry is comprised of fossil fuel–based generation or “conventional generation,”
nuclear generation and renewable energy generation.
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is in meeting domestic energy usage, consider that in 2009 all renewable
energy resources contributed about 10.6 percent of net national energy
production.68 Of this aggregate production amount, conventional hydroelec-
tric production69 represented 3.6 percent, leaving seven percent produced
by all other non–fossil fuel or nuclear resources.70 Wind power produced
nearly 1 percent of total energy output, geothermal power produced 0.5
percent, and solar power produced 0.15 percent.71 Based on these statistics,
renewable electric generation appears to have significant room for devel-
opment before these resources serve a material percentage of the domes-
tic electric generation. Studies suggest that even a single resource like
wind (as opposed to a combination of resources), if developed, could meet
significant percentages of electricity requirements for certain regions of
the country.72
1. Grid Parity? Not Yet
REEGI faces an uphill battle to replace conventional generation
resources. The single largest factor that prevents more rapid implemen-
tation of REEGI is that it costs more than conventional generation.73 At
present, the REEGI as a whole74 is not at “grid parity” with conventional
generation.75 Grid parity refers to the point at which renewable energy can
68 Annual Energy Review 2009, supra note 50, at 5, Table 1.1, and at 7, Table 1.2 (Aug. 2010).
69 See W. MUSIAL, STATUS OF WAVE AND TIDAL POWER TECHNOLOGIES FOR THE UNITED
STATES (Aug. 2008), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy08osti/43240.pdf.
70 Id. The other resources are renewable resources such as wind, petroleum, wood, waste,
geothermal, other gases, solar thermal and photovoltaic, as well as miscellaneous technol-
ogies and non-renewable resources, such as batteries, chemicals, hydrogen, pitch, purchased
steam, sulfur, miscellaneous technologies, and non-renewable waste (municipal solid waste
from non-biogenic sources, and tire-derived fuels).
71 Id.
72 Scott Malone, Study Finds Huge Wind Energy Potential off Eastern U.S., REUTERS
(Sept. 28, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/28/us-usa-energy-wind-idUSTRE
68R0HG20100928.
73 Renewable Energy, Green Power and RECs, COMMUNITY ENERGY, http://www.community
energyinc.com/education/renewable-energy0 (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
74 REEGI, while a subset of REI, is itself a very broad industry, because a number of differ-
ent forms of technologies fall under this umbrella—such as wind, solar and hydro power.
Within each, there are different technologies for collection and harnessing of the natural
resource. The pace of development in these areas, in particular solar, is extremely rapid
with very different types of systems being tested and going into commercial production. The
differences between these technologies and the policy implications will be addressed in a
future article.
75 Ben Elliston et al., Grid Parity: A Potentially Misleading Concept?, THE 48TH AUSES
ANNUAL CONFERENCE, Dec. 1–3, 2010, Canberra, ACT, Australia, at 2.
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produce electricity at the same price per unit as conventional generation.76
Some sources question the importance of calculating grid parity.77 “Grid
parity,” like terms describing renewable and clean energy, is vague. How-
ever, when considering REEGI is selling power in the wholesale market to
utilities (as opposed to direct sales to retail customers), the price of power
generally must be at the purchasing utility’s “avoided cost,” which is the
incremental cost to an electric utility for electric energy or capacity, or both,
which, but for the purchase from the qualifying facility/(ies),78 “the utility
would have incurred had it supplied the power itself or had it obtained
the power from another source.”79
2. Technology Barriers: Incumbent Technologies and
Stratification of Industries
Other barriers to the growth of REEGI include the relatively high
cost of development for renewable energy projects as compared to facilities
running on conventional fuel sources. For this Article, the reader should
simply be aware that costs to develop and operate renewable energy proj-
ects vary depending on the type of renewable resource being harnessed as
well as the technology being used to harness the resource.80 Projects typi-
cally focus on a single resource and single technology to capture that
resource.81 In some instances, however, developers have sought to com-
bine resources where possible to share fixed costs, such as transmission
line installation, as well as renewable/conventional generation combina-
tions to assist in making the renewable resource less variable with conven-
tional generation backstops.82 Generally, solar energy incurs the highest
76 Id.
77 See, e.g., id.
78 See 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(1) for a definition of a qualifying facility; see also What Is
a Qualifying Facility?, FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, http://www.ferc.gov
/industries/electric/gen-info/qual-fac/what-is.asp (last updated Feb. 3, 2012).
79 What Is Avoided Cost?, ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY ASSOCIATION, http://www.epsa.org
/industry/faqs/?fa=avoidedCost (last visited Jan. 30, 2013); see also 18 C.F.R. § 292.101
(b)(6) for definition of avoided cost.
80 See RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY NETWORK, RENEWABLES 2011 GLOBAL STATUS REPORT
33 (2011), available at http://www.martinot.info/REN21_GSR2011.pdf.
81 See, e.g., Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, We Can’t Wait: Obama
Administration Announces Seven Major Renewable Energy Infrastructure Projects that
Would Power 1.5 Million Homes to Be Expedited (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.whitehouse
.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/07/we-can-t-wait-obama-administration-announces-seven
-major-renewable-energ.
82 Some projects have sought to combine a renewable resource with a conventional gen-
eration source; see First Hybrid CSP–Coal Power Plant Is Fired Up in Colorado, NATIONAL
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costs to produce electricity on a per kW installed basis, while wind energy,
which is a more developed industry, is the closest to grid parity (excluding
conventional hydroelectric power).83
The aggregating of renewable energy by nonparticipants oversim-
plifies the different issues each industry within the REEGI faces. Take an
analogy to transportation. Suppose someone is talking about the “Transpor-
tation Industry,” the first question the speaker might get is: Transportation
of what? If the speaker refines the industry to the transportation of people,
the next questions might be: To where? And how? The inquirer might ask
whether the speaker means public or private transportation? If public,
does he mean transportation by air, water or surface? Within each of these
mediums, you have different modalities—commercial air travel, private air
travel, by plane or by helicopter, prop or jet. For water, what type of boat
or ship and what destination? A traveler might decline to travel by sub-
marine or fishing trawler to get from Miami to the tip of the Florida Keys,
if the traveler had an offshore cigarette-style racing yacht or hovercraft
in mind. As for surface, riding on a Greyhound bus or Megabus would be
different than being chauffeured in a stretch limousine or a sports car. And
what of the regulations regarding the operators of these different vehicles
let alone the manufacturers of these different vehicles? Depending on the
scope and purpose of the discussion surrounding policies and decision-
making for the transportation industry, all of these questions and distinc-
tions are potentially relevant.
While the distinctions within REEGI may not be this vast, there
are similar distinctions. A dike in the Netherlands built in 1452 is not the
same quality as the Three Gorges hydroelectric dam built in China with
the largest total installed (production capacity 18,200 MW) in the world,
the construction of which required the displacement of over 1.4 million
people.84 Similarly, a windmill built in the 1700s is vastly different from
RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY (July 23, 2010), http://www.nrel.gov/technologytransfer
/news/2010/870.html. For a description of Xcel Energy’s experimental Solar CSP and coal
fired power plant; see also FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, FPL’S MARTIN NEXT GEN-
ERATION SOLAR ENERGY CENTER, available at http://www.fpl.com/environment/solar/pdf
/Martin.pdf, for a description of Florida Power & Light’s hybrid solar and combined cycle
natural gas plant.
83 See Jason Morgan, Comparing Energy Costs of Nuclear, Coal, Gas, Wind and Solar,
NUCLEAR FISSIONARY (Apr. 2, 2010), http://nuclearfissionary.com/2010/04/02/comparing
-energy-costs-of-nuclear-coal-gas-wind-and-solar/.
84 See CHINESE NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON LARGE DAMS, THREE GORGES PROJECT, available
at http://www.chincold.org.cn/dams/rootfiles/2010/07/20/1279253974143251-127925397
4145520.pdf; Three Gorges Project, CHINA THREE GORGES CORPORATION, http://www.ctg.com
.cn/en/index.php (last visited Jan. 30, 2013) (site of the project’s owner, the China Three
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the Shepards Flat wind project constructed in 2010 near Arlington, Oregon
that is capable of producing 845MW from 338 turbines, and was antici-
pated to be the largest land-based wind project in the world at the time of
its construction.85
3. Conventional Generation
As noted, the majority of electrical energy generation is powered by
conventional fuels, specifically coal and natural gas.86 Coal is a significant
source of our nation’s energy output, representing 29.57 percent of the na-
tion’s primary energy production.87 Coal is not a preferred fuel source these
days and, indeed, increasing regulations are causing a number of coal-fired
power plants to close down due to the cost of compliance.88 In July 2011, the
EPA issued the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (“CSAPR”), with a proposed
effective date of January 1, 2012.89 This proposed rule faced significant
resistance. As a consequence of the EPA’s plans, a number of companies
announced plans to shut down coal-fired power plants, as the cost of com-
pliance was too great.90 A number of companies sought to enjoin the EPA
Gorges Corporation, formed by the State Council in Sept. 1993); Peter Ford, Controversial
Three Gorges Dam Has Problems, Admits China, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 19,
2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2011/0519/Controversial-Three-Gorges
-dam-has-problems-admits-China.
85 Press Release, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE LPO Finalizes Deal on the World’s Largest
Wind Project to Date (Dec. 17, 2010), http://lpo.energy.gov/?p=1955.
86 See HESHAM E. SHAALAN, GENERATION OF ELECTRIC POWER Tbl. 8.2 (2003), available
at http://energysystems.princeton.edu/EnergyResources/GenerElectPower__Shalaan.pdf.
87 See Annual Energy Review 2009, supra note 50, table 1.2 (noting that coal produced
21.578 quadrillion Btu out of a total of 72.97 quadrillion Btu in 2009).
88 See Gabriel Nelson, AEP Predicts Need to Shutter 25% of Coal Fleet, N.Y. TIMES (June 9,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/06/09/09greenwire-aep-predicts-need-to-shutter
-25-of-coal-fleet-91911.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2013). The EPA issued the Cross-State Air
Pollution Rule (“CSAPR”) in July 2011, which was scheduled to go into effect January 1,
2012. CSAPR required significant reductions in SO2 and NOx emissions. The coal electrical
generation industry vehemently opposed CSAPR, citing its abrupt emissions requirements
and suggested it was impractical to implement in the time provided. As a result, a signifi-
cant number of coal-fired power plants shut down in 2011 in anticipation of CSAPR. The
EPA eventually changed its position on the effectiveness of CSAPR, but this did little to
address the shutdown and economic impact of the regulation. See also Dan Testa, Citing
CSAPR, Ameren to Shutter 2 Ill. Coal-Fired Plants, SNL FINANCIAL (Oct. 4, 2011, 12:22 PM),
http://www.snl.com/InteractiveX/ArticleAbstract.aspx?id=13391363.
89 See EPA Releases Final Interstate Transport Rule, “Cross-State Air Pollution Rule,”
GEORGETOWN CLIMATE CENTER (July 7, 2011), http://www.georgetownclimate.org/epa
-releases-final-interstate-transport-rule-cross-state-air-pollution-rule.
90 See Dan Lowrey, Luminant Files Notice with ERCOT to Idle Coal Units, SNL
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from moving forward.91 Ultimately, the EPA suspended its plans to im-
plement CSAPR at the beginning of the year, but a significant number of
plants had already closed by the time the EPA reversed course.92
In addition to coal, a number of power plants are fired by natural
gas. Pure natural gas (excluding liquid propane fired plants) generated
virtually the same amount of energy as coal at 29.46 percent in 2009.93 All
fossil fuels—coal, natural gas, crude oil, and liquid propane—generated
77.92 percent of total energy production in 2009.94
Natural gas may be having an independent renaissance that im-
pacts the REEGI. Techniques for extracting natural gas from shale rock
formations have advanced very rapidly through hydraulic fracturing tech-
niques.95 As the supply of natural gas has expanded, the price of natural
gas has dropped precipitously.96 This has had a negative impact on the
REEGI, because there is less incentive for private companies to develop
renewable energy technology with cheap, clean gas at the ready.97 The
FINANCIAL (Oct. 4, 2011), http://www.snl.com/InteractiveX/article.aspx?ID=13391203
&CDID=A-13391203-14895&KPLT=4&Printable=1.
91 Gabriel Nelson, Lawsuits Pour in Before Deadline to Challenge EPA’s Cross-State Air
Pollution Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/10/10
/10greenwire-lawsuits-pour-in-before-deadline-to-challenge-67959.html.
92 See Kathleen Hart, EPA to Miss Deadline for Power Plant Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Rule, SNL FINANCIAL (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www2.snl.com/InteractiveX/article.aspx?ID=
13312568&CDID=A-13312568-13103&KPLT=1&Printable=1.
93 See ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2009, supra note 50, table 1.2 (noting that dry natural gas
power plants generated 21.5 quadrillion BTU out of a total of 72.97 quadrillion BTU in 2009).
94 See id. (noting that all fossil fuels generated 56.86 quadrillion BTU out of a total of
72.97 BTU in 2009).
95 But see Tennille Tracy, Whack to Estimate for Natural Gas, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203806504577178892190235190.html
(reporting that the forthcoming Energy Information Administration 2012 annual report
reduced estimates of shale gas in the United States from 830 trillion cubic feet to 480 tril-
lion cubic feet. While shale gas reserves are smaller than previously projected, far greater
amounts of shale gas are extractable now than several years ago due to improvements
in technology).
96 See Dan Strumpf et al., Natural Gas Sinks Beneath $2 Level, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304356604577337883568116636.html.
97 See Matthew L. Wald & Tom Zeller, Jr., Cost of Tapping Green Power Makes Projects
Tougher Sell, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2010, at A1, A16 (describing the challenges facing wind
and solar developers in competing on price for utility contracts and describing actions by
state regulators in the public service commissions of Virginia, Idaho, Kentucky and Rhode
Island to reject renewable energy deals on the basis of price); see also Russell Gold, Wind,
Sun Power Still Face Hurdles, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10001424052748703883504576186961618483344.html (describing challenges for renew-
able energy including higher pricing for renewable energy, low natural gas prices as a
result of shale rock drilling, and variable transmission challenges the technology presents).
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attractive pricing for conventional generation, given the abundance of
natural gas, provides significant market challenges to the REEGI to oper-
ate and grow.
B. 2011—Year of Disaster and Debt Ceiling Turmoil
Much has changed since President Obama’s January 2011 State of
the Union address. In January 2011 many in the clean energy industry
widely anticipated a nuclear renaissance given the Obama Administration’s
support for new nuclear generation power facilities.98 This renaissance
fizzled through events, including the glut of natural gas resulting in excep-
tionally low natural gas prices and heightened nuclear safety concerns fol-
lowing the Fukushima Dai-Ichi incident after the Tohuku earthquake.99
This changing environment dramatically shifted the focus of the Obama
Administration’s energy policy efforts.100
After Fukushima, President Obama unveiled his energy plan.101
The plan proposed multiple initiatives to reduce dependence on foreign
oil by reducing oil imports by one third by 2025, expanding oil production,
and increasing the use of natural gas and ethanol in vehicles.102 The plan
also called for clean and renewable energy incentives to support further
investment and innovation in clean energy.103 It included a clean energy
standard goal requiring that eighty percent of electricity come from clean-
energy sources by 2035.104 Energy Secretary Chu made the case for the
These articles noted the challenges facing the REEGI even before the most recent glut in
natural gas. As of the beginning of April 2012, prices for natural gas fell to their lowest level
in more than a decade, with excess capacity facing the natural gas industry. See Strumpf,
supra note 96 (price of natural gas fell below $2 per 1000 cubic feet for the first time since
January 28, 2002; glut of natural gas is causing some companies to slow production; con-
cerns exist about lack of storage for natural gas).
98 2011 State of the Union Address, supra note 53.
99 John Broder, An Energy Plan Derailed by Events Is Being Retooled, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31,
2011, at F7. I will not focus on nuclear energy in this article, except to note that the loan
guarantee model applied to nuclear energy faces significant challenges, given the bor-
rower pays for the CSC under the 1703 Program, which puts significant cost pressure on
applicants, as described. See infra note 148.
100 Broder, supra note 99, at F7.
101 See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BLUEPRINT FOR A SECURE ENERGY FUTURE (2011),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/blueprint_secure_energy_future
.pdf; see also Jackie Calmes & John M. Broder, Obama Sets Goal of One-Third Cut in Oil
Imports, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/31/science/earth
/31energy.html.
102 BLUEPRINT, supra note 101, at 20.
103 See BLUEPRINT, supra note 101, at 15–18.
104 See Laura Meckler, Obama Outlines Energy Plan, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2011, http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703712504576232481675369892.html.
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President’s plan in testimony before the House Energy and Commerce
Committee, noting in particular that the Department was not taking a
“kitchen sink” approach, rather the budget represented work that was
“being coordinated and prioritized, with a 360-degree view of how the
pieces fit together.”105
The energy plan was not accepted by Congress. During the spring
and summer of 2011, Congress and the administration struggled over var-
ious budget matters and deficit reduction matters, marked by a divisive
fight over the U.S. debt ceiling, running down to the wire and downgrad-
ing of U.S. sovereign debt. Even Congress’s proposed budget cuts for deficit
reduction through the Congressional Supercommittee failed when the com-
mittee remained deadlocked until its deadline in November 2011. In this
contentious environment, the REI faced significant regulatory uncertainty
with various government incentives expiring in the fall and winter of 2011.
In the midst of this, Solyndra filed for bankruptcy in September 2011, add-
ing an additional accelerant to the already heated debates about govern-
ment support for the REI.106
III. DOE LOAN GUARANTEE PROGRAMS
A. Loan Guarantees Generally
A federal loan guarantee operates in the same manner as a private
loan guarantee—the guarantor provides a promise to repay a loan by the
borrower, in the event that the borrower is unable to pay. This encourages
the lender to make the loan in question. The general purpose of a loan guar-
antee is to encourage lending and associated investment that would not
otherwise occur absent the loan guarantee.
Take this simple example. Suppose a student wants to buy a new
car and wants to get financing through the dealership.107 Unfortunately,
105 The FY2012 Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission Budgets: Joint
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power and the Subcomm. on Environment
and the Economy of the H. Energy and Commerce Comm., 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (statement
of Steven Chu, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of Energy), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys
/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg68480/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg68480.pdf.
106 Scott McGrew, Solyndra to Declare Bankruptcy, NBC BAY AREA (Sept. 2, 2011), http://
www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/Solyndra-Shutting-Down-128802718.html.
107 Car dealerships generally offer customers a variety of financing options, ranging on the
high quality end directly from the car manufacturer through their financing division, to
other financial institutions willing to make loans to less credit-worthy borrowers. E.g., Lee
Ann Obringer, How Car Financing Works, HOW STUFF WORKS, http://auto.howstuffworks
.com/buying-selling/car-financing3.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
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as a student, she does not have sufficient credit history or a stable enough
income to qualify for a loan with a low interest rate. Rather than turn away
a disappointed customer, the lender can seek to mitigate its risk by asking
the borrower to have someone else with better credit history and qualifica-
tions to guarantee her obligations on her car loan, such as a responsible
parent. What is the parent’s liability? Assume the parent is a traditional
payment guarantor (rather than a demand guarantor);108 the parent will
be jointly and severally liable with the student for all of the obligations on
the loan.109 At the outset of the loan, the parent will have a contingent lia-
bility for the full value of the loan. If the student pays the loan, the parent’s
liability gradually decreases, until the loan is fully repaid. If the student
fails to make a payment, the lender may then demand that the parent
make that payment. If the student defaults on the loan, the lender can
exercise its rights under the guarantee and the parent must pay the full
value of the loan.110 Once the parent pays under the guarantee, the parent
will be subrogated to the rights of the lender and will have all the rights
of the lender against the borrower, the student.111
The benefit of a guarantee is that it permits borrowers to not only
obtain financing, but to do so at a rate the borrower would not otherwise
be able to obtain. Beyond this simple example, loan guarantees are used
by lenders in traditional financing structures, including limited recourse
project financings often used to develop energy projects, improving credit
profiles of transactions, or mitigating specific risks.112 For example, project
financings for infrastructure projects often require credit-worthy sponsors
to provide limited recourse guarantees for specific purposes, such as fund-
ing specific construction, providing capital reserves for projects, etc. When
sponsors provide these guarantees, they are able to reduce the financing
108 Compare Guarantee, Trade Finance Glossary, Defining Trade Finance, DLA PIPER,
http://www.dlapipertradefinance.com/en/glossary/g/guarantee.html (last visited Jan. 30,
2013), with Demand Guarantee, Trade Finance Glossary, Defining Trade Finance, DLA
PIPER, http://www.dlapipertradefinance.com/en/glossary/d/demand--guarantee.html (last
visited Jan. 30, 2013).
109 Guarantee, Trade Finance Glossary, Defining Trade Finance, DLA PIPER, http://www
.dlapipertradefinance.com/en/glossary/g/guarantee.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
110 See id.
111 Carl D. Ciochon, Guarantor Liability—A Litigation Perspective, WENDEL ROSEN BLACK
& DEAN, http://www.wendel.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=content.contentDetail&ID=9018.
112 See, e.g., PHILLIP BROWN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LOAN GUARANTEES FOR CLEAN
ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES: GOALS, CONCERNS, AND POLICY OPTIONS 1–9 (2012), available
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42152.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, REAP GUAR-
ANTEED LOAN PROGRAM (2012), available at http://www.rurdev.usda.gov/SupportDocuments
/OR-bpREAP_GLoverview.pdf.
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costs for the borrower, thus leveraging capital more efficiently. Federal
loan guarantees operate the same way.
B. DOE Loan Guarantee Program
Federal loan guarantees involve a federal agency or another feder-
ally run program providing a guarantee backed by the full faith and credit
of the United States of a loan to a private borrower.113 The purpose of this
type of federal credit program is to attract private investment to a specific
area or to facilitate a specific activity. The Loan Guarantee Program Office’s
description of its various programs sets forth the eligibility requirements
for each loan guarantee program.114 The effect of the federal guarantee is
to lower the borrower’s cost of borrowing, because the improved likelihood
of repayment to creditors improves the borrower’s credit profile to pro-
spective lenders. Like a private guarantor, if the borrower defaults, then
the federal government steps in and makes loan payments on behalf of
the borrower. The government, as guarantor, then has a right of subro-
gation against the borrower after demand is made on the guarantee by the
lender.115 As in the private market, the guarantor charges the borrower a
113 Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, 2 U.S.C. §§ 661–661(f) (Supp. IV 2010) (providing
a statutory definition—“The term ‘loan guarantee’ means any guarantee, insurance, or
other pledge with respect to the payment of all or a part of the principal or interest on any
debt obligation of a non-Federal borrower to a non-Federal lender, but does not include the
insurance of deposits, shares, or other withdrawable accounts in financial institutions.”);
see generally 2 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRI-
ATIONS LAW 11-1 to 11-73 (3rd ed. 2006) [hereinafter Principles of Appropriations Law],
available at http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/d06382sp.pdf.
114 See Eligibility, Loan Programs Office, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://lpo.energy.gov/?page
_id=31 (last visited Jan. 30, 2013). The DOE Loan Programs Office defines loan guarantee
as “a contractual obligation between the government, private creditors and a borrower—such
as banks and other commercial loan institutions—that the Federal Government will cover
the borrower’s debt obligation in the event the borrower defaults . . . .” See Department of
Energy Finalizes $169 Million Loan Guarantee to Granite Reliable Power: A Wind Power-
ing America Success Story, Wind Research, NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY
(Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.nrel.gov/wind/news/2011/1634.html. The Loan Program also
“allow[s] the government to share some of the financial risks of projects that employ new
technologies that are not yet supported in the commercial marketplace or where private
investment has been inhibited.” See GREAT LAKES WIND COLLABORATIVE, FINANCING
MECHANISMS AND FINANCIAL INCENTIVES, BEST PRACTICES FOR SUSTAINABLE WIND ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION (July 2011), available at http://www.glc.org
/energy/wind/pdf/bptoolkit/GLWC-BPToolkit-BP02.pdf.
115 See 10 C.F.R. § 609.15(g) (providing that “The Loan Agreement shall provide that, upon
payment of the Guaranteed Obligations, the Secretary shall be subrogated to the rights of
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fee for this credit support. However, unlike the private market, the cost
of a federal guarantee may not directly correlate to the risk profile of the
debtor. Thus, the incentive element of the government’s involvement is to
stimulate a sector of the economy that would not have access to credit mar-
kets at reasonable rates of interest. Loan guarantees are often viewed as
a cost-effective government incentive, as they provide contingent support
to areas where the government seeks to stimulate private investment and
the loan guarantees are often structured to be self-financed.116
1. Authorizing Legislation
The latest version117 of loan guarantees managed by the DOE was
initially authorized by Congress under Title XVII of The Energy Policy
Act of 2005 (“EPAct 2005”).118 EPAct 2005 required the DOE to solicit
proposals from a wide variety of eligible renewable energy and clean tech-
nologies to support their development through federal loan guarantees.
The scope and array of renewable and clean energy technologies the DOE
was tasked with advancing through the loan guarantee programs was very
broad, perhaps too broad.119 This Article focuses on the two principal loan
the Holders . . . . The Holder shall transfer and assign to the Secretary all rights held by
the Holder of the Guarantee Obligation. Such assignment shall include all related liens,
security and collateral rights to the extent held by the Holder.”).
116 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET (OMB), EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRC. A-129,
POLICIES FOR FEDERAL CREDIT PROGRAMS AND NON-TAX RECEIVABLES, PART II—BUDGET
AND LEGISLATIVE POLICY FOR CREDIT PROGRAMS (2000) [hereinafter CIRC. A-129], avail-
able at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a129_rev2013_main (identifying goals
for federal credit programs: “(1)(a) Correct a capital market imperfection, which should be
defined; and/or (b) Subsidize borrowers or other beneficiaries, who should be identified, or
encourage certain activities, which should be specified.”).
117 DOE has previously administered loan guarantee programs. See John Herrick, Federal
Financing of Green Energy: Developing Green Industry in a Changing Energy Marketplace,
31 PUB. CONT. L.J. 257, 258–61 (Winter 2002). The article describes the DOE loan guar-
antee programs authorized in the late 1970s and early 1980s to promote development of
synthetic fuels, alcohol fuels, and geothermal energy projects. As Herrick details, these
programs had mixed success. In somewhat similar circumstances, the incentives provided
were not properly matched to commercial market conditions, or market conditions shifted
to make projects no longer economically viable. Id. These programs were all implemented
prior to the Credit Reform Act so these projects did not have to comply with the Credit
Reform Act reporting requirements. See supra note 113.
118 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58 § 1701 (2005) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16511)
[hereinafter EPAct 2005].
119 Id. § 1703, 42 U.S.C. § 16513 (Supp. IV 2010). The Energy Policy Act of 2005 provided that
loan guarantees would be offered for ten different categories of technologies: (1) Renewable
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guarantee programs administered by the DOE, the Section 1703 Program120
and the Section 1705 Program.121 This Article also discusses the Advanced
Technology Vehicle Manufacturers Loan Program briefly, as this program
has been lumped together with the 1703 and 1705 programs by supporters
and detractors alike.122
2. Funding
The authorizing legislation to establish the DOE LGP was first
passed in 2005; however, because of a lack of funding, establishing the
LGP Office was a slow process.123 Neither the program nor the to-be-formed
office received appropriations under EPAct 2005.124 In 2007, Congress pro-
vided appropriations for issuing guarantees as well as for administrative
expenses to staff the LGP Office.125 In 2008, as part of the federal response
to the Great Recession,126 Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabi-
lization Act of 2008 (“EESA”).127 Better known for the Troubled Assets
Relief Program (“TARP”),128 the EESA also included a number of provisions
energy systems, (2) Advanced fossil energy technologies, (3) Hydrogen fuel cell technologies,
(4) Advanced nuclear energy facilities, (5) Carbon capture and sequestration practices
and technologies, (6) Efficient electrical generation, transmission, and distribution tech-
nologies, (7) Efficient end-use energy technologies, (8) Production facilities for fuel efficient
vehicles, (9) Pollution control equipment, and (10) Refineries.
120 See id. (noting the creation of the 1703 Program under Title XVII of EPAct 2005).
121 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 § 406, 42 U.S.C. § 16516 (Supp. IV
2010) (establishing Section 1705, entitled “Temporary Program for Rapid Deployment Of
Renewable Energy and Electric Power Transmission Projects”).
122 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 136, 121 Stat.
1492 (2007).
123 See History, Loan Programs Office, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://lpo.energy.gov/?page
_id=134 (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
124 Id.
125 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844, 1621
(2008) (authorizing the LGP Office to issue loan guarantees funded by applicant fees under
§ 1702(b)(2) of EPAct 2005 and providing $5.5 million to fund administrative expenses for
the office); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-750, DEP’T OF ENERGY
NEW LOAN GUAR. PROGRAM SHOULD COMPLETE ACTIVITIES NECESSARY FOR EFFECTIVE
AND ACCOUNTABLE PROGRAM MGMT. (2008) [hereinafter GAO RECOMMENDATIONS] (describ-
ing initial authorization and subsequent initial appropriation for LGP).
126 David Wessel, A Big, Bad . . . ‘Great’ Recession, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2010, at A2.
127 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765
(2008).
128 See id. at Title I (TARP provided significant support for banks and financial institutions,
including AIG, as well as General Motors and Chrysler).
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focused on the REI, including appropriations for the 1703 Program.129
Within months of passing the landmark EESA legislation, which initially
authorized $700 billion in spending according to the CBO,130 Congress
passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (“ARRA”)
with an even more ambitious projected cost of $787 billion.131 Title IV of
the ARRA authorized the 1705 Program.132 Both the EESA and ARRA were
enormous pieces of legislation designed to stabilize the U.S. economy and
jump start the country out of recession by improving confidence and liquid-
ity and stimulating job creation. Both pieces of legislation included sig-
nificant provisions aimed at the REI and clean tech industries.133
The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 separately cre-
ated and provided appropriations for the DOE for the Advanced Technology
Vehicle Manufacturing Program (“ATVM Program”),134 which provides
direct loans for advanced technology vehicle manufacturers.135 The ATVM
Program is not a loan guarantee program. It will be briefly described here
because the LGP Office administers this program in addition to the 1703
and 1705 Programs, and because the ATVM Program is often considered
in tandem with the loan guarantee programs.136
With the additional resources allocated in 2009, the staff of the
LGP Office grew dramatically in size to handle processing existing and
129 See id. Division B of EESA is titled Energy Improvement Act and deals with energy
production incentives.
130 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE (CBO), REPORT ON THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM—
DECEMBER 2011 Table 3 (2011), available at http://www.cbo.gov/publication/42688.
131 The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat.
115 (2009). This Act is often referred to as the Recovery Act and was enacted into law on
February 17, 2009. The net effect of the Act has been tracked by the government. See
RECOVERY.GOV, http://www.recovery.gov/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 30, 2013);
see also CBO, ESTIMATED IMPACT OF THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT
ON EMPLOYMENT AND ECONOMIC OUTPUT FROM OCTOBER 2011 THROUGH DECEMBER 2011
(2012), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/02-22-ARRA
.pdf (adjusting the total fiscal impact of ARRA from $787 billion to $831 billion for the
2009–2019 period).
132 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), § 406, 42 U.S.C. § 16516
(Supp. IV 2010).
133 The EESA and ARRA also made significant changes to existing REI incentives and
created new incentives for the REI. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 101 et seq., 122 Stat. 3765 (2008); see also American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009, § 406, 42 U.S.C. § 16516 (Supp. IV 2010). EESA and also ARRA
included funding for the ATVM Program, administered by the LGP Office.
134 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, § 136, 42 U.S.C. § 17013 (Supp. IV 2010).
135 See infra Part III.B.3.c (describing ATVM Program).
136 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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new loan applications. The DOE issued solicitations from time to time
seeking applicants for loan guarantees. The solicitations ranged from
broad requests covering all eligible technologies to very specific applica-
tions seeking to develop a niche area.137
Since the legislation in 2008 and 2009, no additional funds have
been appropriated for Title XVII, despite the Obama Administration’s ef-
forts to obtain additional appropriations in the 2011 fiscal year and 2012
fiscal year budgets.138 In March and April 2011, a number of critics sought
to defund the LGP Office and Title XVII altogether as evidenced by the
budget plan introduced by the House of Representatives.139 Nevertheless,
the administration sought additional funding even in the summer of 2011
for both the 1703 and the 1705 Programs.140
The funding for the 1705 Program was provided under the ARRA
sunset on September 30, 2011. The DOE was able to issue loan guaran-
tee commitments for approximately $10.5 billion in projects in August
and September 2011.141 As with many other industries in the private
sector, the REEGI and the broader REI remained on the sidelines wait-
ing for Congress and the White House to act. Uncertainty regarding budget
137 See Appendix (detailing various solicitations issued by DOE for funding under the 1703,
1705, and ATVM Programs).
138 For resolutions authorizing appropriations for the 1703 and 1705 Programs, see Revised
Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-5, § 20320, 121 Stat. 8, 21
(authorizing $4 billion in loan guarantees to be issued, with fees to be paid by the ap-
plicant); see also American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
T.IV, 123 Stat. 115, 140 (reserving approximately $25 million for administrative expenses
and appropriating the balance of the $6 billion for loan guarantees made under the 1705
program); Consumer Assistance to Recycle and Save Program, Pub. L. No. 111-47, 123
Stat. 1972 (2009) (redirecting $2 billion to the program popularly known as CARS. Congress
redirected $2 billion from the $6 billion given to funding loans by ARRA); Education Jobs
Fund; State Fiscal Relief, Pub. L. No. 111-226, § 308, 124 Stat. 2389 (2010) (rescinding an
additional $1.5 billion from the original $6 billion in order to fund other initiatives, such
as education).
139 110 H.R. 1, 112th Cong. § 1425 (2011) (aimed to reduce LGP for innovative technol-
ogies by $25 billion); see also Naureen S. Malik & Cassandra Sweet, Proposal Aims to Gut
DOE Loan Program, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142
4052748703806304576232712438183564.html (describing a Republican House Budget
proposal seeking to cut the $41 billion loan guarantee program included in the President’s
FY2012 budget).
140 Examination of DOE’s Clean Technology Programs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Energy and Environment of the H. Comm. on Sci., Space, and Tech., 112th Cong. 1, 1–7
(2011) (statement of David Frantz, Director of the DOE Loan Programs Office), available
at science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.house.gov/files/documents/hearings/061511
-Frantz.pdf.
141 Our Projects, LOAN PROGRAMS OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://lpo.energy.gov
/?page_id=45 (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
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cuts caused many businesses to place further investments of capital on
hold pending action by the Congressional Supercommittee.142 When the
Congressional Supercommittee admitted failure in November 2011,143
market uncertainty increased. During this period of legislative and reg-
ulatory uncertainty, neither the REI nor the REEGI have received ad-
ditional government support, especially since the negative attention
Solyndra attracted.
In addition to the lack of funding and the limited time the DOE had
to implement the LGP, the DOE’s funding suffered from the same legisla-
tive impediment as its authorizing legislation and mission: Congress was
either too specific144 or too broad.145 Neither spectrum offered the DOE a
proper roadmap to implement the DOE LGP in a productive manner.
3. The 1703, 1705, and ATVM Programs
The LGP Office administers three programs: the 1703 Program, the
1705 Program, and the direct loan ATVM Program. While the LGP Office
administers the ATVM Program, it will be discussed later. Projects that
were eligible to receive loan guarantees under the 1703 or 1705 Programs
had to fall into two general categories. The project either had to employ
an innovative or significantly improved technology,146 or it had to employ
142 As a compromise to increase the federal debt ceiling during a tumultuous negotiation
between Congress and the White House before an August 2, 2011, deadline to extend the
federal debt crisis, a bipartisan Congressional Supercommittee was formed which had the
stated goal to identify $1.5 trillion in budget cuts over a ten year period. See David Wessel,
Can the Super Committee Raise Taxes or Not?, WALL ST. J. BLOGS (Aug. 3, 2011, 2:23 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/08/03/can-the-super-committee-raise-taxes-or-not/.
143 Janet Hook & Naftali Bendavid, Deficit Panel Folds Its Tent, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204443404577052311834234128.html.
144 See, e.g., CBO, FEDERAL LOAN GUARANTEES FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR
POWER PLANTS 4 (2011), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs
/122xx/doc12238/08-03-nuclearloans.pdf (providing funding for a single technology: front-
end nuclear facilities).
145 See Energy Policy Act of 2005, § 1703(b), 42 U.S.C. § 16513(b) (Supp. II 2008) (listing a
multiple clean and renewable energy technologies to be supported by loan guarantees with
no funding guidance from Congress. DOE issued solicitations that were exceptionally broad
in terms of eligible technologies, given the lack of guidance from Congress on funding spe-
cific technologies).
146 See 10 C.F.R. § 609.2 (2012) (defining “New or Significantly Improved Technology” as
“a technology concerned with the production, consumption or transportation of energy and
that is not a Commercial Technology, and that has either: (1) [o]nly recently been devel-
oped, discovered or learned; or (2) [i]nvolves or constitutes one or more meaningful and im-
portant improvements in productivity or value, in comparison to Commercial Technologies
in use in the United States at the time the Term Sheet is issued.”) Note that this is
further refined by looking at the definition of Commercial Technology; see infra note 147.
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a commercial technology project.147 The type of technology a project em-
ployed in both categories was measured at the time of the loan guarantee
application. New technology projects could have applied under either the
1703 Program or the 1705 Program. Commercial technology projects were
limited to the 1705 Program. Each of the 1703 and 1705 Programs had
specific eligible technologies in their authorizing language.
Another significant difference between the 1703 Program and the
1705 Program was whether the applicant had to pay cost of a loan guaran-
tee, called the credit subsidy cost (“CSC”), as calculated by OMB or whether
Congressional appropriations were available to fund the applicant’s CSC.148
a. The 1703 Program
The 1703 Program, initially authorized under EPAct 2005, was
created to provide loan guarantees to a broad range of technologies.149
Applicants had to demonstrate that their projects would meet two prin-
cipal characteristics, to (1) “avoid, reduce or sequester air pollutants or
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and (2) employ new or
significantly improved technologies as compared to commercial tech-
nologies in service in the United States at the time the guarantee is
issued.”150 The intent of this innovative technologies program was to
assist cutting edge clean and green technologies to bridge the gap from
start-up funding to full commercialization.151 The 1703 Program further
147 See id. (defining “Commercial Technology” as “a technology in general use in the com-
mercial marketplace in the United States at the time the Term Sheet is issued by DOE. A
technology is in general use if it has been installed in and is being used in three or more
commercial projects in the United States in the same general application as in the pro-
posed project, and has been in operation in each such commercial project for a period of at
least five years. The five-year period shall be measured, for each project, starting on the
in service date of the project or facility employing that particular technology. For purpose
of this section, commercial projects include projects that have been the recipients of a loan
guarantee from DOE under this part.”).
148 Credit Subsidy Cost is abbreviated as “CSC” in this Article. See Glossary of Terms, Loan
Programs Office, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://lpo.energy.gov/?page_id=64 (last visited
Jan. 30, 2013). See also infra note 200 for an explanation of how OMB calculates the CSC.
In short, the CSC is either paid by the applicant or is paid by appropriations for the CSC spe-
cifically authorized by Congress. When the applicant pays, for example under Section 1703,
it is often referred to as the “Borrower Pays” option.
149 42 U.S.C. § 16513(b) (Supp. IV 2010) (outlining ten specific technologies).
150 Id. at 16513(a).
151 See BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FINANCE, CROSSING THE VALLEY OF DEATH: SOLUTIONS
TO THE NEXT GENERATION CLEAN ENERGY PROJECT FINANCING GAP, June 21, 2010, at 5
2013] BEYOND SOLYNDRA 457
provided that projects must demonstrate a reasonable prospect of repay-
ment of the loan.152
Notwithstanding the initial creation of the DOE LGP under EPAct
2005, the Act did not provide any appropriations authority for the program,
nor were any funds available to perform administrative functions to create
the DOE LGP.153 Congress did not appropriate funding for Title XVII until
mid-2007.154 During this interim period, the DOE temporarily reassigned
staff to build the LGP Office and take steps necessary to promulgate regula-
tions and create procedures to run the LGP office.155 However, the lack of
funding hampered the DOE’s efforts to build up the office and take various
steps to implement legislation, including setting up procedures and risk
controls, promulgating regulations, and hiring staff. The LGP Office did not
issue final regulations for the 1703 Program until October 23, 2007.156 It
was generally understood that during the Bush Administration, establish-
ment and staffing of the LGP Office were not a high priority.157
(“Moving a technology from the research to the commercial phase is an arduous task, usu-
ally requiring it to proceed through the so-called Commercialisation ‘Valley of Death.’ ”);
see also id. at 6 (“Project finance funders and bank lenders typically have high levels of capi-
tal and can commit to longer-term investments, but they have little or no technology risk
tolerance. No existing class of financing institutions is effectively positioned to address this
particular risk/return category.” (emphasis in original)).
152 42 U.S.C. § 16512(d)(1) (2006).
153 See Allison S. Clements & Douglass D. Sims, A Clean Energy Deployment Administration:
The Right Policy for Emerging Renewable Technologies, 31 ENERGY L. J. 397, 422–23 (2010)
(describing the initial funding issues faced by DOE to create the LGP); see also GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-339R, THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY: KEY STEPS
NEEDED TO HELP ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF THE NEW LOAN GUARANTEE PROGRAM FOR
INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGIES BY BETTER MANAGING ITS FINANCIAL RISK (2007) [hereinafter
KEY STEPS NEEDED], available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-339R (describing
DOE’s actions to implement the LGP and the intra-agency funding transfers DOE used to
create minimal staffing); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, B-308715, DEPART-
MENT OF ENERGY—TITLE XVII LOAN GUARANTEE PROGRAM (2007) (concluding that DOE
violated its statutory authority by using appropriated funds to set up the LGP without
appropriations authority for the LGP).
154 See EPAct 2005, § 406, 42 U.S.C. 16515 (Supp. IV 2010). Congress appropriated funds
to establish the program, but did not permit more than $4 billion in loan guarantees to be
issued and required these guarantees had to be self-financed. See also supra notes 125, 138.
155 See KEY STEPS NEEDED, supra note 153.
156 Loan Guarantees for Projects That Employ Innovative Technologies, 72 Fed. Reg. 60,116
(Oct. 23, 2007) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 609). Note that this final rule was subse-
quently amended on Dec. 4, 2009, to enable the DOE LGP to have requirements consistent
with commercial market practice.
157 See Clements & Sims, supra note 153, at 422 (noting the Bush “Administration’s lack
of enthusiasm for the program”).
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When Congress finally made funds available, it appropriated funds
to the DOE with earmarks for the 1703 Program.158 The wide range of
technologies funded included: (1) energy efficiency, renewable energy and
advanced transmission and distribution ($10 billion); (2) nuclear power
facilities ($18.5 billion); (3) “front end” nuclear fuel cycle facilities ($2
billion); (4) coal-based power generation, industrial gasification and carbon
capture and sequestration ($6 billion); and (5) advanced coal gasification
($2 billion).159 The breadth of technologies covered by the 1703 Program was
far beyond just REEGI. Clean and green energy technologies, not simply
renewable energy technologies, were well represented.160 In addition, clean
technology initiatives like energy efficiency and improvements in trans-
mission grids were also included in the mix of earmarked funding.161
b. 1705 Program
The LGP Office’s role expanded when the 1705 Program was im-
plemented as part of the ARRA, which was passed just a few weeks after
the Obama Administration took office.162 The ARRA was originally esti-
mated to cost $787 billion when it was passed in 2009. This estimate was
revised in 2011 to $840 billion as a result of scoring changes made by the
Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) and the Office of Management and
Budget (“OMB”) to reflect President Obama’s FY2012 Budget.163 Three
principal goals of the ARRA were to (1) create new jobs and save existing
ones, (2) spur economic activity with investment in long-term growth, and
(3) foster accountability and transparency in government spending.164
The funding for the ARRA fell into three general categories: (a) tax
cuts and benefits for families and businesses, (b) increased federal funding
for entitlement programs, such as unemployment benefits, and (c) funds
allocated for contracts, grants and loans.165 The third category was projected
158 See GAO RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 125. See also infra note 161, and accompany-
ing text.
159 Loan Guarantee Program Established in EPACT2005, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION
ADMINISTRATION, http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/aeo/otheranalysis/aeo_2009analysispapers/lgp
.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
160 See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1703(a), 119 Stat. 594, 1120 (2005).
161 See id.
162 President Obama was inaugurated Jan. 20, 2009. ARRA was passed Feb. 17, 2009. See
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009).
163 See Breakdown of Funding by Category, RECOVERY.GOV, http://www.recovery.gov
/Transparency/fundingoverview/pages/fundingbreakdown.aspx (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
164 See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-5, § 3, 123 Stat. 115
(2009).
165 Id. § 2.
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to distribute almost $244 billion in contracts, grants and loans to a variety
of recipients.166 Within this category, $14 billion was initially earmarked
to support energy efficiency and renewable energy.167 The 1705 Program
was created as one component of this package. As a consequence of these
three objectives, many aspects of the ARRA, including the 1705 Program,
had a limited lifetime; the effectiveness of programs, and thus the continu-
ation of funding, was to be measured by the primary criterion of whether
the funded programs created or retained jobs.168
The 1705 Program differed from the 1703 Program in several re-
spects. First, the scope of projects that could be supported under the 1705
Program was limited to fewer categories of technologies than the 1703
Program. The 1705 Program could support “(1) [r]enewable energy systems,
including incremental hydropower, that generate electricity or thermal
energy, and facilities that manufacture related components, (2) [e]lectric
power transmission systems, including upgrading and reconductoring
projects, and (3) [l]eading edge biofuel projects that will use technologies
performing at the pilot or demonstration scale . . . .”169
Second, Congress appropriated funds for the 1705 Program to
cover the CSC for projects, which could be very substantial, rather than
requiring applicants to bear the cost of the CSC.170 Congress initially ap-
propriated $6 billion for CSCs in loan guarantees issued under the 1705
Program, which it quickly cut to $4 billion within six months after the ini-
tial appropriation to free an additional $2 billion in funding for the Cash
for Clunkers program.171
The LGP Office issued five solicitations under the 1703 Program
before Congress created the 1705 Program.172 As one might imagine, to
166 See Breakdown of Funding, supra note 163.
167 Id. The LGP Office spent $8.8 billion on the ATVM program. See Joann Muller, Auto-
makers’ Report Card: Who Still Owes Taxpayers Money? The Answer Might Surprise You,
FORBES (Aug. 29, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/joannmuller/2012/08/29/automakers
-report-card-who-still-owes-taxpayers-money-the-answer-might-surprise-you/.
168 See Jobs Summary—National, RECOVERY.GOV, http://www.recovery.gov/Transparency
/RecipientReportedData/Pages/jobsummary.aspx (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
169 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 § 406, 42 U.S.C. § 16516(a) (Supp.
IV 2010).
170 See supra note 148 (describing the calculation used to determine the CSC value). See
also 1705, Loan Programs Office, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://lpo.energy.gov/?page_id
=41 (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
171 See Consumer Assistance to Recycle and Save Program, Pub. L. No. 111-47, 123 Stat.
1972 (2009). This program is commonly referred to as Cash for Clunkers.
172 See Appendix (detailing solicitations issued by DOE for funding under Section 1703,
Section 1705, and the ATVM Program).
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the extent an applicant was eligible under both Programs, the applicant
preferred to be considered under the 1705 Program rather than the 1703
Program, because the applicant’s CSC would be covered by appropria-
tions from the 1705 Program. Given both the staggered timing of solicita-
tions issued by the LGP Office and the limits on technology, not all 1703
Program applicants could take advantage of their eligibility under the 1705
Program. However, pending applicants which were eligible under both
programs were permitted by the LGP Office to have their application con-
sidered under the 1705 Program eligibility requirements.173 This aided the
LGP Office’s efforts to meet statutory deadlines by funding projects that
could start construction before September 30, 2011.174
In addition to the LGP Office’s reprogramming of existing applica-
tions, the LGP Office also issued a commercial technology solicitation to
target renewable power systems projects employing commercially avail-
able technologies175 with preexisting financing commitments. This solici-
tation, the Financial Institutions Partnership Program (“FIPP”), featured
a partial-risk sharing loan guarantee program with project lenders serv-
ing as the applicants for these renewable energy generation projects.176 As
with other sectors in the economy, such as the housing construction indus-
try and the small business community, the financial crisis resulted in a
virtually complete evaporation of sources of capital and financing for re-
newable energy projects.177 The intent of FIPP was to create a government
funding option for creditworthy financeable commercial technology projects
that, but for the credit crisis and resulting lack of bank liquidity, would
have been financed and built.178 This difference in purpose resulted in
FIPP having a different structure. The DOE was to review projects that
173 1705, Loan Programs Office, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://lpo.energy.gov/?page_id=41
(last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
174 GREG W. DURHAM, CENTER FOR INT’L ENV’T & RES. POL’Y, NEW ENERGY: THE EFFECTS
OF REGULATORY REFORMS ON THE US DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY LOAN GUARANTEE PROGRAM
27–28 (2011), available at http://fletcher.tufts.edu/CIERP/Publications/more/newenergy.
175 See 10 C.F.R. § 609.2 (2012) (highlighting the difference from innovative technologies
supported by the 1703 Program).
176 See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SOLICITATION NO. DE-FOA-0000166, FEDERAL LOAN
GUARANTEES FOR COMMERCIAL TECHNOLOGY RENEWABLE ENERGY GENERATION PROJECTS
UNDER THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTION PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM, 20 (2009) [hereinafter FIPP
Solicitation], available at https://lpo.energy.gov/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/CTRE.pdf.
177 UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND ITS
IMPACT ON RENEWABLE ENERGY FINANCE 1 (2009), available at http://www.energy-base.org
/fileadmin/media/sefi/docs/publications/Study_Financial_Crisis_impact_on_RE_.pdf.
178 See Gregory J. Lynch & Melissa M. Turczyn, FIPP May Streamline DOE Loan Guarantee
Awards, ETHANOL PRODUCER MAGAZINE (Nov. 11, 2009), http://www.ethanolproducer.com
/articles/6138/fipp-may-streamline-doe-loan-guarantee-awards.
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were “shovel-ready.” The applicant to the DOE was not the project devel-
oper itself, but the bank consortium that sought to finance the project.179
The banks, as the applicants, shepherded the application through the DOE
process and provided the DOE with all the due diligence they had already
performed on the project.180 The project being submitted needed to have
already obtained all requisite equity and financing to commence construc-
tion on a commercially sound project with conventional technology, and
completed tasks like obtaining an indicative and satisfactory credit rating
for the project’s debt.181 The guarantees available under FIPP also differed
from guarantees under the 1703 Program. The guarantees under FIPP
were partial risk guarantees, covering only eighty percent of costs instead
of one hundred percent of the loan value as under the 1703 Program.182
The applicant banks under FIPP thus had to have at least twenty percent
the loan uncovered.183
As with other DOE solicitations, the FIPP application process was
extremely detailed. The primary difference, given that the private lender
(rather than the project developer) was the applicant under FIPP, was that
the LGP Office required the lender-applicants to provide all the due dili-
gence documentation they had gathered in preparation for their private
financing, such as all independent technical, development, operational,
financing and legal due diligence matters on the project, just like the due
diligence standards for traditional limited recourse project financing.184 In
addition to traditional financial due diligence, the LGP Office also imposed
statutory requirements on applicants, such as demonstrating compliance
with the Davis-Bacon Act,185 which regulates wages; with the National
179 See FIPP Solicitation, supra note 176, at 7.
180 See id.
181 See id. at 7.
182 Id. at 94.
183 “Uncovered” is an industry term used to describe the portion of private debt that is not
insured by a loan guarantee. Where partial risk guarantees are employed, the lenders’ syn-
dicate will often require that participating lenders hold the same ratable percentage in
both the insured and uninsured loan facilities and may even prevent individual lenders
from assigning or participating their interests in these facilities separately.
184 Comments from applicants interviewed in independent reports, Congressional hearings,
and news articles consistently cite applicants as stating DOE’s due diligence requirements
were as stringent, if not more stringent, than those required in traditional private project
financings. Letter from David G. Frantz, Acting Executive Director, Loan Programs Office,
to Senator Charles E. Grassley, Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary (Aug. 3,
2012), available at http://www.thune.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=
7f63b50c-8d9c-4eb4-b819-6b7bc652f9c4.
185 See FIPP Solicitation, supra note 176, at 11.
462 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 37:425
Environmental Protection Act;186 with the Buy American Act;187 and provid-
ing indicative credit ratings from two independent rating agencies on the
transaction.188 The FIPP solicitation, which focused just on commercial
REEGI projects, and not manufacturing, transmission or biofuels projects,
required traditional project finance structural risk mitigation.189 The proj-
ects had to provide evidence of various contractual risk mitigants, such as
long term offtake contracts for the electricity generated by the project with
creditworthy sponsors (typically utility companies), engineering, procure-
ment, and construction (“EPC”) contracts for the facilities, as well contracts
for marketing of any renewable energy credits.190 The FIPP Solicitation’s
focus on REEGI highlighted the DOE’s conflicting missions to support in-
novative technologies on the one hand, commercial technologies on the
other hand, yet in each case limiting the risk of default to taxpayers.191
c. Advanced Technology Vehicle Manufacturers; ATVM Program
While not a loan guarantee program, the ATVM Program is also
administered by the LGP Office.192 Pursuant to Section 136 of the Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007 (the “EISA”), the DOE was autho-
rized to make direct loans to manufacturers of advanced technology and
ultra-efficient vehicles, or the component suppliers or engineering inte-
grators for such vehicles.193 The statute provided that the DOE may make
direct loans for up to thirty percent of the cost of reequipping, expanding,
or establishing manufacturing facilities in the United States for any of the
186 Id. at 38. Note that while this solicitation required applicants to comply with NEPA
requirements, in the fall of 2011, DOE updated its NEPA requirements for the first time
in fifteen years, creating categorical exemptions which significantly reduce the burden on
applicants who fall into these exemptions. See generally CH2M-HILL. RDD/112490008,
CATEGORICAL EXCLUSION UNDER THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT (NEPA),
White Paper (2011), available at http://www.ch2m.com/corporate/services/environmental
_management_and_planning/assets/Abstracts/2011/CH2M-HILL-categorical-exclusion.pdf.
187 FIPP Solicitation, supra note 176, at 12.
188 Id. at 9.
189 FIPP, FIPP Hooray . . . ? Analysis of and Commentary on DOE’s Financial Institution
Partnership Program, WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI (Oct. 28, 2009), http://www.wsgr
.com/WSGR/Display.aspx?SectionName=publications/PDFSearch/wsgralert_FIPP.htm.
190 See FIPP Solicitation, supra note 176, at 52.
191 See FIPP, FIPP Hooray . . . ?, supra note 189.
192 See ATVM, Loan Programs Office, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://lpo.energy.gov/?page
_id=43 (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
193 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, § 136, 42 U.S.C. § 17013(b) (Supp. IV
2010).
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eligible activities described above.194 In 2009, Congress expanded the DOE’s
scope by adding ultra-efficient vehicle manufacturers as eligible businesses
and permitted the DOE to reconsider applications that had been timely
filed prior to January 1, 2009, but rejected because the applicants were
ultra-efficient vehicle manufacturers.195 The DOE made direct loans under
the ATVM Program to several manufacturers, including Fisker Automotive
and Tesla Motors, both manufacturers of plug-in electric/hybrid cars, as
well as to Ford Motor Company and Nissan North American Inc. in order
to repurpose existing manufacturing facilities to produce electric or hybrid
vehicles and improve vehicle fuel efficiency.196 Of all the projects supported
by the DOE, ATVM projects have generated by far the greatest number of
permanent jobs,197 which was one of the benchmarks for measuring the
success of ARRA implementation.198 The DOE’s success in job creation as
a criterion of ARRA has been driven in large part by the DOE’s funding of
manufacturing jobs, with ATVM playing a significant role in this area.199
4. OMB’s Role in Loan Guarantee Programs
a. Background
OMB is involved in the DOE loan guarantee program under its
oversight authority for any credit subsidy calculations done by agencies
194 Id.; see also Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance and Continuing Appropriations
Act, Pub. L. No. 110-329 § 129 (2008), 42 U.S.C. § 17013(d) (appropriating $7.5 billion for
ATVM loans capping total loan principal to no more than $25 billion, and providing $10
million for administration). While the ATVM Program was initially authorized under the
EISA in 2007, DOE didn’t receive appropriations until this 2008 Act. The Federal Financing
Bank (“FFB”) was authorized to make the direct loans under this program. Id. § 129(c)(1).
195 Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111-85 § 312(b), 123 Stat. 2875 (adding eligibility of ultraefficient vehicle projects
for ATVM Program).
196 See Our Projects, Loan Programs Office, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://lpo.energy.gov
/?page_id=45/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
197 See id. (calculating that ATVM projects have saved or created 38,700 jobs). As with any
manufacturing projects, the number of jobs these provide will far exceed the number of
permanent jobs from projects in REEGI, given the nature of the projects.
198 ARRA, Pub. L. No. 111-5 § 3, 123 Stat. 116 (Supp. IV 2010).
199 Ironically, Solyndra was also a manufacturing concern and estimated providing a sig-
nificant number of jobs when the loan guarantee commitment was issued. The goals of
ARRA may have required DOE to use funding and investment criteria that resulted in
riskier lending decisions by DOE. See Joel Rosenblatt, Solyndra Files Plan to Reorganize
in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG NEWS (July 28, 2012), http://www.businessweek
.com/news/2012-07-28/Solyndra-files-plan-to-reorganize-in-chapter-11-bankruptcy.
464 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 37:425
pursuant to the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (“Credit Reform Act” or
“FCRA”).200 Before the Credit Reform Act, agencies would not seek ap-
propriations for these contingent obligations and kept them as off-budget
items. Only when the contingencies arose and losses resulted, would the
agency seek appropriations. This pattern was problematic, as agencies
would implement federal credit programs without sufficient consider-
ation for the fiscal consequences and did not take into account risk of loss
appropriately when implementing these programs.201
The Credit Reform Act was passed to remedy this pattern of federal
agencies’ budgeting for federal credit programs such as loan guarantee pro-
grams and loan insurance programs.202 When implementing FCRA, policy-
makers recognized that booking the full loan amounts was not accurate
because these federal credit programs represented contingent, not defini-
tive, obligations.203 Some interim legislative changes required budget appro-
priations to be obtained. The final solution, embodied by the Credit Reform
Act, was to create a new system of booking these contingent obligations.204
The Credit Reform Act requires the expected loss, rather than the full orig-
inal loan amount, be booked and appropriations authority be sought for
this lesser amount.205
b. OMB Guidelines
The Credit Reform Act provides that OMB is required to assess
costs to the tax payer of credit programs by agencies, such as loan guaran-
tee programs. OMB’s Circulars A-129 and A-11 provide federal agencies
guidance on creating and maintaining federal credit programs, and set
forth OMB’s responsibilities.206 A principal aspect of OMB’s review pro-
cess as required by Circular A-11 is that OMB must calculate the CSC,
which reflects an estimated net present value of the aggregate potential
200 Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (“Credit Reform Act”), 2 U.S.C. §§ 661–661(f) (Supp.
IV 2010).
201 See Principles of Appropriations Law, supra note 113, at 11-12, 11-13.
202 See id. at 11-15, 11-16.
203 See id. at 11-12, 11-14.
204 See id. at 11-15.
205 Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, 2 U.S.C. §§ 661a(5)(B)(iii), 661a(5)(F) (Supp. IV 2010).
206 CIRC. A-129, supra note 116 (addressing the goals federal departments and agencies
should apply for implementing federal credit programs, including setting relevant criteria
and requirements for programs and processes to create new programs or expand additional
ones); OMB, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRC. A-11 PART 5, PREPARATION, SUB-
MISSION AND EXECUTION OF THE BUDGET (2011) [hereinafter CIRC. A-11], available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/a11_current_year/a_11_2011.pdf.
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cost or gain to the tax payer of a specific project on a discounted contract
cash flow basis.207
Once a final loan guarantee commitment is made, the CSC amount
is booked. The amount is subject to re-estimation annually.208 If the
agency’s original estimate is too low, because, for example, it assumed
too low a default rate, then resources must be apportioned to cover the
shortfall.209 Section 504(f) of FCRA permits indefinite budget authority
for such reapportionment.210 If the agency’s estimate was too high and the
CSC is reduced, this similarly requires re-estimation and reductions to spe-
cific budgetary authority to account for any offsetting additional receipts.211
c. OMB Process with DOE
Notwithstanding the detailed guidance OMB provides in its circu-
lars, OMB does not make publicly available the proprietary financial model
it uses to determine the CSC, called the Credit Subsidy Calculator 2.212
The process to calculate the CSC for each loan guarantee involves an
207 See Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 § 503(a), 2 U.S.C. § 661b(a) (2006); see also
CIRC. A-11, supra note 206, at § 185.2, 185.5(a) (defining subsidy cost as “the estimated
present value of the cash flows from the Government (excluding administrative expenses)
less the estimated present value of the cash flows to the Government resulting from a direct
loan or loan guarantee, discounted to the time when the loan is disbursed.”).
208 See CIRC. A-11, supra note 206, at § 185.3.
209 See id. at CIRC. A-11, supra note 206, at § 185.18 (providing that: “A downward reestimate
indicates that the subsidy cost payment to the financing account by the program account was
too large so that its assets exceed its liabilities. The reestimate amount (plus interest on
the reestimate) must be obligated and disbursed from the financing account. Before re-
cording the obligation, ensure you have adequate resources apportioned. . . . For loan
guarantees only, to the extent the reestimate is due to lower default payments than ini-
tially estimated, either actual or projected, use your uninvested balance with Treasury to
cover the obligation. In cases where amounts less than $1 need to be returned, do not in-
clude the amount on the face of the apportionment . . . .”) (Excess funds are then allocated
to a downward reestimate receipt account.).
210 See Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 § 504(f), 2 U.S.C. 661c(f) (2006); see also CIRC. A-11
supra note 206, at § 185.17.
211 See CIRC. A-11, supra note 206, at § 185.3(v) (defining negative subsidies: “(v) Negative
subsidies mean subsidy costs that are less than zero. They occur if the present value of cash
inflows to the Government exceeds the present value of cash outflows. In such cases, appro-
priations bills must still provide specific authority before direct loans or loan guarantees
can be made, generally in the form of a loan limitation.”) Any under-estimations or better
performance by a credit program is thus transferred out of the agency on an annual basis.
212 NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE, CREDIT SUBSIDY COSTS FOR NEW NUCLEAR POWER PROJECTS
RECEIVING DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE) LOAN GUARANTEES: AN ANALYSIS OF DOE’S
METHODOLOGY AND MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS 3, note 1 (2010), available at http://www.nei.org
/filefolder/CreditSubsidyCostWhitePaper.pdf.
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extended process between the DOE and OMB where the DOE provided
OMB credit subsidy models for each project and OMB provided feed-
back.213 OMB’s risk modeling generally was not shared with the DOE.
OMB’s review took significantly longer than the DOE’s initial response to
applications.214 This lack of transparency in performing risk calculations
created uncertainty for applicants, because they could not do their own
calculations to determine the CSC.
The OMB/DOE’s CSC calculation process significantly impacted
the DOE LGP. As reported by the DOE Office of the Inspector General in
February 2009, it took the LGP Office fifteen months of negotiation with
OMB to reach agreement on the model to calculate the CSC.215 Even after
reaching agreement on the financial model, OMB had not approved the
CSC for projects, including the 1703 Program projects.216 In one instance,
an applicant under the 1703 Program for a nuclear generation loan guaran-
tee, Constellation Energy, publicly announced its decision to withdraw its
application after OMB finally released a CSC calculation for the project.217
In that case, OMB calculated the CSC to be $880 million, or 11.6 percent
of the total proposed loan guarantee amount of $7.5 billion.218 Under the
1703 Program, this amount would be payable by the applicant and, as
Constellation Energy noted, this amount would be in addition to any
financing costs the applicant would incur in constructing the project.219
213 REPORT OF R. TODD NEILSON, CHIEF RESTRUCTURING OFFICER, SOLYNDRA 80 (2012)
[hereinafter Neilson Report], available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/86910992/Solyndra
-CRO-Report-Final.
214 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-157, DOE LOAN GUARANTEES FURTHER
ACTIONS ARE NEEDED TO IMPROVE TRACKING AND REVIEW OF APPLICATIONS 23, 25 (2012)
[hereinafter GAO-12-157], available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/589210.pdf. DOE’s
initial response on loan guarantee applications in the last year of the 1705 Program was
several weeks. As the LGP Office received additional funding to add staff, their stated goals
were to decrease initial processing time for loan guarantee applications. According to in-
dependent audits, the LGP Office succeeded with these goals. Id. at 15.
215 See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DOE/IG-0812, AUDIT
REPORT: THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY’S LOAN GUAR. PROGRAM FOR INNOVATIVE ENERGY
TECH. 3 (2009), available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/igprod/documents/IG-0812.pdf.
216 See, e.g., id. at 3, 4.
217 Mark Peters, Constellation Energy Quits Loan Guarantee Program, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11,
2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB20001424052748704442404575542413155178010.html.
218 Constellation Rejects Loan Guarantee Terms, WORLD NUCLEAR NEWS (Oct. 11, 2010),
http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN_Constellation_rejects_loan_guarantee_terms
_1110101.html.
219 See id. Michael Wallace, the COO of Constellation Energy rejected the DOE/OMB’s pro-
posed 11.6 percent CSC fee for the company’s loan guarantee application for its joint
venture with Electricité de France to increase the Calvert Cliffs project. He expressed
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Energy Secretary Steven Chu noted that the inter-agency process
slowed the review process for loan guarantees. He also noted that statutory
constraints on the DOE meant that DOE could not invest in more specu-
lative projects to enhance innovation,220 highlighting the dichotomy of the
DOE LGP’s mission of supporting both innovative technology projects and
commercial technology projects, while reducing the DOE’s exposure to
project defaults in both instances.
The lack of transparency and delays by OMB did not go unnoticed
by Congress. In the fall of 2010, Senator Jeff Bingaman expressed a view
that OMB represented a choke point in the release of federal loan guaran-
tees under the DOE LGP during the Senate Energy and Natural Resources
Committee’s (“SENR Committee”) hearings, stating “[a]s far as I can tell
from the testimony today they [OMB] are a significant part of the prob-
lem . . . . We will continue to pursue their perspective on this so we can get
this loan guarantee program working as we think it should.”221 The hearing
generally revealed that OMB was an integral part of the process, yet no one
testifying from the DOE or industry suggested that OMB was to blame.222
Rather, witnesses, including Jonathan Silver of the LGP Office, noted that
startup programs have growing pains and that interagency cooperation was
the best it had been. But given the starting point, this may or may not have
been a compliment for OMB’s responsiveness.223 The SENR Committee’s
particular frustration with OMB and its flawed methodology in calculating the CSC. The
article reproduced Wallace’s letter to DOE. He wrote, in part that
During the course of our discussions, Constellation Energy and our
partners identified a significant problem in the methodology that the
OMB requires for the credit cost calculation, a problem that is applicable
beyond just our project, and therefore of significant program and policy
consequence. Yet in seeking to explore this further, we encountered sig-
nificant delay and resistance in being able to even engage on the issue.
After finally being able to detail our analysis of the problem and possible
solutions to key officials, and after Congress held a hearing exploring the
broader problem, we understand the [Obama] Administration may con-
vene an interagency process to consider it further. But the timing of such
discussions, their ultimate conclusion, and the prospect of a reasonable
outcome remain wholly uncertain.
Id.
220 Robert Thomson, Politics and Policy: Energy Secretary Steven Chu on the Adminis-
tration’s Game Plan, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424
052748704869304575104621269451154.html.
221 Katherine Ling, OMB Rebuked at Loan Guarantee Hearing, Despite Absence, ENV’T
& ENERGY DAILY, Sept. 24, 2010.
222 Id.
223 Senator Bingaman introduced two bills to streamline the loan guarantee application pro-
cess by, among other things, including eliminating third party credit rating requirements
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support of the DOE and the LGP Office was in sharp contrast to the
hearings by the House Energy and Commerce Committee and the Over-
sight and Government Reform Committee regarding Solyndra and the
DOE LGP.224
Shortly after the SENR hearing on OMB and Constellation’s public
withdrawal, senior advisors and cabinet secretaries met to brief the Presi-
dent on the issue of the OMB review process for the DOE LGP and pos-
sible solutions.225 The briefing memo, dated October 25, 2010, was jointly
prepared by Carol Browner, Energy Advisor to the President; Ron Klain,
Chief of Staff to Vice President Biden; and Larry Summers, Director of the
National Economic Council, in advance of the President’s meeting with
Treasury Secretary Geithner and Energy Secretary Chu to discuss options
for the 1705 Program.226 The memo proposed four alternatives to address
the delay in issuing loan guarantees: (1) limit OMB and Treasury oversight
to permit the DOE greater management of the process, (2) create clear
policy principles before any funds were disbursed, (3) create an expedited
review by Treasury and OMB, or (4) reprogram 1705 Program funds to a
different renewable energy incentive program managed by Treasury.227 The
briefing memo also focused on the risk of providing multiple subsidies.
The apparent resolution from the meeting was a commitment by the
for projects less than $100 million and authorizing the Secretary of Energy to issue condi-
tional commitments after OMB’s first recommendation without further approval. S. 3746,
111th Cong. (2010), 156 CONG. REC. S6899–6900 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 2010); S. 3759, 111th
Cong. (2010), 156 CONG. REC. S6904 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 2010).
224 See, e.g., The No More Solyndras Act (H.R. 6213), House Energy and Commerce Com-
mittee (Sept. 10, 2012), http://energycommerce.house.gov/fact-sheet/no-more-solyndras
-act-hr-6213.
225 Press Release, Energy & Commerce Committee, Energy & Commerce Leaders Probe
OMB for Role in DOE Stimulus Loan Guarantees, Risky Half Billion Dollar Award to
Solyndra a Top Concern (Mar. 14, 2011), energycommerce.house.gov/press.release/energy
-commerce-leaders-probe-omb-role-doe-stimulus-loan-guarantees-risky-half-billion
(describing the brief and the concerns it contained).
226 Memorandum from Carol Browner et al., to the President of the United States,
Renewable Energy Loan Guarantees and Grants 1–5 (Oct. 25, 2010) [hereinafter White
House Briefing Memo], available at http://archives.republicans.energycommerce.house.gov
/Media/file/Hearings/Oversight/111711_solyndra/Documents/DB_Part_3_Documents_32A
_42K.pdf (labeling the memo “Document F”).
227 Id. at 4–6; see also American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
§ 1603, 123 Stat. 115, 363–367. Section 1603 provided a cash grant option in lieu of existing
investment or production tax credits to owners of various types of REI projects and was
administered by the U.S. Department of Treasury. This program was generally referred to
as Section 1603 or the Cash Grant program. Section 1603 expired December 31, 2011. The
White House Briefing Memo also compared the relative merits of the cash grant program
to Section 1705. The variety and complexity of government incentives was difficult to navi-
gate for many participants in the REI. White House Briefing Memo, supra note 226, at 2–3.
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DOE, OMB, and Treasury to streamline the review process.228 Despite
the briefing memo and meeting, no significant changes were made to the
1705 Program.229
C. Pre-Solyndra Assessments of the DOE Loan Guarantee Program
1. Government Audits
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) and the DOE’s
Office of Inspector General (“DOE OIG”) have conducted several audits
of the LGP Office since the Office’s creation. These reports were produced
for either Congressional committees and subcommittees or the DOE.230
These reports highlighted various issues that have arisen within the DOE
LGP since its creation in 2005. The reports raised different issues that
evolved as the LGP developed and gained funding, with several consistent
assertions by the auditing bodies.
The GAO and DOE OIG reports improved over time. Initially, these
offices expressed concern about the lack of guidelines and regulations, as
well as evaluation criteria.231 As the LGP Office received funding and
staffed up, it was able to address a number of these early concerns. By
2010, the GAO’s recommendations had narrowed in scope to address four
principal issues.232 In 2011, the DOE OIG was principally concerned about
the LGP Office’s record-keeping procedures.233
228 Tom Hamburger et al., Obama Advisors Raised Warning Flags Before Solyndra
Bankruptcy, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/26/nation/la
-na-energy-loans-20110927.
229 See id.; Andrew Malcolm, Obama Was Warned of Loan Dangers Long Before Solyndra
Sank, L.A. TIMES BLOGS (Sept. 27, 2011, 3:08 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com
/washington/2011/09/obama-solyndra-larry-summers.html.
230 As part of the appropriations for the DOE LGP, GAO was tasked with undertaking peri-
odic audits of the program and reporting to Congress. See GAO-12-157, supra note 214.
231 See also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-798T, DEP’T OF ENERGY: OBSER-
VATIONS ON ACTIONS TO IMPLEMENT THE NEW LOAN GUARANTEE PROGRAM FOR INNOVATIVE
TECHNOLOGIES (2007), http://www.gao.gov/assets/120/116357.pdf [hereinafter GAO-07-798T].
See generally KEY STEPS NEEDED, supra note 153.
232 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-627, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY: FURTHER
ACTIONS ARE NEEDED TO IMPROVE DOE’S ABILITY TO EVALUATE AND IMPLEMENT THE LOAN
GUARANTEE PROGRAM 13 (2010) [hereinafter GAO-10-627], available at http://www.gao
.gov/new.items/d10627.pdf (noting inconsistent treatment of applicants, no systematic
appeals process, and failure to issue a solicitation for all Section 1705 projects, notably
manufacturing projects).
233 See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DOE/IG-0849,
AUDIT REPORT: THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY’S LOAN GUARANTEE PROGRAM FOR CLEAN
ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES 2, 3, 10 (2011), available at http://www.recovery.gov/Accountability
/inspectors/Documents/IG-0849.pdf.
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2. Industry Perspectives
When the 1705 Program was introduced as part of the ARRA, many
in the REI community were supportive and optimistic about the potential
to jump start their stalled industry in the midst of the Great Recession and
financial crisis.234 The 1703 Program had existed since 2005, yet no loan
guarantee commitments had been issued. The 1705 Program offered hope
to the industry, given the appropriations for the cost of the CSC and ex-
pansion to commercial technologies in certain areas. Some industries, such
as the solar renewable energy industry, were very supportive of the 1705
Program.235 However, the short program life of the 1705 Program was
viewed as limiting the program’s scope and potential effectiveness.236 In
addition, the program eligibility requirements as implemented by the LGP
Office were less favorable to certain renewable energy industries. The pres-
ident of the Renewable Fuels Association wrote an open letter to Energy
Secretary Chu about the program’s eligibility criteria and difficulty for
cellulosic ethanol producers to meet the criteria, because the program re-
quirements did not conform to the realities of the ethanol business.237
Beyond the 1705 Program scope and eligibility debate, some advo-
cates, including financiers and other industry participants, supported a
broader approach to government promotion of the REI through a more am-
bitious proposal to create a separate green bank, similar to the Export-
Import Bank of the United States.238 Their proposed agency was titled
234 Michael J. Gergen et al., Investing in a Clean Energy Future, PFI YEARBOOK (2010).
235 See 1705, Loan Programs Office, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://lpo.energy.gov/?page_id
=41 (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
236 See Gergen et al., supra note 234 (stating that “While the LGP will likely prove to have
been a helpful first step in establishing a federal credit support program for clean energy
technologies, it is only a first step, especially given its limited appropriations and the lim-
ited life of its Recovery Act provisions”).
237 See Letter from Bob Dineen, President & CEO, Renewable Fuels Assoc., to Steven Chu,
Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of Energy (Oct. 26, 2009), available at http://www.ethanolrfa.org
/page/-/objects/documents/2677/doe_loan_guarantee_letter.pdf. Mr. Dineen noted that the
requirements for (1) long term offtake contracts with guaranteed pricing, (2) extensive com-
mercial scale financial and operational data, and (3) higher levels of equity for startup
technologies than for more mature technologies with commensurate indicative debt ratings
to prove projects had a reasonable prospect of repayment, could not be easily met by ethanol
projects since ethanol is a commodity business and sells its product in the spot market,
similar to oil and other refined petroleum products. He also noted that start up businesses
could not demonstrate long track records of data and, in the same vein, the equity behind
startups was generally less than established businesses and, therefore, credit ratings were
not forthcoming for businesses. Id.
238 The Export-Import Bank of the United States is also known as the “Ex-Im Bank.” The
Bank’s mission is to support U.S. jobs through exports and is the United States’ export
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the Clean Energy Deployment Administration (“CEDA”) and would have
greater autonomy and budgetary authority to make direct loans and
issue loan guarantees.239
Practitioners across the energy field worked to identify the key
elements of the 1705 Program and watched carefully as the DOE imple-
mented the program and issued several solicitations under the auspices of
the 1705 Program.240 One group of practitioners authored an article on the
1705 Program and offered five recommendations on the structure of the
program to improve its effectiveness241 (I refer to the authors as the “PF
authors”). First, the PF authors noted there is a “fundamental tension be-
tween the statutory goals of the Loan Guarantee Program and the selection
criteria employed in granting loan guarantees.”242 The PF authors noted
that while the statutory goals include promoting innovative technology,
the DOE’s criteria relied heavily on the creditworthiness or “bankability”
of an applicant to determine whether to select a project.243 The PF authors
asserted this would likely prevent many of the innovative projects from
moving forward because they were less likely to have the requisite finan-
cial support to meet this requirement.244
Second, the PF authors observed that many application require-
ments were overly burdensome, such as paying application fees up front
and in full.245 In addition, the PF authors noted requiring applicants to ob-
tain preliminary credit ratings would impose time and cost burdens on
credit agency. Ex-Im Bank accomplishes its mission by offering a number of products, such
as direct loans, loan guarantees and export credit insurance. See generally Our Mission,
About Us, EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.exim.gov/about/ (last
visited Jan. 30, 2013).
239 See generally Clements & Sims, supra note 153. The CEDA proposal was viewed as
similar to Ex-Im Bank because it would have the goal of becoming a self-sustaining agency
offering a variety of products to assist clean energy industries. Unlike Section 1703 and
Section 1705, loan guarantees would be just one product that the CEDA could offer. The
CEDA was intended to have significantly more appropriations to expand its scope. See
Clean Energy Development Administration: Hearing on S.1462 Before the S. Committee
on Energy and Natural Res., 112th Cong. (May 3, 2011); Press Release, U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, U.S. Chamber Backs Clean Energy Deployment Administration at Senate
Hearing (May 3, 2011), available at http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2011/may
/us-chamber-backs-clean-energy-deployment-administration-senate-hearing.
240 See Appendix (listing LGP Office solicitations).
241 See Jennifer F. Massouh et al., Real Promise or False Hope: DOE’s Title XVII Guarantee,
22 ELECTRICITY J. 53 (2009) [hereinafter Title XVII Paper].
242 Id. at 60.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 61.
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applicants that could have a negative impact on the quality of applications
due to self-selection.246 They recommended (a) permitting applications to
be received on a rolling basis rather than during the limited periods pro-
vided to respond to solicitations issued by the DOE, (b) permitting appli-
cation fees to be remitted later in the process, and (c) eliminating credit
rating requirements or deferring them until later in the process.247
Third, the PF authors noted the inconsistency in traditional financ-
ing techniques and other existing loan guarantee programs, such as those
used by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and Ex-Im Bank
compared with what the DOE had proposed for collateral arrangements
and intercreditor issues.248 The DOE guidance required the DOE to have
superior rights on collateral disposition, required non-guaranteed debt to
have the same loan tenor as guaranteed loans (as much as thirty years) and
did not permit stripping of non-guaranteed debt in sale or participation
of debt. Additionally, DOE guidance permitted the DOE to ask for addi-
tional collateral beyond the project assets.249 The PF authors noted these
various requirements were not consistent with traditional project financing
techniques in the private sector or other government programs and were
not likely to be well received.250
Fourth, the PF authors highlighted that the DOE required equity
contributions to be “cash equity,” which would affect the scale and type of
applicants, because other forms of equity were not permissible.251
Finally, the PF authors noted that the DOE loan guarantees, as
originally described, were only available for loans and other debt obliga-
tions, which limited some of the more common financing structures for re-
newable energy projects that have equity components to take advantage
of tax credit incentives, such as sale-leasebacks, lease pass-throughs and
partnership flip financing structures.252
246 Id.
247 Title XVII Paper, supra note 241, at 61–62.
248 Id. at 63.
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Id. at 64. Conversely, typical project financing, lenders will often allow the borrower
and its equity sponsors to count more than just cash contributed equity as equity. For
example, an equity sponsor may contribute land, materials or even equity in a subsidiary
to the project borrower and would seek to have such contributions accepted by the lenders.
Furthermore, solely utilizing upfront cash equity may not be the most economically effi-
cient capital structure.
252 Id. at 64–65.
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3. Analysis
The PF authors were not the only ones commenting on the 1705
Program. Other professionals in the industry, as well as developers, fi-
nanciers, trade groups and interested groups had many comments for the
DOE.253 It listened. The DOE reviewed and revised its regulations in the
fall of 2009.254 The DOE addressed a number of the issues raised by the
PF authors, as well as other comments from the public.255 The DOE up-
dated its regulations to permit a variety of transaction and financing struc-
tures consistent with limited recourse project financings in various other
segments of the renewable energy market to expand eligibility for DOE
loan guarantees.256 The DOE also modified its interpretation concerning
collateral security, project ownership, and the type of equity that could
be contributed.257
The fundamental tensions the DOE faced were much greater than
the tension between innovation and bankability raised by the PF authors
in the Title XVII paper described above. The PF authors questioned
whether truly innovative projects on the cusp of commercialization could
meet the application requirements set by the DOE, such as indicative credit
ratings.258 The DOE focused on tensions that were even broader. It was
supposed to support both innovative projects (defined as ones not in wide-
spread commercial use) and commercial technology projects (defined by the
number of commercial applications—in use by three or more projects for a
period of at least five years).259 Furthermore, the DOE was supposed to sup-
port projects that could demonstrate a reasonable prospect of repayment.
The DOE had to support projects across a wide spectrum of technologies,
each of which posed different risks, not only during the development stage
but also during operation.260 The DOE was to support REEGI projects, but
also manufacturing projects. The DOE had to support projects that would
have been built without government support, but for the lack of financing
253 See, e.g., Loan Guarantees for Projects that Employ Innovative Technologies, 74 Fed.
Reg. 63,544, 63,546 (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 609) (totaling up the number of interested
parties who submitted comments).
254 Id. at 64,546 (issuing a revised final rule in this announcement). The DOE had previously
issued a Notice of Public Rulemaking and Opportunity to Comment on August 7, 2009. Id.
255 Id.
256 Id. at 63,544.
257 Id. at 63,545, 63,546. The Solyndra Part, infra Part IV, briefly describes some of the
collateral security aspects of these updated regulations.
258 See Title XVII Paper, supra note 241, at 57.
259 See 10 C.F.R. § 609.2 (2012) (defining commercial technology).
260 See Title XVII Paper, supra note 241, at 54, 55.
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generally available in the market, as long as these projects commenced
construction by September 30, 2011.261 Yet under the 1703 Program, the
DOE also had to support projects that could pay their own CSC.262 In re-
viewing the independent assessments of the DOE, a common critique was
the DOE’s lack of adequate performance metrics. Given the DOE’s broad
and inconsistent mandate, it is hard to envision how the DOE could have
across-the-board performance metrics, or even solicitation-specific perfor-
mance metrics, given the lack of similarity of projects. The GAO noted this
fundamental challenge to the DOE LGP in its 2008 report when it stated:
Further, DOE will not gain significant experience in each
technology because the program’s objective is to commer-
cialize a limited number of each type of innovative technolo-
gies. Therefore, the types of projects will, by design, evolve
over time, and the experience and data that DOE gains may
not be applicable to evaluating the risks of projects applying
in the future.263
Undaunted by the challenges of inconsistent and conflicting legis-
lative intent between its loan guarantee programs, the LGP Office moved
forward to approve loan guarantee commitments.264 The LGP Office issued
its first conditional loan guarantee commitment under the 1705 Program
in March 2009, and finalized this commitment in September 2009—four
years after the DOE LGP was initially authorized.265 Solyndra was the
first recipient of a conditional loan guarantee commitment.266 By the end
of the 1705 Program’s availability period, the LGP Office issued loan guar-
antee commitments for approximately $10.2 billion of projects in August
and September 2011.267
261 Id. at 58, 59.
262 1703, Loan Programs Office, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://lpo.energy.gov/?page_id=39
(last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
263 GAO RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 125, at 20.
264 See Our Projects, Loan Programs Office, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://lpo.energy.gov
/?page_id=45 (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
265 Id.
266 Id.; see Press Release, Loan Programs Office, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Vice President Biden
Announces Finalized $535 Million Loan Guarantee for Solyndra (Sept. 4, 2009), available
at https://lpo.energy.gov/?p=827; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Obama Administration
Offers $535 Million Loan Guarantee to Solyndra, Inc. (Mar. 20, 2009), available at https://
lpo.energy.gov/?p=839.
267 See Our Projects, Loan Programs Office, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://lpo.energy.gov
/?page_id=45 (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
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IV. SOLYNDRA STORY
A. Changing the Landscape
Solyndra’s bankruptcy in September 2011,268 has been detrimental
to the image of the REI and has highlighted the role that government in-
centives play in the industry. Solyndra opened the door to critics challeng-
ing the effectiveness of the DOE LGP and questioning the broader role of
government incentives for the REI.
B. Background
Solyndra was founded in May 2005.269 Solyndra’s product, a cylin-
drical photovoltaic panel, was designed to make installations on rooftops
significantly easier and thus more cost effective than traditional flat panel
photovoltaic systems.270 Solyndra’s panel also required less polysilica to
create, which permitted the company to achieve a price advantage through
its manufacturing process.271 The company grew rapidly and began com-
mercial shipments of its photovoltaic systems in July 2008.272 Solyndra
planned an initial public offering for 2010 and filed a Form S-1 with the
Securities Exchange Commission in December 2009.273
Solyndra first submitted a pre-application for a loan guarantee in
December 2006 under the 1703 Program to finance the construction of an
additional manufacturing facility in Fremont, CA, for its thin film cylin-
drical photovoltaic solar panels.274 Solyndra initially applied as an eligible
268 Peg Brickley, Solar Energy Firm Files for Chapter 11—Solyndra’s Step Marks Big Loss
for Backers; U.S. Is Creditor, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2011, at B5, available at http://www
.djreprints.com/link/DJRFactiva.html?FACTIVA=wjco20110907000029. Note that this
article reported figures $527 million, while the DOE LPO reported $535 million, for the
amount of Solyndra’s loan guarantee. The difference between the two figures is that the
original guaranteed loan commitment to Solyndra was for $535M. At the time of Solyndra’s
Chapter 11 filing, it had borrowed $527M of the $535M.
269 See SOLYNDRA, INC., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Amended by S-1A March 16,
2010) at 16, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1443115/0001193125
10058567/ds1a.htm.
270 See id. at 16.
271 See Innovative Cadmium Telluride Technology, FIRST SOLAR INC., http://www.firstsolar
.com/Innovation/CdTe-Technology (last visited Jan. 30, 2013). At the time of Solyndra’s
founding in 2005, polysilica was the only material used to produce solar panels. Since then,
other companies have created panels with other materials.
272 See Registration Statement, supra note 269, at 26.
273 See id. at 1–3.
274 Declaration of W.G. Stover, Jr., Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, In
Support of First Day Motions at ¶ 8, In re Solyndra LLC et al., No. 11-12799 (Bankr. Del.
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renewable energy manufacturing facility.275 The DOE reached out to
Solyndra and fifteen other qualifying companies and invited them to sub-
mit full applications under the 1705 Program following the authorization
of and appropriations for the 1705 Program.276 Under the 1705 Program,
innovative technologies applicants were eligible for full loan guarantees,
where the lending, as well as the loan guarantee, was provided by the
Federal Government through the Federal Financing Bank (“FFB”).
In March 2009, Solyndra received a conditional commitment for a
$535 million loan guarantee from the DOE; it was the first DOE loan guar-
antee provided through DOE LGP.277 At the time of the initial loan guar-
antee, Solyndra was touted by the Obama Administration as an example
of the success of the clean-tech economy, the future of jobs in a green econ-
omy, and America’s preeminence in the field.278 As one of the loan guar-
antees funded as part of the ARRA, the loan guarantee was intended to
meet the Act’s goals of creating jobs. The DOE made a final commitment
to Solyndra for this loan guarantee in September 2009.279
However, Solyndra experienced financial difficulties despite having
received the DOE loan guarantee commitment.280 Solyndra suspended its
attempt to float a public offering and pulled its registration statement in the
middle of 2010.281 Solyndra worked to stabilize its finances and engaged in
2011), available at https://www.solyndra-info.com/courtfilings.aspx (listed under filing
date 09/06/2011; filing #13). The new facility was nicknamed “Fab 2” and its construction
was the basis for the loan and loan guarantee made to Solyndra. Solyndra had another
manufacturing facility nicknamed “Fab 1,” which was idled when Solyndra hit financial
troubles in November 2010.
275 See Appendix.
276 See Declaration of W.G. Stover, Jr., supra note 274, at ¶ 8.
277 See id. ¶ 8.
278 Carol D. Leonnig et al., Obama’s Focus on Visiting Clean-Tech Companies Raises
Questions, WASH. POST (June 25, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obamas
-focus-on-visiting-clean-tech-companies-raises-questions/2011/06/24/AGSFu9kH_story.html
(discussing Obama’s visits to “clean technology” businesses, including a visit to Solyndra in
May 2010, weeks after auditors questioned whether Solyndra could remain a going concern);
see also Alison Vekshin, Treasury Department’s Watchdog Probes Federal Bank Role in
Solyndra’s Loan, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 14, 2011, 2:32 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news
/2011-09-14/treasury-department-s-watchdog-probes-federal-bank-role-in-solyndra-s-loan
.html (describing the start of a federal probe into Solyndra).
279 See Our Projects, Loan Programs Office, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://lpo.energy.gov
/?page_id=45 (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
280 These difficulties culminated in Solyndra’s filing for bankruptcy. See Brickley, supra
note 268. The problems that caused Solyndra’s demise were market risks, as discussed
infra Part V.B.
281 SOLYNDRA, INC., S-1 Registration Statement Withdrawal, Form RW (June 18, 2010),
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1443115/000119312510141727/drw.htm.
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a restructuring in February 2011, which yielded an additional $75 million
of equity investments.282 One component of the 2011 restructuring per-
mitted the new investors to have a senior secured position to the federal
government’s loan guaranteed by the DOE.283 News sources also reported
another significant component of the restructuring was the subordination
of over $1 billion of equity previously contributed to Solyndra.284
Solyndra was in trouble many months before it filed for bankruptcy.
Sources detailed Solyndra’s efforts to raise capital, along with its cost struc-
ture and capital intensive business, as well as the decreased demand for
its panels.285 In March 2011, the CEO admitted missteps, the company ex-
pected too much growth, and focused too little on market development.286
Notwithstanding the February restructuring, Solyndra’s significant senior
secured debt obligations of over $783 million prevented it from obtaining
bridge financing to continue its operations in August 2011, and was a factor
in Solyndra’s filing bankruptcy.287
C. Bankruptcy
Solyndra’s bankruptcy288 in September 2011 had huge repercus-
sions on the REI. The swiftness of the filing, the termination of over 1100
282 See Declaration of W.G. Stover, Jr., supra note 274, at ¶¶ 16–24 (detailing the February
2011 Restructuring).
283 See id. ¶¶ 16–22 (describing the intercreditor priorities agreed to during the February
2011 restructuring).
284 See Yuliya Chernova, After Investing $1B, Solyndra’s Backers Finally Lose Their Grip,
WALL ST. J. BLOGS (Aug. 31, 2011, 6:59 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2011/08
/31/after-investing-1b-solyndras-backers-finally-lose-their-grip/. This title is somewhat
misleading, as equity investors are always structurally subordinated to the interests of
lenders, and secured lenders stand at the top of the priority pyramid. One of the troubles
with the Solyndra restructuring was that significant amounts of equity were converted
to debt, of course at a discount, as described later in this Article.
285 Eric Wesoff, Solyndra IPO Canceled, GREENTECH SOLAR (June 17, 2010), http://www
.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/solyndra-ipo-cancelled (reporting on Solyndra’s announce-
ment that it filed a request with the SEC to withdraw its S-1 Registration Statement).
286 Yuliya Chernova, Solyndra CEO: We Made Two Major Mistakes, WALL ST. J. BLOGS
(Mar. 3, 2011, 3:58 PM), available at http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2011/03/03/solyndra
-ceo-we-made-two-major-mistakes (quoting the CEO that “the company has not focused as
much as it should have on commercial aspects. ‘The emphasis was on technology innovation,’
he said, and ‘much less on commercial aspects, like developing market and sales channels.’ ”).
287 See Declaration of W.G. Stover, Jr., supra note 274, at ¶ 24 (describing Solyndra’s situ-
ation after the February 2011 restructuring yielding an additional $75 million, but re-
sulting in $783 million in senior secured debt).
288 The project company for the Fremont manufacturing facility, Solyndra LLC, and its
parent company, 360 Solar Degree Holdings, Inc., both filed for bankruptcy and these 
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employees, and idling of Solyndra’s two plants took many by surprise.289
Solyndra filed for bankruptcy on September 6, 2011. Competitive pres-
sures from overseas competitors with government backing created pres-
sures for pricing and payment terms, and the reduction or elimination of
government incentives for purchasers, particularly in Europe, drastically
reduced the market for solar panels, as discussed in more detail below.290
In the initial filing motions291 made by Solyndra, also known as
“first day filing motions,” the Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) stated one of
the reasons for Solyndra’s bankruptcy filing was its inability to compete
with solar panel manufacturers from around the world in a pricing war.292
As described below, the CFO was referring to global pressures, but in par-
ticular, to dumping practices by Chinese solar panel manufacturers.293 The
CFO noted that these other panel manufacturers received low cost capital
and were able to offer incentives to customers such as extended payment
terms that harmed Solyndra’s ability to collect accounts receivable.294
Solyndra’s initial goal in its bankruptcy proceeding was to seek a
turnkey buyer—a buyer willing to restart or continue operations—for its
entire business. Solyndra believed there was greater value for its creditors
through a turnkey sale rather than piecemeal liquidation.295 Unfortunately,
Solyndra was unable to locate such a buyer and has instead engaged in an
orderly winding up process with a series of asset sales.
proceedings were consolidated into a single proceeding. This declaration detailed Solyndra’s
corporate structure and described how the FFB was utilized to construct the Fremont
facility. See Declaration of W.G. Stover, Jr., supra note 274, at ¶ 1, ¶ 10.
289 Ronald D. White, Solar Panel Firm Solyndra to Cease Operations, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1,
2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/01/business/la-fi-solar-shutdown-20110901.
290 See Declaration of W.G. Stover, Jr., supra note 274, at ¶ 23.
291 “First day filing motions” are motions by the filer, known as the debtor, at the beginning
of a bankruptcy proceeding in which the debtor requests certain things from the court to
enable the debtor to continue its normal operations, such as the right to use cash collateral
to pay routine expenses, such as paying salaries and accounts payables, the ability to hire
professionals, typically bankruptcy professionals, obtain financing after the bankruptcy
and other matters. See generally Daniel M. Press & Brett Weiss, First-Day Motions in
Individual Debtor Chapter 11 Cases, LEXISNEXIS COMMUNITIES (Dec. 12, 2011, 3:15 PM),
http://www.lexisnexis.com/community/bankruptcylaw/blogs/bankruptcycommentary/archive
/2011/12/12/first-day-motions-in-individual-debtor-chapter-11-cases.aspx.
292 See Declaration of W.G. Stover, Jr., supra note 274, at ¶ 8.
293 See, e.g., Wendy Koch, U.S. Finalizes Steep Tariffs on China’s Solar Panels, USA TODAY
(Nov. 7, 2012, 6:23 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/11/07/us-tariff
-China-Solar-Panels/1689177/.
294 See Declaration of W.G. Stover, Jr., supra note 274, at ¶ 23.
295 Jacqueline Palank, Attorney: Solyndra Still Open to Turnkey Bids, WALL ST. J. BLOGS
(Jan. 31, 2012, 3:44 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/2012/01/31/attorney-solyndra-still
-open-to-turnkey-bids/.
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D. Reasons for Solyndra’s Failure—A Perfect Storm
The problems Solyndra faced, which caused its downfall, were not
unique to Solyndra, but applied to other U.S. solar panel manufacturers
as well. According to Solyndra’s bankruptcy filing, the company failed due
to a variety of factors, including a number of competitive pressures. Chief
among them was the dumping practices by Chinese solar panel manufac-
turers, as well as changing market conditions that reduced the customer
base for manufacturers.296 Less than one month before Solyndra’s bank-
ruptcy filing, two other U.S. solar panel manufacturers—Evergreen Solar,
Inc. and SpectraWatt, Inc.—also filed for bankruptcy, although neither
company had received a DOE loan guarantee commitment so their filings
went largely unnoticed outside the domestic solar industry.297
The entire domestic solar manufacturing industry has faced and
continues to face significant market challenges. As a result, a number of
domestic companies have folded and consolidation is occurring with the
remaining players.298 The market challenges these companies face in-
cluded: (1) a lack of access to capital at reasonable terms as a result of
the Great Recession,299 (2) a greatly reduced demand for solar panels due
to cutbacks in government incentives for purchasers, particularly in the
European Union, as discussed below,300 (3) a decrease in polysilica prices,
which had previously affected the cost to produce to solar panels—this re-
duction harmed companies like Solyndra with manufacturing techniques
that assumed continued high pricing for polysilica,301 and (4) a manufac-
turing trade war involving product dumping into the United States, as
discussed below.
1. Trade War
The entire U.S. solar panel manufacturing industry, including
Solyndra, faced significant pressure from overseas competitors, China in
particular. A group of U.S. solar panel manufacturers led by SolarWorld
296 See White, supra note 289.
297 Aviva Gat, Solar Eclipse? Three U.S. Solar Panel Makers in Chapter 11, THE DEAL
PIPELINE (Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.thedeal.com/content/restructuring/solar-eclipse
-three-us-solar-panel-makers-in-chapter-11.php.
298 See id.
299 See id.
300 See id.
301 Becky Beetz, PV Polysilicon Prices Continue to Plummet, PV MAGAZINE, Sept. 17, 2012,
http://www.pv-magazine.com/news/details/beitrag/pv-polysilicon-prices-continue-to-plummet
_100008512/. “PV” is shorthand for “photovoltaic.”
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filed a suit with the U.S. International Trade Commission alleging that
Chinese solar panel manufacturers were engaging in dumping of solar
panels in the United States, artificially depressing the price of solar
panels.302 The U.S. International Trade Commission issued a unanimous
preliminary determination on December 2, 2011, that the Chinese solar
panel imports were harming the U.S. solar manufacturing industry.303 The
U.S. Department of Commerce agreed to take expedited action to deter-
mine whether duties should be applied to Chinese imports for all panels
imported starting December 3, 2011.304 The Department of Commerce is-
sued a preliminary ruling in March 2012 that Chinese panel manufacturers
had engaged in a pattern of dumping and assessed duties on Chinese solar
panel imports.305
These many challenges have continued to hammer solar panel man-
ufacturers. Energy Conversion Devices, a solar panel manufacturer and
302 Koch, supra note 293.
303 Matthew L. Wald, Panel Says Chinese Imports Hurt U.S. Solar Firms, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 2, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/03/business/energy-environment/chinese
-imports-hurt-us-solar-companies-trade-commission-says.html.
304 See Press Release, Coalition for American Solar Manufacturing, U.S. Department of
Commerce Finds Massive Surge of Chinese Solar Imports (Jan. 30, 2012), available at http://
www.americansolarmanufacturing.org/news-releases/01-30-12-casm-critical-circumstances
-release.pdf; Keith Bradsher, Trade War in Solar Takes Shape, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2011),
http:/www.nytimes.com/2011/11/10/business/global/us-and-china-on-brink-of-trade-war-over
-solar-power-industry.html (describing investigation commenced by the Commerce Depart-
ment, following petition by seven American solar manufacturers seeking tariffs be imposed
on solar panels imported from China. Assessment is that the wholesale price of solar
panels has dropped to $1 to $1.20/ watt of capacity vs. $1.80 in January and $3.30 in 2008).
Keith Bradsher, U.S. Solar Panel Makers Say China Violated Trade Rules, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/20/business/global/us-solar-manufacturers
-to-ask-for-duties-on-imports.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Stuart Burns, U.S. Solar Panel
Producers Calling for Tariffs Against Chinese Manufacturers, OILPRICE.COM (Nov. 14, 2011,
10:39 PM), http://oilprice.com/Alternative-Energy/Solar-Energy/US-Solar-Panel-Producers
-Calling-For-Tariffs-Against-Chinese-Manufacturers.html (stating the Dep’t of Commerce’s
time table for a preliminary decision).
305 INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FACT SHEET, COM-
MERCE PRELIMINARILY FINDS DUMPING OF CYSTALLINE SILICON PHOTOVOLTAIC CELLS,
WHETHER OR NOT ASSEMBLED INTO MODULES FROM THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
(2012), available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/factsheets/factsheet-prc-solar-cells-ad
-prelim-20120517.pdf; Keith Bradsher & Matthew L. Wald, A Measured Rebuttal to China
over Solar Panels, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/21/business
/energy-environment/us-to-place-tariffs-on-chinese-solar-panels.html. But see Nigam Arora,
U.S. Wimps Out, Refuses to Fight Chinese Solar Dominance, FORBES (Mar. 21, 2012,
12:51 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2012/03/21/u-s-wimps-out-refuses
-to-fight-chinese-solar-dominance/ (lamenting that the imposed tariffs were far lower than
hoped for).
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project developer, filed for bankruptcy on February 14, 2012, before the
Department of Commerce issued its ruling.306 After the imposition of tar-
iffs, Abound Solar, another DOE loan guarantee recipient, filed for bank-
ruptcy on June 28, 2012, and announced it will liquidate.307 AE Polysilicon,
another manufacturer of a alternative polysilicon process, announced its
shutdown and pending liquidation in May 2012.308 Undoubtedly, this casu-
alty list of solar manufacturers will continue to grow until there is some
improvement in the solar market.
2. Deteriorating Global Market Conditions
In addition to the anticompetitive dumping by Chinese panel manu-
facturers, U.S. solar panel manufacturers, as well as other global compa-
nies, have all struggled with the reduction or elimination of incentives for
renewable energy in the European Union.309 European Union countries
had been at the forefront of production incentives to spur growth of the
renewable energy industry, with significant economic consequences for
countries like Portugal, Spain, and most recently, Germany.310 As govern-
ments ended these subsidies to REEGI, the supporting REI, such as solar
panel manufacturers saw the market for their products collapse virtually
overnight.311 Any remaining manufacturers then had to compete for the
remaining market base. The uncertain outlook for solar manufacturers
306 See Martin LaMonica, Solar Industry Bloodbath Leads to Another Bankruptcy, CNET
NEWS (Feb. 14, 2012, 11:29 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-11386_3-57377645-76/solar
-industry-bloodbath-leads-to-another-bankruptcy/ (noting that ECD’s subsidiaries both
developed flexible silicon cells and developed solar projects, the manufacturing subsidiary
was shut down in 2011).
307 See Caroline Humer et al., Abound Solar Files to Liquidate in Bankruptcy, REUTERS
(July 3, 2012, 1:02 AM), http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/07/02/us-aboundsolar-bankruptcy
-idINBRE86118020120702; Matthew L. Wald, A 2nd U.S.-Supported Maker of Solar Panels
Will Close, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2012, http://www.nytimes/2012/06/29/business/energy
-environment/abound-solar-says-it-will-file-for-bankruptcy.html.
308 See Marc Osborne, Motech Pulls the Plug on AE Polysilicon Operations, PV TECH
(May 29, 2012), available at http://www.pv-tech.org/news/motech_pulls_the_plug_on_ae
_polysilicon_operations.
309 See Gat, supra note 297.
310 See generally Study: Incentives Giving Boost to European Solar Sector, EURACTIV
(July 28, 2008), http://www.euractiv.com/energy/study-incentives-giving-boost-eu-news
-220297.
311 European Solar Incentive Cuts Initiate Global Photovoltaic Market Shift, SOLARBUZZ
(June 22, 2011), http://www.solarbuzz.com/news/recent-findings/european-solar-incentive
-cuts-initiate-global-photovoltaic-market-shift.
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generally given this regulatory uncertainty is evident by tracking the
volatility of the stock of U.S. publicly traded solar firms.312
E. Solyndra Investigations
Immediately after Solyndra’s bankruptcy filing, the FBI raided
Solyndra’s offices on September 8, 2011, and executed search warrants
against the homes of certain Solyndra executives, including CEO Brian
Harrison and company founder Chris Gronet.313 The DOE’s Office of Inspec-
tor General had asked for the FBI’s assistance to determine whether any
improprieties existed with the loan guarantee to Solyndra.314 The FBI
has indicated it was investigating Solyndra to determine whether there
was accounting fraud or misrepresentation of financial information to the
federal government.315 As of this writing, no charges have been brought
against the company or any of its officers.
Following Solyndra’s bankruptcy, and independent from the FBI
criminal investigation, Solyndra’s board engaged an independent officer
to handle restructuring and liquidation. As part of his duties, the Chief
Restructuring Officer, Todd Neilson, conducted an investigation to deter-
mine whether Solyndra engaged in wrongdoing.316 Mr. Neilson’s report was
released in April 2012, and was filed with the bankruptcy court. The report
concluded that neither Solyndra nor any of its officers had engaged in any
illegal or improper activity as part of seeking to secure Solyndra’s DOE
loan guarantee commitment.317
In addition to the FBI investigation, at least two Congressional
committees and their subcommittees have held hearings and conducted
312 Compare First Solar Ousts CEO, Shares Dive 24 Percent, CNET NEWS (Oct. 25, 2011,
2:53 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-11128_3-20125518-54/first-solar-ousts-ceo-shares
-dive-24-percent/ (stating that the Board of Directors ousted CEO of First Solar), with Solar
Stocks Soar on First Solar Deal, YAHOO! FINANCE (June 12, 2012, 2:32 PM), http://finance
.yahoo.com/news/solar-stocks-soar-first-solar-183226369.html.
313 Sajid Farooq, FBI Raids Solyndra’s CEO, Founder’s Homes, NBC BAY AREA (Sept. 9,
2011), http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/FBI-Raids-Solyndras-CEO-Founders-Homes
-129556623.html.
314 Id.
315 See Seth Stern & Jim Snyder, FBI Said to Be Probing Solyndra for Possible Account
Fraud, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2011-09-29
/fbi-said-to-be-probing-solyndra-for-possible-accounting-fraud.html.
316 See Jacqueline Palank, Trustee Brings FBI, Accounting Experience to Solyndra Probe,
WALL ST. J. BLOGS (Mar. 27, 2012, 12:23 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/2012/03/27
/trustee-brings-fbi-accounting-experience-to-solyndra-probe/.
317 Neilson Report, supra note 213, at 3, 4. For example, one finding of the report was that
all legal and consulting fees were reasonable. Id. at 180–81.
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investigations into Solyndra and the DOE LGP in general.318 The House
Energy and Commerce Committee (“HEC Committee”) chaired by Repre-
sentative Fred Upton and its Subcommittee for Oversight and Investiga-
tions (“OI Subcommittee”) have held a number of hearings and published
their findings on Solyndra.
The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (“OGR
Committee”), chaired by Representative Darrell Issa, and its Subcommit-
tee on Regulatory Affairs, Stimulus Oversight and Government Spending
(“RASOG Subcommittee”), have also held hearings and conducted inves-
tigations regarding the DOE LGP. This committee’s hearings covered loan
guarantee recipients other than Solyndra.
Much of the focus of these hearings has been to probe possible con-
nections between the White House’s involvement in the review process to
make a final loan guarantee commitment to Solyndra and significant polit-
ical contributors to President Obama and Democratic Party interests who
were connected with Solyndra. As a result of the Solyndra saga, some mem-
bers of Congress even called for DOE Secretary Chu’s resignation.319
1. Partisanship
Much of the media coverage of Solyndra has focused on the nega-
tive impact on the Obama Administration.320 Many reports have focused
on whether loan guarantees were issued based on political contributions,
318 One hearing was before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce. See Solyndra and the DOE Loan Guarantee
Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 112th Cong. (2011) (statements of Jeffrey Zients, Deputy Director,
OMB; and Jonathan Silver, Executive Director, Dep’t of Energy Loan Programs Office),
available at http://archives.republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/hearings/hearingdetail
.aspx?NewsID=8897. The other was a full committee hearing of the Senate Committee on
Energy and Natural Resources. See Full Committee Hearing: Allison Report on DOE Loan
Guarantee Program, Hearings and Business Meetings, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, available at http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm
/hearings-and-business-meetings?ID=d0867c7a-9cca-4f12-8bb9-57d0fa02ab58.
319 Bonner R. Cohen, Solyndra Scandal Widens, Chu Pressured to Resign, HEARTLANDER
(Nov. 19, 2011), http://news.heartland.org/newspaper-article/2011/11/19/solyndra-scandal
-widens-chu-pressured-resign; Ben Geman & Andrew Restuccia, Rep. Barton: Chu Could
Be ‘Fall Guy’ on Solyndra, THE HILL (Nov. 17, 2011, 2:15 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/e2
-wire/e2-wire/194341-barton-chu-may-be-fall-guy-on-solyndra.
320 Yuki Noguchi, Solyndra Flop May Cost Taxpayers, Embarrass Obama, NPR RADIO
BROADCAST (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/09/15/140489033/solyndra-flop-may
-cost-taxpayers-embarrass-obama.
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whether there was improper favoritism shown to Solyndra by the Obama
Administration (often referred to as crony capitalism), highlighted the fail-
ure of government in serving as a venture capitalist, and on the failure of
renewable energy to serve as an alternative to fossil fuel–based energy.321
Heightened scrutiny of the DOE’s program following the Solyndra debacle
may have impacted the DOE’s decision-making when selecting recipients
for loan guarantee commitments.322
The tenor of dialogue in the Congressional investigations, hearings,
press releases, and even news reports from the majority and minority posi-
tions on these committees reflected a deep partisan divide on the portrayal
of what happened to Solyndra and who is to blame.323 The OGR and HEC
Committees have been accused of conducting partisan politics with inves-
tigations and hearings on the DOE LGP. For example, the ranking OGR
Committee member, Rep. Elijah Cummings, even asserted prior to the
March 20, 2012, hearing that the OGR Committee had started eleven inves-
tigations based on “unsubstantiated allegations that proved inaccurate.”324
Given the allegations of partisanship, this Article will avoid an un-
due focus on the substance of these proceedings. However, it will address
Solyndra’s restructuring in February 2011, and the DOE’s analysis of its
right to approve this restructuring. This matter was addressed in an OI
Subcommittee hearing in November 2011.325 This Article will also briefly
321 See, e.g., Department of Energy “Junk Loans” and Cronyism—Intro, GREEN CORRUPTION
(Apr. 28, 2012), http://greencorruption.blogspot.com/2012/04/green-corruption-department
-of-energy.html#.UKam74Zx6Vo; Marita Noon, The Special Seven: Obama’s Green-Energy
Crony-Corruption Story, Part IV, CONSERVATIVE ACTION ALERTS (Sept. 20, 2012), http://
www.conservativeactionalerts.com/2012/09/the-special-seven-obamas-green-energy-crony
-corruption-story-part-iv/.
322 See Eric Wesoff, Update: SolarCity and SolarStrong Lose to a Congress with Solyndra
Fever, GREENTECH MEDIA (Sept. 23, 2011), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read
/Update-SolarCity-and-SolarStrong-Lose-to-Congress-and-Solyndra-Fever/ (SolarCity had
planned to partner with military housing developers and install solar panels on as many
as 160,000 rooftops to produce up to 371 MW of additional electric capacity, but was unable
to reach the finish line to receive a conditional commitment from DOE).
323 See, e.g., White House Lashes Out at Congress Over ‘Partisan’ Solyndra Investigation,
CNS NEWS (Nov. 10, 2011), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/white-house-lashes-out-congress
-over-partisan-solyndra-investigation.
324 Jim Snyder, Democrat Says Issa Hasn’t Shown ‘Scandal’ in Energy Loans, BLOOMBERG
(Mar. 19, 2012, 3:05 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-19/democrat-says-issa
-hasn-t-shown-broad-scandal-in-energy-loans.html.
325 See generally The Solyndra Failure: Views from DOE Secretary Chu, Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Energy and Commerce Comm., 112th
Cong. (2011), available at http://archives.republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/hearings
/hearingdetail.aspx?NewsID=9090.
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address testimony given by Dr. Veronique de Rugy about loan guarantee
programs before the RASOG Subcommittee in March 2012.326
2. Solyndra February 2011 Restructuring
The OI Subcommittee focused on the DOE’s role in the Solyndra
matter. One issue on which the Subcommittee focused was whether the
DOE’s approval of the terms of the Solyndra restructuring in February
2011 was within its legal authority, and whether the DOE could take such
action without the approval of the Department of Treasury.327 The subcom-
mittee staff report focused on language from the DOE’s final rule in 2009,
about Treasury’s role in any loans made and changes to such loans.328
As detailed in Solyndra’s Chapter 11 first day filings, all parties
(secured lenders, the DOE, and existing equity investors) agreed to a re-
structuring in February 2011 that provided first priority security interests
to existing investors serving as new lenders for $69.3 million, plus accru-
ing interest, costs and expenses (approximately $75 million at the time
of the bankruptcy filing).329 The FFB’s loan was subordinated to this new
$69.3 million facility in right of payment and collateral liquidation. The
effect of this new intercreditor arrangement meant that in the event that
lenders sought payment from Solyndra by enforcement against Solyndra’s
assets, the first $69.3 million in principal (plus associated interest and
expenses) recovered from Solyndra and its assets would be applied to this
facility first.330 After the new facility was paid off, FFB and the DOE could
then recover the next $150 million of collateral security, and then could
326 The Obama Administration’s Green Energy Gamble Part II: Were All the Taxpayer
Subsidies Necessary?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Affairs of the H. Comm.
on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. (2012) (testimony of Veronique De Rugy,
Senior Research Fellow, Mercatus Center at George Mason Univ.) [hereinafter De Rugy
Testimony], available at http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/DeRugy
-Testimony.pdf.
327 Memorandum from the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, The Solyndra
Story, 112th Cong. 2, 12–13 (2011) [hereinafter Solyndra Story Memo], available at http://
energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/analysis
/20110914solyndra.pdf.
328 H. SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, MAJORITY STAFF REPORT, THE
SOLYNDRA FAILURE 103, 105 (2012), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites
/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/analysis/20120802solyndra.pdf.
329 See Declaration of W.G. Stover, Jr., supra note 274, at ¶¶ 16–24 (describing the
February 2011 restructuring, the intercreditor priority arrangements among the lenders
and the secured debt burden of the company).
330 See Neilson Report, supra note 213, at 177.
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recover an additional $385 million against the collateral security.331 The
final tranche of lenders could recover another $186 million against the
collateral security.332 The total aggregate secured debt was about $783
million.333 This debt burden proved to be crushing for Solyndra and it
was not able to obtain additional financing to continue operations.334
It is not unusual in distressed situations for the parties involved,
both secured and unsecured creditors and equity investors, to make hard
decisions and compromise their positions (particularly creditors) to allow
a business to continue operating. While secured lenders have the best posi-
tion, they are often forced to make concessions, such as lending additional
money, foregoing default interest, or permitting existing or additional secu-
rity to be shared with other parties, in order to have equity investors con-
tribute more money to a struggling business. Although lenders are not well
positioned, they do not have a strong desire to foreclose on their security
and become owners. Therefore, lenders must be thoughtful in determin-
ing when to maintain their security interests and when compromising may
yield a better recovery in the long term. Lenders’ decisions are often based
on their view of whether a company can be turned around. Of course, there
is no guarantee that even after a restructuring a business will be able to
recover and prosper.
This Article does not propose to answer whether the DOE correctly
interpreted its authorizing statute regarding its authority to agree to the
Solyndra restructuring. Nor does this Article answer whether the DOE
properly interpreted the role of Treasury as merely consultative. However,
it should be noted that the DOE’s interpretation of permissible collateral
security to be taken in connection with a loan guarantee commitment, as
well as the DOE’s flexibility in amending the terms of any guaranteed fi-
nancing as part of a restructuring or workout, remained consistent prior
to and after Solyndra’s restructuring and its bankruptcy.
The OI Committee staff report and hearing focused on a memo-
randum prepared by the LGP Office’s chief counsel supporting the DOE’s
position on the Solyndra restructuring.335 It did not appear that any
331 See id. at 128.
332 Id.
333 See id.
334 See Declaration of W.G. Stover, Jr., supra note 274, at ¶¶ 16–22; see also Matthew Daly,
Solyndra Bankruptcy: Obama Administration Considered Bailout, HUFFINGTON POST
(Nov. 2, 2011, 11:28 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/02/solyndra-bankruptcy
-obama-administration-bailout_n_1072737.html.
335 Memorandum for the General Counsel from Susan S. Richardson on Solyndra
Restructuring (Feb. 15, 2011), available at http://assets.nationaljournal.com/pdf/111014
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Congressional committee reports or hearings focused on the DOE’s im-
plementing regulations when trying to address the intent of the Title XVII
statutory provisions, even though the committee’s staff report directly
referenced the DOE’s final revised rule.336
The DOE revised its 2007 regulations interpreting § 1702(d) and
other provisions of Title XVII in December 2009.337 The focus of the DOE’s
changes in this revised final rule included, among other things, revisions
to the DOE’s requirements for collateral sharing, as well as pari passu
treatment for unsecured debt tranches and equity contributions.338 In the
2009 final rule summary, the DOE states its view on the statutory intent
that “[s]ection 1702(d) addresses certain threshold requirements that must
be met before the guaranty is made; and section 1702(g) addresses the
Secretary’s rights in the case of default of the loan.”339 The DOE further
interprets the statutory language in 1702(d) as not even requiring the
DOE take a security interest in collateral:
First, it should be borne in mind that nowhere does sec-
tion 1702 itself require that the Secretary receive a first
lien on all project assets as a condition of his ability to make
a loan guarantee. Instead the statute requires only that
the Secretary’s guaranteed obligation “not be subordinate
to other financing.” In fact, section 1702 does not require
that the lender or the Secretary receive any collateral as a
statutory requirement for making a loan guarantee.340
The DOE’s explanations for the final rule in December 2009 are
not dispositive as to statutory interpretation. However, they offer insight
into the DOE’s view as early as 2009 and provide the public and Congress
with notice of how the DOE viewed the authorizing statute and how the
DOE intended to interpret and implement the legislation. Thus, Congress
_SolyndraMemo1.pdf (interpreting § 1702(d)(3) of Title XVII to be a condition precedent
to issuing loan guarantees, not an ongoing requirement).
336 See Solyndra Story Memo, supra note 327, at 2.
337 Loan Guarantees for Projects That Employ Innovative Technologies, 74 Fed. Reg. 63,544
(Dec. 4, 2009) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 609).
338 Id.; see also Title XVII Paper, supra note 241, at 63, 64. Some of the comments of the
PF authors were items that DOE updated in this December rulemaking to ensure DOE’s
regulations were consistent with the project finance market practice as well as applicable
to structures used for renewable and clean energy transactions.
339 Loan Guarantees for Projects That Employ Innovative Technologies, 74 Fed. Reg. at
63,545 (Dec. 4, 2009).
340 See id.
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had ample opportunity prior to the Solyndra restructuring to refine the
DOE LGP authorizing legislation if the DOE’s regulatory interpretation
was inconsistent with Congress’s view.341
F. Distinguishing Solyndra—Manufacturing Risks
Despite the politically salacious tale the Solyndra story has offered,
most DOE LGP loan guarantee recipients will not be “Solyndras,” because
they are not of the same ilk. Solyndra, as a manufacturing company, faced
different risks than many other loan guarantee recipients, which are gen-
eration projects.342 As previously discussed, Solyndra faced significant mar-
ket pressures in its capacity as a solar panel manufacturer.343 Missteps by
Solyndra’s management did not help matters.344 These market pressures
on panel prices did not and do not harm REEGI projects. Ironically, the dif-
ficulties faced by all solar panel manufacturers, both in the United States
and abroad, have been a boon to purchasers of solar panels—like solar
power plants—who have benefitted from the precipitous drop in solar
panel costs.345 This highlights just one of many schisms within the REI.346
One of the DOE’s mandates was to provide broad support to manu-
facturing projects.347 The risks present in manufacturing projects are great
on their own accord. Add to this the DOE’s requirement to fund innovative
projects for which there is no ready market, because a particular technology
in the REI has not been commercialized yet.348 The risk inherent in this
type of project is vastly greater than a REEGI project which can demon-
strate firm offtake contracts for its generated power throughout the term
of the loan guaranteed by the DOE.
341 See id. at 63,549 (notifying Congress of the issuance of the final rule).
342 See Our Projects, Loan Programs Office, DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://lpo.energy.gov/?page
_id=45 (identifying the majority of recent recipients as generation projects).
343 See Gat, supra note 297 (discussing the market challenges that affected manufacturers
of solar energy products).
344 See Chernova, We Made Two Major Mistakes, supra note 286.
345 See Russell Gold, Wind, Solar Energy Still Face Big Hurdles—Solar Gains Traction,
Thanks to Subsidies, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2011, at B1 (discussing general drop in pricing
and consumer trends to install panels with assistance of federal and state subsidies in addi-
tion to reductions in panel prices. Utility scale developers have also benefitted from the drop
in panel prices).
346 The diverse groups within the broader REI complicate the ability to craft a coherent
framework of incentives even for just the REEGI to reach grid parity and long term sus-
tainability without incentives, as I will discuss in a future work.
347 ARRA of 2009, § 406, 42 U.S.C. § 16516(a) (Supp. IV 2010).
348 Id. § 16513(a)(2).
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1. Post-Solyndra Troubles
More DOE loan guarantee recipients have run into financial trou-
bles, filed for bankruptcy, or simply undergone Congressional scrutiny
since Solyndra’s bankruptcy. The loan guarantee recipients that are in fi-
nancial trouble or in bankruptcy are all similar to Solyndra in that they are
manufacturing projects employing or developing innovative technologies.
Beacon Power Corporation filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition on
October 30, 2011.349 Beacon Power designs, develops, and produces fast-
responding flywheel-based energy storage systems with the goal of aiding
the reliability to electrical grids, particularly in connection with renew-
able energy resources.350 On the date of Beacon’s bankruptcy filing, it listed
$72 million in assets and $47 million in liabilities.351 The list of its 20 larg-
est unsecured creditors was comprised mainly of trade creditors with all
but the three largest creditors owed less than $100,000.352 Beacon Power
filed a motion to consolidate three affiliates into a single filing, but other-
wise did not file significant first day motions.353 When Beacon Power filed
for bankruptcy, its executives made a point to state that Beacon was not
Solyndra.354 Beacon Power’s business was attractive enough that it was
able to find a buyer for most of its assets out of bankruptcy in February
2012.355 The DOE is expected to recover seventy percent of its loan guar-
antee.356 Beacon is similar to Solyndra in that it also researches and man-
ufacturers an innovative technology product. It differs from Solyndra,
349 Dawn McCarty, Beacon Power, Backed by U.S. Loan Guarantees, Files Bankruptcy,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-10
-31/beacon-power-backed-by-u-s-loan-guarantees-files-bankruptcy.html.
350 Id.
351 Id.
352 Voluntary Petition, Consolidated List of Twenty Creditors Holding Largest Unsecured
Claims, In re Beacon Power Corp. et al., No. 11-13450-KJC (Bankr. Del. 2011), available
at http://www.stewartlaw.pro/site_files/documents/beacon_power.pdf.
353 See id. Beacon Power Corporation, Stephentown Holding LLC and Stephentown Regula-
tion Services LLC sought to be combined into a single filing on Beacon Power’s voluntary
petition. Of the list of 20 largest unsecured creditors of the entity, Beacon listed, Beacon
listed 18 trade creditors and two professional creditors, with just over half of the $1.6 million
owed to these creditors going to the trade creditors and the balance to professional creditors.
354 Martin LaMonica, Beacon Power: We’re Broke, But We’re No Solyndra, CNET NEWS
(Nov. 1, 2011, 2:04 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-11128_3-20128637-54/beacon-power
-were-broke-but-were-no-solyndra/.
355 Martin LaMonica, DOE-Backed Beacon Power Finds Buyer Post-Bankruptcy, CNET
NEWS (Feb. 6, 2012, 2:49 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-11386_3-57372189-76/doe-backed
-beacon-power-finds-buyer-post-bankruptcy/.
356 Id.
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because it is not in the solar panel industry, which is under great stress
globally. Its technology is also sufficiently unique and still marketable, so
Beacon was able to find a turnkey buyer for the business.357
Abound Solar, another solar panel manufacturer, filed for bank-
ruptcy on June 28, 2012, and announced it would liquidate.358 Abound Solar
had ceased production at the manufacturing plant it had constructed and
was working to create a next generation panel prior to filing for bank-
ruptcy.359 Abound Solar is similar to Solyndra because it was in the same
solar panel manufacturing industry and has also fallen victim to the price
and trade wars for its product.
Outside the realm of direct loan guarantee programs, Fisker Auto-
motive, an ATVM Program loan recipient, has also received significant
attention as the DOE has suspended further draw-downs on its loan for
failure to meet milestones.360 Some media reports have questioned whether
Fisker would produce cars at the Delaware plant for which it received the
DOE loan for construction.361 While not a loan guarantee recipient, Fisker
is similar to Solyndra in that it is a manufacturer. As an automaker, Fisker
does not have guaranteed sales to mitigate the risks with building a man-
ufacturing facility, and thus faces inherently greater risks than REEGI
loan guarantee recipients. Fisker is, however, similarly situated to other
ATVM loan recipients, each of which is an auto manufacturer.362 Fisker’s
loan commitment represents six percent of the aggregate ATVM portfolio,
based on Fisker’s aggregate loan commitment.363 Based on the $200 mil-
lion actually advanced to Fisker, Fisker’s loans represent 2.4 percent of the
aggregate ATVM portfolio.364
In addition to projects in financial difficulty, the OGR Committee
and RASOG Subcommittee have focused on other loan guarantee recipi-
ents during Congressional hearings and investigations.365 The Committee
357 Id.
358 See Humer et al., supra note 307; Wald, supra note 307.
359 Wald, supra note 307.
360 See Matthew Mosk, Fisker May Never Build Electric Cars in US, ABC NEWS: THE
BLOTTER (May 30, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/fisker-build-electric-cars-us/story
?id=16458585#.
361 See id.
362 Our Projects, Loan Programs Office, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://lpo.energy.gov/?page
_id=45 (last visited Jan. 30, 2013) (listing five auto manufacturers as the ATVM recipients).
363 Id.
364 See Mosk, supra note 360.
365 See The Obama Administration’s Green Energy Gamble Part II: Were All the Taxpayer
Subsidies Necessary?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Affairs of the H. Comm.
on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. (June 19, 2012) [hereinafter Green Energy
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and Subcommittee have asked questions about a number of projects,
including ones owned or developed by First Solar, NRG, BrightSource
Energy, Prologis, and Abengoa Solar.366 The subject matter, testimony,
questioning, and commenting during these Congressional hearings has
been wide-ranging. One recurring theme has been whether improper polit-
ical favors were employed to secure loan guarantee commitments by certain
recipients.367 These allegations and the integrity of the DOE LGP applica-
tion process is beyond the scope of this Article. However, this Article would
not be complete without referencing these inquiries and allegations.
2. REI vs. REEGI Loan Guarantees
The structure of and risks associated with REI loan guarantees and
REEGI loan guarantees differ. Within the broad spectrum of REI projects
the DOE LGP was directed to support, REEGI projects have a lower risk
profile than general REI loan guarantees.368 The structure of REEGI proj-
ects, whether the DOE committed to the projects under the FIPP program
or as innovative technology REEGI projects, did not possess the same risks
inherent in supporting innovative technology projects, especially manufac-
turing projects.369 Consistent with traditional electricity generation project
finance principles, REEGI projects are structured with firm multi-year
power purchase agreements to creditworthy offtakers, such as utilities,
for the electricity the projects generate.370 The LGP Office imposed the
same or greater due diligence and lending requirements that exist in tradi-
tional project finance markets, thus reducing the risk profile for the DOE
through project risk mitigation for successful applicants.371
The different risk profiles between REI and REEGI loan guarantees
highlight the inconsistency in the DOE’s mission, as I described in greater
detail below. The DOE was required to select projects that minimized the
risks of default and provided reasonable prospects for repayment. Yet at
Gamble], available at http://oversight.house.gov/hearing/the-obama-administrations-green
-energy-gamble-part-ii-were-all-the-taxpayer-subsidies-necessary/.
366 See id.; see also Alicia Mundy & Ryan Tracy, Solar Firm’s Big Push for U.S. Loan, WALL
ST. J., June 6, 2012, at A4 (describing the lobbying efforts by BrightSource Energy to seek
approval for loan guarantee, including hiring of former Biden Chief of Staff and meetings
with White House officials in an effort to seek approval by DOE).
367 See Green Energy Gamble, supra note 365.
368 FIPP Solicitation, supra note 176, at 5.
369 See Appendix. The FIPP Solicitation supported renewable energy generation system
projects employing commercial technologies that were ready for construction, but not for
the financial crisis.
370 See FIPP Solicitation, supra note 176, at 8.
371 See Letter from David G. Frantz, supra note 184.
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the same time, the DOE was required to support innovative technologies
across a broad spectrum of technologies with few commonalities between
them.372 REEGI projects, because of their structures with fully contracted
offtake contracts to mitigate project risk, generally offer much lower risk
profiles when compared to non-REEGI projects in the DOE LGP portfo-
lio, such as solar manufacturing projects.373 The DOE generally faces the
lowest default risk on the most stable projects, such as projects employing
commercial technologies. Yet, the DOE is required to support innovative
technologies, defined as technologies not yet in commercial use, which are
inherently riskier projects. If such projects were low risk, they would have
been financed in the private markets and implemented.
V. DOE LOAN GUARANTEE PROGRAM ANALYSIS
A. Loan Guarantees as a Policy Tool
Loan guarantee programs provide a versatile policy option giving
government the ability to provide targeted, directed support to a small sub-
set of projects. Loan guarantees allow for (1) correction of a market distor-
tion, whether the distortion is caused by a single or related series of events,
(2) support of a nascent or struggling industry, (3) directed benefits to a
specific population, or (4) encouragement of specific private investment.374
When policy makers employ loan guarantee programs, the programs
are more likely to succeed if they receive (1) clear guidance for the scope of
the program, (2) clear expectations of the results sought from the program,
and (3) a reasonable time frame to implement the program.375 Although
loan guarantee programs may be flawed as they have so far been imple-
mented, there is little to support critics’ claims that all loan guarantees are
inherently flawed.376 In the case of the DOE LGP, policy makers did not
adequately provide any of these three parameters. Given the lack of clear
372 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58 § 1703(b), 119 Stat. 594, 1120 (2005).
373 See HERBERT ALLISON, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT CONSULTANT’S REVIEW WITH
RESPECT TO THE DEP’T OF ENERGY LOAN AND LOAN GUARANTEE PORTFOLIO 22, 71 (2012)
[hereinafter INDEPENDENT CONSULTANT’S REPORT], available at http://www.whitehouse
.gov/sites/default/files/docs/report_on_doe_loan_and_guarantee_portfolio.pdf.
374 See generally Joel Darmstadter & Joshua Linn, Loan Guarantees Reconsidered,
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE (2011), available at http://www.rff.org/Publications/WPC
/Pages/Loan-Guarantees-Reconsidered.aspx.
375 See supra Part IV.D.
376 See Jesse Jenkins et al., Solyndra’s Failure Is No Reason to Abandon Federal Energy
Innovation Policy, FORBES (Sept. 2, 2011, 7:33 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/energy
source/2011/09/02/solyndras-failure-is-no-reason-to-abandon-federal-energy-innovation
-policy.
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direction, the DOE was able to craft a successful DOE LGP project port-
folio in spite of its contradictory and ambiguous guidance.
B. Post-Solyndra Lessons
As described above, loan guarantees can stimulate private invest-
ment to a particular area. The Solyndra experience offers a stark reminder
that commercial risks exist in any industry and credit enhancements
(whether publicly or privately provided) do not mitigate the underlying
commercial risks. Just like a private actor providing a loan guarantee,
where the government serves as guarantor, it reduces risk to the lender
and permits the borrower to obtain financing. However, the loan guarantee
itself does not reduce the underlying commercial risk of the borrower’s
business—indeed, if the venture were not risky a guarantor would be un-
necessary. As discussed above, the defaults to date in the DOE LGP port-
folio are more attributable to inherent market risk than fundamental
failure of loan guarantees in general.377 The DOE loan guarantee recipi-
ents that have filed for bankruptcy to date were all manufacturing projects.
Two of the three projects were solar panel manufacturers, an industry that
has undergone significant contraction in the past several years.378
Loan guarantees offer policymakers significant flexibility and the
ability to provide targeted support. By their nature, loan guarantees do not
address commercial risks of the underlying business; rather, they serve to
incentivize private lenders to provide financing to the targeted industry.
Government then must identify its risk tolerance to the underlying com-
mercial risks. The LGP sought applicants that were financially viable on
a stand-alone basis in an effort to mitigate the underlying commercial
risks.379 As the DOE’s prior experience demonstrates, projects will fail
where there are fundamental market failures, as the DOE experienced
with its synthetic fuels projects.380 When the underlying market conditions
changed, these businesses failed.381
377 See supra notes 342, 343, and accompanying text.
378 See Gat, supra note 297.
379 The LGP Office, in issuing its solicitations, required applicants demonstrate acceptable
credit ratings without giving effect to the proposed loan guarantee. See FIPP Solicitation,
supra note 176, at 9.
380 See also MICHAEL GRAETZ, THE END OF ENERGY: THE UNMAKING OF AMERICA’S ENVIRON-
MENT, SECURITY, AND INDEPENDENCE 120 (2011) (describing implementation of the Energy
Tax Act of 1978. The Energy Tax Act included subsidies for, solar power as well as synthetic
fuels. The Department of Energy ran a loan guarantee program to develop innovative tech-
nologies from the late 1970s until the 1980s). See generally Herrick, supra note 117, at
259–60 (describing DOE’s synthetic fuel loan guarantee program).
381 See supra Part IV.D.2. In the syngas period, when government incentives for this area
ended, various projects failed, including those with DOE loan guarantees. Today, loan
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C. Conflicting Statutory Intent
The conflicting Congressional mandates provided to the DOE LGP
are largely responsible for the delays in the DOE LGP implementation. The
initial scope of the DOE LGP was overly broad when it was first authorized.
As previously discussed the original program under Section 1703 covered
ten broad technology categories and was designed to support inherently
risky technologies on the cusp of commercialization.382 Yet, the DOE LGP
also was required to select projects that showed a “reasonable prospect of
repayment.”383 In contrast, Section 1705 mandated the DOE fund “com-
mercial” rather than “innovative” technologies—commercial projects that
would save and create jobs.384 Neither the original mandate nor the new
mandate came with much guidance as to which technologies or what levels
of risk would be acceptable to promote the broad field of technologies.385
Given that the DOE had yet to issue a single loan guarantee by the time
the ARRA was enacted, this timing was quite ambitious. The DOE had to
hire staff, promulgate regulations, identify professionals to assist the DOE,
and draft and issue solicitations seeking applications, all before even con-
sidering the applications it would receive.386 The DOE then had to select ap-
propriate 1705 Program recipients by the sunset date in September 2011.
Furthermore, under its statutory directives, the successful applicants under
Section 1705 had to meet specific federal environmental, prevailing wage,
and Buy American requirements that applicants would not have had to
satisfy in the private markets.387
The DOE faced a difficult task in enunciating its mission. As the
GAO consistently noted, the LGP Office did not establish clear methods
to evaluate projects, either at the application stage or during the ongo-
ing monitoring stage, nor did it create clear criteria to measure project
guarantees must act in concert with other government incentives for a period, because the
REI is not yet self-sustaining. Loan guarantees will not enable industries to achieve financial
viability but will serve to attract financing to projects.
382 See Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 1703, 42 U.S.C. § 16513 (2006); supra note 149 and
accompanying text.
383 Our Mission, Loan Programs Office, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://lpo.energy.gov/?page
_id=17 (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
384 See supra notes 146–47 (defining commercial and new/significantly improved technology).
It may be argued that technology loan guarantee programs are not the best suited to create
jobs, however, this is beyond the scope of this Article.
385 See 10 C.F.R. § 609.1, § 609.2 (offering vague definitions of eligible technologies).
386 See supra notes 153–56, and accompanying text.
387 See supra notes 185–87, and accompanying text.
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performance.388 It is hard to envision how the DOE could possibly come
up with clear and concise criteria, given the breadth of types of technologies
and differing stages of projects and technologies the DOE was required
to support. In some of its assessments, GAO did note that the DOE would
have difficulty learning from experience, as other agencies had done when
developing their loan guarantee programs, because the DOE had to de-
vote significant amounts of time to each project and there was little if any
overlap between the types of projects the DOE was required to support.389
Ironically, in 2008 the GAO recommended the DOE look to Fannie Mae and
Sallie Mae programs as examples for well-run loan guarantee programs.390
For the 1705 Program loan guarantees, the DOE had a limited
window to request applications, review and approve them before the
September 30, 2011 sunset date.391 Certain types of lower-risk projects,
such as infrastructure projects, by their nature take a long time to de-
velop before they are ready for financing. A REEGI project might take
several years conducting site research and permitting before a developer
selects the final configuration for a project.392 In addition to project devel-
opment, the DOE’s statutory requirements, such as NEPA review, could
add anywhere from six to eighteen months of additional time to any given
application.393 Because of the limited time available to implement the 1705
Program, the DOE naturally turned to applicants who had previously
388 See KEY STEPS NEEDED, supra note 153, at 27, 36; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-07-798T, supra note 231 and accompanying text.
389 See GAO RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 141, at 2.
390 See id. The GAO’s recommendation for the DOE to examine Fannie Mae’s loan guar-
antee program for its clear performance metrics and streamlined loan guarantee process
was ironic. About three months after the GAO’s report, Fannie Mae (the Federal National
Mortgage Association) and its sister government sponsored enterprise, Freddie Mac
(Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation) experienced massive losses and had to be
taken over by the Federal government and placed into conservatorship.
391 1705, Loan Programs Office, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://lpo.energy.gov/?page_id=41
(last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
392 For example, for wind generation, developers set up testing equipment to measure wind
speed in various locations and track results over any extended period of time, because wind
can change seasonally. Likewise, solar projects must determine how much sun a location
gets. Geothermal projects likely take the most time, as land options must be obtained, then
test wells bored to assess whether a particular area has sufficient steam—much like ex-
ploration for any other underground natural resource. See, e.g., Joshua Moss, Wind Energy
in Michigan, MICHIGAN POLICY NETWORK (May 6, 2012), http://www.michiganpolicy.com
/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1199:wind-energy-in-michigan&catid
=39:energy-and-environment-policy-briefs&Itemid=138.
393 NEPA TASK FORCE REPORT TO CEQ, MODERNIZING NEPA IMPLEMENTATION 66 (2003),
available at http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/ntf/report/finalreport.pdf.
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applied under the 1703 Program to the extent these applicants also qual-
ified under the 1705 Program, thus expediting the DOE’s ability to review
these existing applications.
In addition to the timing constraints, the significant costs to compa-
nies of application to the DOE LGP (in terms of time, money, and uncer-
tainty) limited the number and type of applicants to the program.394 The
applicants were self-selecting and had to be of significant enough size to
bear these costs. A majority of the final projects were REEGI projects,
whether funded as innovative technology projects or commercial technol-
ogy projects under the partial guarantee FIPP solicitation.395
The LGP Office also supported manufacturing sector projects like
Solyndra, Abound Solar, and Beacon Power. These were the largest com-
mitments to manufacturing projects supported by the DOE LGP.396 As dis-
cussed above, while manufacturing projects were attractive because they
most easily met the mandate for creating new jobs or protecting existing
ones, they are inherently more risky. That risk comes from the fact that
there is not a long-term offtake contract for the sale of manufactured
goods—not necessarily from the underlying technology.397 However risky
such projects might have been, the DOE was directed to support manufac-
turing ventures as well as REEGI projects.
Much of the continuing criticism of the DOE LGP is whether the
DOE met its objectives. It may be easy to point to Solyndra as “proof” that
the DOE has failed, but to do so is both unfair and unfounded. Unfair in
that the DOE never received clearly defined goals from Congress.398 Un-
founded in that the DOE LGP has been able to succeed in using federal
commitments to attract private investment to and financing of the REI
that otherwise might not have occurred absent DOE support.399
394 Our Projects, Loan Programs Office, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://lpo.energy.gov/?page
_id=45 (last visited Jan. 30, 2013) (listing only 2-1703 Program projects, 26-1705 Program
projects and 5 ATVM projects approved for guarantees).
395 See id. Of the 33 projects guaranteed, at least half were generation projects. See also,
FIPP Solicitation, supra note 176, at 5–8 (providing for generation projects’ eligibility but
excluding manufacturing projects).
396 Our Projects, Loan Programs Office, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://lpo.energy.gov/?page
_id=45/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2013). In addition to Solyndra and Abound Solar, the LGP
Office also supported two other solar manufacturers: 1366 Technologies, Inc. and SoloPower.
397 See INDEPENDENT CONSULTANT’S REPORT, supra note 373, at 22, 71 (discussing how gen-
eration projects lend themselves to steady offtake contracts).
398 See supra notes 144, 145, and accompanying text.
399 See, e.g., Eligibility, Loan Programs Office, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://lpo.energy.gov
/?page_id=31 (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
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In spite of the fractured and disjointed directives for the DOE LGP,
it has managed to produce a relatively stable loan portfolio to date, notwith-
standing the criticism of the program. The DOE LGP has a loan portfolio
heavily weighted with lower risk REEGI projects.400 The DOE provided
significant support under the FIPP solicitation, in which the DOE provided
eighty percent partial loan guarantees to lender applicants, thus sharing
project risk with lenders.401
1. Responses to Common Critiques of the DOE LGP
There have been many critics of the DOE LGP, especially post-
Solyndra.402 Some focus on the failures of Solyndra specifically,403 while
others have broad critiques of loan guarantees. Still others are generally
opposed to any government incentives, whether tax incentives, loan guar-
antees, or other forms of federal credit support to the REI.404
400 See Our Projects, Loan Programs Office, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://lpo.energy.gov
/?page_id=45 (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
401 FIPP Solicitation, supra note 176, at 8. It would be instructive to consider whether par-
tial risk loan guarantee programs generally lower default rates more than comprehensive
guarantee programs, perhaps because of additional private lender due diligence. Evaluating
this would be complicated, given the different intent of various loan guarantee programs.
402 See Naureen S. Malik & Cassandra Sweet, Proposal Aims to Gut DOE Loan Program,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870380630457
6232712438183564.html (describing a Republican House Budget proposal seeking to cut the
$41 billion loan guarantee program included in the President’s FY2012 budget. The article
quoted Rob Gillette, then CEO of First Solar, “The DOE loan program provides an impor-
tant financing ‘bridge’ at a time when the U.S. private debt markets have little to no ex-
perience financing first of their kind utility-scale solar projects.” The CFO of NRG Energy,
Inc. was quoted, “Without the federal loan guarantee program, private-sector capital
earmarked for this and other clean-energy projects will stay on the sidelines.”).
403 See, e.g., The No More Solyndras Act (H.R. 6213), HOUSE ENERGY & COMMERCE
COMMITTEE (Sept. 10, 2012), http://energycommerce.house.gov/fact-sheet/no-more-solyndras
-act-hr-6213. Some members of Congress have recommended limiting or defunding the pro-
gram in its entirety. As recently as July 2012, Congressman Upton introduced legislation
he termed the “No More Solyndras Act.” Congressional Republicans Target Clean Energy
Loan Guarantee Programs, PLATTS (July 10, 2012, 2:45 PM), http://www.platts.com/RSS
FeedDetailedNews/RSSFeed/ElectricPower/6453353.
404 See Autumn Hanna, Department of Energy: Loan Guarantee Program Overview,
TAXPAYERS FOR COMMON SENSE (Apr. 2011), available at C. As of the date of publication,
groups prepared summaries and tables outlining the appropriations for the 1703 and 1705
Programs, as well as noting the differences between parties regarding continued support
for the program. But see Jenkins et al., supra note 376 (arguing that Solyndra is a small part
of the entire LGP portfolio, that the leverage the government has provided is essential to
bridge the Valley of Death, and that we should redouble our efforts to support innovation
lest the United States gets left behind).
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Some of the most vocal critiques of the DOE LGP can be described
as variations of the positions first set forth by Henry Hazlitt. Mr. Hazlitt
wrote in 1946 of the dangers of government involvement in the private
sector, focusing on the view that government investment distorts private
investment, deprives government investment to other sources, and results
in an improper reallocation of wealth.405
Critics of the DOE LGP generally repeat the same arguments Mr.
Hazlitt noted in 1946. Mr. Hazlitt’s Economics in One Lesson is a classic ex-
position of the Austrian School of Economics, a cornerstone for libertarian
tenets, and an excellent book.406 There is certainly a basis for Hazlitt’s ar-
guments about credit diverting production.407 However, applying Hazlitt’s
theoretical critiques to this modern day program, over a half century after
Hazlitt published his work, is not as straightforward as critics might
suggest. The debate over the merits or pitfalls of loan guarantees for REI
projects does not neatly fit into Mr. Hazlitt’s theoretical example of gov-
ernment loan guarantees to a farmer who would not otherwise qualify for
loans in the private market.408 Mr. Hazlitt assumes a market exists in
which private lenders are available and are lending money to farmers,
except for one farmer.409 In his example, the government elects to provide
a loan guarantee subsidy to the one farmer who is unable to get financing
from private capital.410 The remainder of Mr. Hazlitt’s analysis focuses on
the effects of government action and its consequences on other parties, all
in the name of helping the one farmer.411
This simple example does not fit the modern day DOE LGP. First,
there is not an active and robust financing market absent government
guarantees, or government intervention as a more general matter. For
example, when the 1705 Program was implemented, there was virtually
no access to private capital.412 Second, the REI is not a simple commodity
where there is a liquid market and there are multiple participants most
of whom have access to capital. In other words, one company (the farmer)
does not necessarily fail where the remainder of companies in the broad
industry (agriculture) thrive purely on private market and private capital
405 See generally HENRY HAZLITT, ECONOMICS IN ONE LESSON (21979) “Government ‘encour-
agement’ to business is sometimes as much to be feared as government hostility.” Id. at 40.
406 See id. at 211.
407 Id. at 40.
408 Id.
409 Id. at 41–44.
410 Id. at 44.
411 HAZLITT, supra note 405, at 44.
412 See Gat, supra note 297, and accompanying text.
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investments. There is no traditional commodity market in the REI, mean-
ing all borrowers look alike, nor is there great depth.413 As discussed be-
fore, one difficulty in assessing the REI is the vast and stratified nature
of the field. It is not realistic to compare a solar panel manufacturer to a
utility scale wind farm electrical generating facility. For at least the 1703
Program, the very focus of the DOE LGP was to support projects that had
not yet reached commercial viability; therefore, they were not likely to ob-
tain bank financing.414 Third, the markets today and government impact
on participation in the market is different than it was in 1946.
The arguments against loan guarantees first used by Mr. Hazlitt
and repeated in one form or another by current critics include (1) the gov-
ernment is not well suited to pick winners and losers,415 (2) federal loan
guarantees socialize costs and privatize gains,416 (3) loan guarantees create
moral hazards,417 and (4) government capital crowds out private capital
through a distortion of the market.418
This Part briefly describes each argument and provides a short
response.419 The DOE LGP is not perfect, and may deserve some criticism
413 See Daniela Pylypczak, Which Solar Energy ETF Is Right for You? TAN vs. KWT,
COMMODITY HQ (Oct. 12, 2012), http://commodityhq.com/2012/which-solar-energy-etf-is
-right-for-you-tan-vs-kwt/.
414 See Eligibility, Loan Programs Office, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://lpo.energy.gov
/?page_id=31 (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
415 See, e.g., De Rugy Testimony, supra note 326, at 9; see also NPR, Marketplace Report,
with Guest Speaker David Frum, Sept. 14, 2011, available at http://www.marketplace.org
/topics/commentary/its-not-easy-funding-green (last visited Jan. 30, 2013) (stating that
government is not good at playing venture capitalist because of the competing goals gov-
ernment has in addition to generating a positive return).
416 See, e.g., De Rugy Testimony, supra note 326, at 7.
417 See J.W. Verret, No, Dude, We Don’t Need More Solyndras, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2011),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/dec/9/no-dude-we-dont-need-more-solyndras/;
see also J.W. Verret, Energy Secretary Chu, I Told You So on Solyndra, TRUTH ON THE
MARKET BLOG (Dec. 10, 2011), http://truthonthemarket.com/2011/12/10/energy-secretary
-chu-i-told-you-so-on-solyndra/; Marc A. Thiessen, Forget Bain—Obama’s Public-Equity
Record Is the Real Scandal, WASH. POST (May 24, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com
/opinions/forget-bain-obamas-public-equity-record-is-the-real-scandal/2012/05/24
/gJQAXnXCnU_story.html (chronicling the many failed government loan guarantees). But
see Jill Fitzsimmons, Marc Thiessen Distorts Success Rate of Clean Energy Investments,
MEDIA MATTERS BLOG (May 25, 2012, 5:25 PM), http://mediamatters.org/blog/2012/05/25
/marc-thiessen-distorts-success-rate-of-clean-en/186692 (responding that private venture
capital loans fail frequently too).
418 See De Rugy Testimony, supra note 326, at 9.
419 A full law and economics analysis of each of Hazlitt’s arguments is beyond the scope of
this Article, but no discussion of the DOE LGP would be complete without acknowledging
the discourse and offering limited responses.
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with respect to its execution. However, these theoretical critiques fall short
of accurately describing the problems with the DOE LGP. They are in-
accurate or fail to offer policy makers constructive feedback on redressing
the DOE LGP’s shortcomings.
a. Government Is Not Well Suited to Pick Winners and Losers
This first argument typically begins by stating that government
is not properly suited to venture capitalism and goes hand-in-hand with
the argument that government is not suited to pick winners and losers.420
This assertion misstates both the role of loan guarantees and of venture
capitalists. Venture capitalists (“VCs”) invest equity in businesses that
cannot be supported by public shareholders and seek a significant risk-
based return on investment. In return for the prospect of a higher return,
VCs typically take greater risks than other investors, so will invest in a
number of businesses, knowing some will fail.421
Additionally, the government is not an investor. The DOE, in the
role of guarantor, does not take equity risk, but rather backstops secured
lenders in their financings to eligible businesses. If a business defaults,
the DOE is subrogated to the rights of the secured lender and would
stand ahead of all equity investors, including VCs.422 Equating the gov-
ernment to VCs is an inaccurate characterization of the DOE LGP’s role
in these transactions.
The argument that government is not well suited to pick winners
and losers covers several fronts. One aspect of this argument addresses the
moral hazard issue discussed below, on whether improper influence may
be exerted to obtain government subsidies. Another aspect of this argu-
ment is whether the government may apply different criteria than the pri-
vate market in choosing winners and whether this is appropriate.423 The
purpose of the DOE LGP, unfortunately, was not clearly stated in its or-
ganic legislation, which has made it difficult for the DOE to clearly define
its mission. With a well-stated purpose, a loan guarantee program should
be able to set clear criteria for awarding applicants, thus mitigating the
420 See De Rugy Testimony, supra note 326, at 9.
421 Fitzsimmons, supra note 417.
422 See Memorandum for General Counsel, supra note 335, at 1.
423 See Hans A. von Spakovsky, Solyndra E-mail Explodes Myth of Nonpartisan Civil
Service, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (Sept. 16, 2011, 3:07 PM), http://www.nationalreview
.com/corner/277485/solyndra-e-mail-explodes-myth-nonpartisan-civil-service-hans-von
-spakovsky; see also Daniel Foster, Treasury Audit: Solyndra Was a Rush Job, NATIONAL
REVIEW ONLINE (Apr. 4, 2012, 11:59 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/295266
/treasury-audit-solyndra-was-rush-job-daniel-foster.
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risks Mr. Hazlitt first noted. It is not possible to have an infallible program.
Time will tell whether the DOE LGP portfolio has been successful in pick-
ing winners and losers.
On a related note, another critic has suggested that the DOE LGP
has created economic rent-seeking behavior and therefore is not efficient.
J.W. Verret asserted,
As an example of the distortionary effects of government
guarantees on the private market, the Department of
Energy’s generous $40 billion loan to businesses working
on alternative energy technology has caused much of the
venture capital industry to focus on those firms able to ob-
tain funding through negotiations with the government
rather than on firms able to germinate profitable ideas.424
There are certainly arguments to be made about whether incentives
for renewable energy are an efficient allocation of resources. However, it
is worth highlighting that Professor Verret’s commentary on loan guaran-
tees suffers from inaccuracies in the popular press. The article on which he
relies for his statement about the DOE refers to direct loans made by the
DOE under the ATVM program, not loan guarantee commitments under
the DOE LGP.425 Loans and loan guarantees are not the same and in any
case, neither would be considered equity. Venture capital by its very nature
is at-risk equity capital. To equate Solyndra’s failure with rent-seeking
behavior of venture capital firms seeking ATVM loans seems misplaced.
Query whether venture capital firms choosing to support businesses that
secure DOE ATVM loans as a barometer of likely success is an act of eco-
nomic rent seeking, if they do not seek the loans for themselves, but rather
agree to invest after the DOE agrees to lend.
b. Loan Guarantees Socialize Costs and Privatize Gains
Mr. Hazlitt argued that loan guarantees socialize costs and pri-
vatize gains.426 The argument is that government absorbs all the losses
424 See J.W. Verret, The Bailout Through a Public Choice Lens: Government Controlled
Corporations as a Mechanism for Rent Transfer, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1521, 1525 (2010)
(considering the implications of the TARP program’s equity investment in a number of
private sector businesses through the lens of public choice theory, proposing that these
investments are fairly novel and pose significant opportunities for rent seeking by trans-
ferring politically conferred rents to interest groups).
425 Neil King Jr., Venture Capital: New VC Force, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2009, http://online
.wsj.com/article/SB126074549073889853.html.
426 HAZLITT, supra note 405, at 45.
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in a downside scenario, i.e., when the loan guarantee is called, but the
lender benefits from the gains on the upside.427 An extension to this argu-
ment is that the bureaucrat is willing to take more risks with taxpayers’
money than private business would on its own and therefore takes on
excessive risks.
The first element of this argument that costs are socialized—
spread across the taxpayers—is correct, but the aggregate cost depends
on the amount not recovered on any particular defaulted loan. The DOE
LGP’s loan guarantees are subrogated to the guaranteed lenders’ security
interests.428 To the extent there is a default on the loan and the DOE must
pay on a loan guarantee, the DOE then gains the rights of the guaranteed
lenders and can seek recovery from the borrower.429 Taxpayers bear losses
to the extent the DOE is not able to make a full recovery on the loan. How-
ever, under OMB guidelines, the DOE is required to collect the CSC from
each applicant under the 1703 Program equal to the net present value of
the aggregate potential cost to the tax payer on a discounted cash flow
basis of a potential loan default.430 This borrower pay requirement results
in the borrower, not the taxpayer, bearing potential costs.
The second element of this argument is that gains are privatized.431
Presumably, this refers to the benefit the private lender receives by mak-
ing a virtually risk-free loan guaranteed by the government. This theo-
retical argument fails when actually applied to the DOE LGP, because
pursuant to OMB Circular A-129 guidelines, the lender for one-hundred
percent loan guarantees is the Federal Financing Bank.432 Thus, in prac-
tice, one-hundred percent loans are therefore socialized gains, rather than
privatized gains. Partial risk guarantees, such as the eighty percent FIPP
solicitation, would result in privatized gains to lenders for the guaranteed
portion of their loans.433 However, there are policy reasons that such guar-
antees may be beneficial, notwithstanding the privatized gains, such as
the additional diligence provided by private lenders with money at risk in
the transaction.
427 Id.
428 See Memorandum for the General Counsel, supra note 335.
429 Larry Parker & Mark Holt, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33442, NUCLEAR POWER:
OUTLOOK FOR NEW U.S. REACTORS CRS-11 (2007), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp
/crs/misc/RL33442.pdf.
430 See supra note 207.
431 See HAZLITT, supra note 405, at 45; De Rugy Testimony, supra note 326, at 7.
432 CIRC. A-129, supra note 116, at II3f.
433 See FIPP, FIPP Hooray . . . ?, supra note 189.
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Another perspective of the privatized gains argument would state
that the company receiving the benefit of the loan guarantee has privat-
ized gains that it does not share with government. In the private market,
a guarantor would likely receive an equity stake in exchange for provid-
ing a guarantee and that gain is not provided to the government.434 Setting
aside whether the guarantee fee charged is sufficient,435 the privatizing
gains argument overlooks the policy reasons to have loan guarantees—to
promote growth and sustainability of technologies in clean and renew-
able energy with the goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and reduc-
ing dependence on foreign oil imports.436 When projects succeed, these
broader policy purposes are advanced, not simply the gains made by the
company’s owners.
c. Loan Guarantees Create Moral Hazards
The argument is that beneficiaries of loan guarantees, lenders, have
a moral hazard in that they are likely to take greater risks in the loans
they make when they receive loan guarantees. As noted above, OMB has
addressed this in its policies by having loans with one-hundred percent
loan guarantees by made by the FFB, rather than fully guaranteeing pri-
vate lenders.437
The moral hazard argument includes concerns that bureaucrats
and politicians will be influenced to award government favors, such as
loan guarantees as patronage. This argument has received the most wide-
spread attention, with many allegations that supporters and fundraisers of
President Obama were loan guarantee recipients or received special treat-
ment, because of their status.438 Whether improper actions occurred under
the DOE LGP is still under investigation.439 As of this writing, the author
434 See INDEPENDENT CONSULTANT’S REPORT, supra note 373, at 18.
435 In addition to the CSC that the DOE and OMB calculate, the DOE also charges appli-
cants a separate guarantee fee.
436 See Our Mission, Loan Programs Office, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://lpo.energy.gov
/?page_id=17 (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
437 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, 112th Cong., REP. ON
THE DEP’T OF ENERGY’S DISASTROUS MANAGEMENT OF LOAN GUARANTEE PROGRAMS n.105
(2012), available at http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/FINAL-DOE
-Loan-Guarantees-Report.pdf.
438 See, e.g., Lachlan Markay, Report: 80% of DOE Green Energy Loans Went to Obama
Backers, FOUNDRY (Nov. 14, 2011, 10:43 AM), http://blog.heritage.org/2011/11/14/report
-80-of-doe-green-energy-loans-went-to-obama-backers/.
439 Press Release, H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Committee Leaders Probe DOE’s
Knowledge of Loan Recipient’s Faulty Solar Panels—Now-Bankrupt Abound Awarded
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is not aware of any individual or firm having been criminally charged or
indicted for their involvement in the award of any loan guarantee under
the DOE LGP.
There is always a risk that favoritism is a factor when an award is
made. For the DOE LGP, the only way to mitigate this concern would be
a clear and transparent review and approval process for loan guarantee
applicants. As noted earlier, the review process by the LGP Office and then
OMB was lengthy, uncertain, and not transparent. It would be beyond the
scope of this Article to discuss whether improprieties occurred, but the
review process may have needed significant improvement.440
Another element of the moral hazard argument could be that gov-
ernment involvement stifles private capital investment and finance. Where
government guaranteed loans are available, lenders will flock to these and
will avoid non-guaranteed loans, and in this manner may create a moral
hazard for lenders to put risks on the government. Certainly, lenders will
or should charge a lower interest rate to borrowers that have a better
credit profile as a result of a guarantee. Since loan guarantees covering
private lender loans require the lenders to hold twenty percent of the risk,
such private lenders will be less likely to extend credit to disproportionately
risky borrowers.441
d. Loan Guarantees Crowd Out Private Capital
The argument is that when government injects capital in one sector
through loan guarantees, the government’s act of borrowing funds in the
markets crowds out private investors’ ability to borrow money in the mar-
kets, given the government’s need to borrow funds.442 However, it is worth
contrasting this general argument of crowding out with the actual reality
of timing and market consequences for federal loan guarantee commit-
ments. First, the lender, not the guarantor, provides the loan commitment.
Loan guarantees are not full loan commitments issued on the date of finan-
cial closing to a borrower.443 Thus, at the time of financial close for a guar-
anteed loan, whether the loan is made by a private lender or a government
lender, the only party going to the market for capital would be the lender.
$400 Million Loan Guarantee from Same Program as Solyndra, Oct. 10, 2012, available
at http://energycommerce.house.gov/press-release/committee-leaders-probe-does-knowledge
-loan-recipients-faulty-solar-panels-%E2%80%93-now.
440 See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
441 See FIPP Solicitation, supra note 176, at 18.
442 See De Rugy Testimony, supra note 326, at 9.
443 See 2 U.S.C. § 661a(3), (4) (defining what a federal loan guarantee is).
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The guarantor has a contingent liability, valued up to the face amount of
the loan (plus interest, fees and expenses) owed to the lender.444 Upon a
default, the lender may draw upon the guarantee. Following enactment of
FCRA and the subsequent policy circulars issued by OMB, how the DOE
and other agencies book loan guarantees changed.445 Now, the DOE does
not book the entire amount of the loan as its contingent liability.446 Rather,
at closing of the loan guarantee, the DOE books the CSC for the loan guar-
antee commitment, then the DOE revises its CSC estimate for each project
annually.447 The crowding out argument posed by Mr. Hazlitt may be ap-
propriate with respect to the CSC once a non-recoverable default arises,
but the effect is a future crowding out of private capital at best.448
Mr. Hazlitt’s economics lesson on government credit stated:
When the government makes loans or subsidies to business,
what it does is to tax successful private business in order to
support unsuccessful private business. Under certain emer-
gency circumstances there may be a plausible argument for
this, the merits of which we need not examine here. But in
the long run it does not sound like a paying proposition from
the standpoint of the country as a whole. And experience
has shown that it isn’t.449
Mr. Hazlitt noted that there are circumstances where credit programs,
such as loan guarantees, have a place.450 However, he does not support per-
manent loan guarantee programs or similar federal credit programs.451
444 See supra note 109.
445 CBO, ESTIMATING THE VALUE OF SUBSIDIES FOR FEDERAL LOANS AND LOAN GUARANTEES
1 (2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/Publication/15923.
446 See CIRC. A-11, supra note 206, at 185.5.
447 Id.; see also supra notes 209–11.
448 Interestingly, when Mr. Hazlitt first made his argument on crowding out in 1946, most
lenders to the federal government were likely domestic. Similarly, most investors in lenders
and purchasers of U.S. Treasury securities were likely domestic investors. Today, with
many U.S. Treasuries held by foreign sovereigns and foreign investors, the Hazlitt crowding
out argument proposed by some critics may hold less weight—domestic lenders are not
competing for investors with U.S. treasuries; it is a different audience of buyers. See The
Absorption Problem, ECONOMICS INTERACTIVE, http://www.unc.edu/depts/econ/byrns_web
/Economicae/Figures/Absorp_Equation.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
449 HAZLITT, supra note 405, at 47, 48.
450 Id. at 48.
451 Id.
506 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 37:425
CONCLUSION
As a general matter, loan guarantee programs can provide a ver-
satile policy option to provide targeted, directed support to a small subset
of projects. Loan guarantees allow policy makers to (1) stimulate private
investments in particular industries, (2) provide emergency stabilization
to a particular sector following an incident, and (3) provide support to a
specific population or for a specific type of activity.452 However, the effec-
tiveness of any particular loan guarantee program depends on how well
the authorizing legislation was drafted and how effectively the agency is
able to implement the regulations.
In the case of the DOE LGP, DOE has had mixed success during the
program’s brief tenure. Implementation of the DOE LGP has been chal-
lenging, because Congressional guidance was both overly broad in scope
in its initial authorization and too limited in its emergency implementation
phase. Conflicting goals for the program made it difficult for the DOE to
navigate a clear path through its legislative mandates.453 However, the
DOE has managed to create a relatively stable portfolio of projects not-
withstanding Congress’s lack of clear direction. With better direction, the
DOE LGP may have been able to create a more carefully structured loan
guarantee program for which performance measures had been developed.
Traditional critiques of loan guarantees may have merit as a
theoretical matter, but are less effective when used to critique a specific
program, such as the DOE LGP. Loan guarantees can serve as a useful
credit enhancement tool to support the REI. However, loan guarantees
cannot sustain the REI in isolation and must be one piece of a broader
approach to developing, encouraging, and supporting the REI.454
452 See supra note 374 and accompanying text. In my review of existing federal loan guar-
antee programs, I believe these programs can be divided into these three broad categories.
Any further consideration of these categories and effectiveness of other loan guarantee
programs is beyond the scope of this Article.
453 See supra notes 144, 145, and accompanying text.
454 See supra note 16.
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APPENDIX
SOLICITATIONS ISSUED BY DOE UNDER THE 1703 PROGRAM, THE 1705
PROGRAM AND THE ATVM PROGRAM455
OMB
No.
Solicitation
No. Program
Opening
Date
Closing
Date456
Amount
(in bil-
lions)
Tech-
nology
1910-
5129
DE-PS01-
06LG00001 1703 8/8/2006 11/6/2006 2B 457
Federal Loan Guarantees For Projects That Employ Innovative Technologies In Support Of
The Advanced Energy Initiative
DE-FOA-
0000007 1703 7/11/2008 12/2/2008 2B 458
Federal Loan Guarantees For Front End Nuclear Facilities, Amendment #1
DE-FOA-
0000006 1703 7/11/2008 12/19/2008 18.5B 459
Federal Loan Guarantees For Nuclear Power Facilities, Amendment #1
DE-FOA-
0000008 1703 9/22/2008 3/23/2009 6B 460
Federal Loan Guarantees For Coal-Based Power Generation And Industrial Gasification
Facilities That Incorporate Carbon Capture And Sequestration Or Other Beneficial Uses Of
Carbon And For Advanced Coal Gasification Facilities, Initial
DE-FOA-
0000005 1703 10/29/2008 4/30/2009 10B 461
Federal Loan Guarantees For Projects That Employ Innovative Energy Efficiency, Renewable
Energy, And Advanced Transmission And Distribution Technologies, Amendment #2
456457458459460461
455 Solicitations, LOAN PROGRAMS OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://lpo.energy.gov
/?page_id=58 (last visited Jan. 31, 2013) (listing solicitations issued by DOE under the 1703
Program, 1705 Program and ATVM Program. Solicitations are organized chronologically
by the opening date.).
456 Closing date refers to latest Part ii Application deadline.
457 Ten Categories of technologies for this solicitation were: Biomass; Hydrogen; Solar; Wind
& Hydropower; Fossil Energy Coal; Carbon Sequestration Practices and Technologies;
Efficient Electricity Transmission and Delivery and Energy Reliability; Alternative Fuel
Vehicles; Industrial Energy Efficiency Projects; Pollution Control Equipment, each em-
ploying New or Significantly Improved Technologies.
458 Front end nuclear facilities employing New or Significantly Improved Technologies.
459 Nuclear power facilities employing New or Significantly Improved Technologies.
460 Advanced coal based power generation, industrial gasification or advanced coal gasi-
fication facility employing New or Significantly Improved Technologies.
461 Energy efficiency, renewable energy and advanced transmission and distribution tech-
nologies that constitute New or Significantly Improved Technologies.
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OMB
No.
Solicitation
No. Program
Opening
Date
Closing
Date
Amount
(in bil-
lions)
Tech-
nology
ATVM 11/12/2008 12/31/2008462 25B463 464
Advanced Technology Vehicle Manufacturing Loan Program
1910-
5134 
DE-FOA-
0000132 1705 7/29/2009 10/26/2009 750M465 466
Electric Power Transmission Infrastructure Investment Projects
1910-
5134 
DE-FOA-
0000140 All 7/29/2009 12/31/2010 8.5B467 468
Federal Loan Guarantees For Projects That Employ Innovative Energy Efficiency, Renewable
Energy, And Advanced Transmission And Distribution Technologies, Initial
462463464465466467468
462 See Interim Final Rule 10 C.F.R. § 611.101, at 73 Federal Register No. 219 at 66721,
Nov 12, 2008 providing initial submission deadline. Subsequent applications will be con-
sidered at the end of each subsequent calendar quarter depending on availability of funds
and authority.
463 DOE may not issue more than $25B in principal amount of direct loans and the credit
subsidy cost (“CSC”) and administrative expenses may not exceed $7.51B, which equates
to a projected 30.04% default rate.
464 Automotive manufacturers and component suppliers to finance the cost (1) to reequip,
expand, or establish manufacturing facilities in the U.S. to produce advanced technology
vehicles and qualifying components and (2) for engineering integration performed in the
United States for advanced technology vehicles and qualifying components.
465 There was no cap on the amount of loan guarantees that could be issued, however, the
solicitations capped the aggregate amount of CSC for projects that received loan guar-
antees under this solicitation.
466 Conventional technology complex electric transmission systems projects meeting one
of the following criteria: (1) new or upgraded transmission lines of at least 100 miles of
500kV or at least 150 miles of 345kV, (2) at least 30 miles of underwater cable, (3) high
voltage DC component, (4) is a major interregional connector, (5) is designated a National
Interest Electric Transmission Corridor under EPAct 2005, (6) is associated with offshore
generation (open ocean wave energy, ocean thermal or offshore wind), (7) mitigates sub-
stantial reliability risk for a major population center, or (8) set of improvements for State
or region that criteria in (1).
467 For Section 1703 Program recipients, up to $8.5 billion was allocated for the aggregate
commitment of loan guarantees issued under this solicitation. For Section 1705 Program
recipients, there was no cap on the amount of loan guarantees issued, however, the solici-
tations capped the aggregate amount of CSC for projects to $2.5 billion in Credit Subsidy
Costs, with a sublimit of $500 million for leading edge biofuels projects.
468 For Section 1703 Program—Category 1: Alternative Fuel Vehicles; Category 2: Biomass;
Category 3: Efficient Electricity Transmission, Distribution and Storage; Category 4: Energy
Efficient Building Technologies and Applications; Category 5: Geothermal; Category 6:
Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technologies; Category 7: Energy Efficiency Projects; Category 8:
Solar; Category 9: Wind and Hydropower.
For Section 1705 Categories 2, 3, 5, 8, 9 qualified. For both programs, projects must
employ New or Significantly Improved Technologies.
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No.
Solicitation
No. Program
Opening
Date
Closing
Date
Amount
(in bil-
lions)
Tech-
nology
1910-
5134
DE-FOA-
0000166 1705 10/7/2009 1/6/2011 750M469 470
Federal Loan Guarantees For Commercial Technology Renewable Energy Generation Projects
Under The Financial Institution Partnership Program, Initial
1910-
0400
DE-SOL-
0002197 1705 8/10/2010 1/31/2011 750M471 472
Federal Loan Guarantees For Projects That Manufacture Commercial Technology Renewable
Energy Systems And Components, Initial
469470471472
469 There was no cap on the amount of loan guarantees issued, however, the solicitations
capped the aggregate amount at $750 million of CSC for projects that received loan guar-
antees under this solicitation.
470 Exclusively for Commercial Technology Renewable Energy Generation Projects, such
as wind facility, closed-loop biomass facility, open-loop biomass facility, geothermal facility,
landfill gas facility, trash-to-energy facility, hydropower facility, including incremental
hydropower, solar facility, but not for manufacturing, transmission or leading edge bio-
fuels projects.
471 There was no cap on the amount of loan guarantees issued, however, the solicitations
capped the aggregate amount at $750 million of CSC for projects that received loan guar-
antees under this solicitation.
472 Renewable energy manufacturing projects that produce commercial technology products
for generation of electricity or thermal energy, have project costs greater than $75 million,
can obtain a credit rating of ‘BB’ or better from S&P or Fitch or ‘Ba2’ from Moody’s, will cre-
ate or retain jobs in the U.S., and meeting other criteria of Title XVII. FFB financing to be
provided for these 100% loan guarantees.
